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Modèles et méthodes d'évaluation et de gestion des risques appliqués aux 
systèmes de transport de marchandises dangereuses (TMD), reposant sur les 
nouvelles technologies de l'information et de la communication (NTIC) 
 
RESUME : Durant ma thèse de doctorat, j'ai développé plusieurs modèles et méthodes 
d'évaluation des risques dans les systèmes de transport de matières dangereuses. En 
raison de la multiplicité des approches d’évaluation de risque, tous les modèles décrits, 
définis et utilisés sont fondés sur la définition classique du risque technologique - liés à 
l'activité de l'homme - la catégorie des risques accidentels, - ou d'un accident - d'un 
véhicule transportant des matières dangereuses.  
Cette définition des risques est la même pour les conduites que pour le transport par 
route, mais différentes approches méthodologiques pour l’évaluation des risques de 
transport peuvent être abordées:  
Au chapitre 2: une définition générale des marchandises dangereuses a été réalisé 
ainsi que différents types de matières dangereuses considérées. Ensuite, l’étude a été 
focalisé sur les hydrocarbures ainsi que sur les réglementations qui y sont liés. 
Dans le chapitre 3, l’étude a porté sur la définition des risques dans le transport des 
matières dangereuses, respectivement, dans le cas des pipelines ainsi que pour le 
transport routier. 
Au cours du chapitre 4, une description complète de la méthodologie d'évaluation 
des risques de pipelines a été réalisé. Par la suite, au chapitre 5, un modèle innovant et 
technologique a été utilisé afin de décrire un scénario d'accident du GPL par route et 
d’évaluer son impact sur la population concernée. 
Au chapitre 6, j'aborde des modèles et des méthodes innovants pour l’évaluation des 
risques et le contrôle de la DGT par route. Cette méthodologie est basée sur une 
approche «Risk adverse decision making». 
Au chapitre 7, une loi de contrôle optimale de la DGT a été développé et appliqué 
dans le cas d’une infrastructure critique, spécifiquement, dans le cas des tunnels. Enfin, 
le chapitre 8 a pour objectif de résumer mon travail en termes de résultats obtenus au 
cours de ma thèse. 
 
Mots clés : systèmes de transport, marchandises dangereuses, modèles d'évaluation 
des risques, technologies de l'information et de la communication. 
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Models and methods of risk assessment and control in dangerous goods 
transportation (DGT) systems, using innovative information and communication 
technologies (ICT) 
 
ABSTRACT : All the models that I have described and defined originate from the 
classical definition of technological risk, specifically of accidental risk, that is related to 
human activities. The risk I have dealt with is so related to the failure – or accident – 
either of a vehicle on road or a pipeline, transporting dangerous goods (DG). Although 
different means of transportation do not deeply influence the basic definition of risk 
(which is more affected by the quantity, the type and the nature of the transported 
dangerous good), different methodological approaches may be used to evaluate the risk 
in transportation. 
In Chapter 1, some preliminary basic concepts on industrial risk, its assessment and 
its characterisation in the transportation and logistic domain are introduced. On the 
ground of the basic assumption that “an accident may happen” both in road and in 
pipeline transportation, in Chapter 2 I have defined what a DG is, which type of DG I 
have considered in this study, which transportation modalities are generally used, and 
which of them I have chosen for my research activity, and finally, what the main relative 
regulations are present in France, Italy and in general in Europe. Chapter 3 deals with the 
risk definition in the transportation of DG, respectively, in pipeline and on road, starting 
from one risk definition, univocally based on the risks related to humans activities. 
Similarities and differences between pipeline and road transportation risk definition are 
also discussed. Then, in Chapter 4, an original methodology used to describe pipeline 
risk assessment has been defined and validated on a case study. In Chapter 5, an 
innovative and technological real-time approach which can be used to describe the 
effects of a DG accident scenario on road, and the population involved, has been 
described. Finally, I tackle specific models and methods of risk assessment and control in 
DGT on road, considering two different approaches: a risk adverse decision maker 
approach (Chapter 6); and an optimal real-time control of DGT flow towards a critical 
infrastructure, such as a tunnel (Chapter 7). Conclusions and future developments are 
reported in Chapter 8. 
Keywords : transportation systems, dangerous goods, models of risk assessment, 
information and communication technologies. 
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Foreword 
 
Every day, dangerous goods (DG) are transported in different modalities from one or 
more origins to their destinations, all over the word, where people needs DG to live, to 
work, but also to find out new frontiers. Every country needs DG for everyday civil life 
activities: for example to use energy, to transport goods and passengers, or simply to 
conduct a healthy and safe life.  
 
For these main reasons, the contemporary generation is addicted to DG, and for this 
reason we have the duty to monitor and to control their overall supply chain from 
producer to consumer – including their transportation - using innovative information and 
communications systems - such as Global Positioning Systems, Geographic Information 
Systems, Decision Support Systems. 
 
The awareness of DG production, loading, unloading, storage, and transport, gives 
us the challenge to use DG, firstly, in a sustainable way, (optimizing, preventing cost and 
time delays, avoiding waste), secondly, in a safe and sustainable way in order to reduce 
the human exposition to the possible harmful effects of such DG (reducing emissions and 
spills), and also to quantify the potential damage or consequences links to its use, not 
only for us, but also for the future generations (avoiding accidents, injuries, and deaths). 
 
These are some reasons for which I decided to face this world, the world of DGT, 
unknown for me before 2001, year of my first research to get my degree in 
Environmental Engineering with a topic dealing with “Definition of a methodology for 
real-time evaluation of risk from the transport of dangerous goods by road. Application 
to a case study in the transport of hydrocarbons in Liguria.”  
 
After almost ten years, I have understood that the DG transport system has an 
extremely complex architecture and a stratified framework. DG transport is a complex 
system due to the aspect of "mobility and dynamicity" of its hazard, but also because of 
external and boundary conditions, and also for the mode of transport, (such as the nature 
of the materials transported, the state vehicle, weather condition, condition of transport 
infrastructure, proximity to urban centres, traffic density etc.). In addition, public 
authorities and the highway managers have a very fuzzy picture of flows of DG that go 
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through European Union territory. In addiction, it is a complex subject to study in all its 
dimensions (scientific, technical, economical, sociological, environmental, etc.). 
 
This system has different levels of research and investigation, and - at a strategic 
level - I should not leave out even a single part, otherwise I can not reconstruct the whole 
system. Otherwise, it is unrealistic to describe mathematically, or analytically the whole 
system with the hope to have only one and realistic and finite solution for such a 
complex problem.  
 
A DGT, and the related risk, might be characterized by several aspects: 
− The DG type and the related chemical-physical characteristics related to the 
hazard in its transportation; 
− The transportation modality; 
− The infrastructure used in the transportation; 
− The human factors linked to the transportation (drivers, users, decision makers, 
public and private authorities and their policies); 
− The territorial and geographical elements exposed to the transport considered; 
− The meteorological, atmospheric, and environmental conditions monitored during 
the transportation. 
 
In my PhD work, two transportation modalities, pipeline and road, have been taken 
into account, since they represent the most common modalities of transportation in 
Europe of DG, as well as in France and Italy.  
 
The different methodologies that have been used throughout my PhD work are 
strongly oriented to an engineering vision of the hazard and of the related risk, where a 
numerical quantitative evaluation is required. To support this view, I have deepened and 
used methodologies and technologies oriented to Geographic Information Systems, 
Innovative Statistic Approaches, Mathematical Programming, Optimal Control and, in 
part, Game Theory.  
 
Specifically, in first place, I have defined an on-line / off-line GIS for the 
quantitative definition of the vulnerability of a pipeline to third parties activities, 
corrosion and mechanical failures. The proposed methodology, which also includes 
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innovative statistical approaches based on artificial neural networks, has been applied to 
an important oil pipeline in the South of Italy. 
 
Secondly, I have integrated the real-time information coming by the Eni 
tracking/tracing system used to monitor the transportation of petrol products on the roads 
of the European territory (currently about 400 vehicles) with a common tool (ALOHA) 
used to evaluate the hazard and the exposure according to different accident scenarios. 
This approach has been tested with some case studies in the North of Italy, where a LPG 
explosion and release scenarios where supposed on a highway. 
 
In addition, I have also formulated two original methodologies - might be more 
theoretical than the previous ones - with some direct practical application. The first 
methodology, which originates from a work by Prof. Bell, Imperial College, London, 
aims to verify how a risk adverse behaviour in DG transport on road can contribute to a 
practical reduction of risk if a mixed strategy – that is spreading travels both in time and 
in space – is applied. This methodology is based both on a game theory vision of the 
problem and on a practical mathematical programming modelling approach. The second 
methodology is based on the computation of optimal control laws in the DG transport on 
road to define the DG optimal flow which must access throughout a critical 
infrastructure, such as a tunnel. 
 
In my opinion, it is also important to underline that I have had the chance to relate 
my PhD work to an International context, as well as to access to the most recent “know-
how” on DG transport. Specifically, my work on the vulnerability of pipelines is strictly 
connected to a National project, funded by University of Genova and by ISPESL, and it 
has also been performed in close collaboration with Eni. My work on DG transport risk 
on road has been developed in close connection with the VIFP EU project Da.Go.T, as 
well as with two ALCOTRA-Interreg projects between Italy and France.  
 
In fact, my overall PhD work strongly reflects the effects of the co-tutoring between 
University of Genoa and Mines Paris-Tech. A part from the Interreg projects, I have had 
the chance to deepen and to compare the Italian and French regulations and organisations 
to face DG transport risk. During my stay at the Mines Paris-Tech, for example, I met 
representatives - or simply knew during my study in France - industrial stakeholders, 
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such as Albemarle, Arcelor, Arkema, Charabot, Mane Fils, Primagaz, SB Formulation, 
Shell, SNPE, Total; association stakeholders (CYPRES) and finally institutional 
stakeholders (BARPI, DRIRE of Midi-Pyrenees and PACA, INERIS, PACA Prefecture, 
SDIS 13). 
 
I focused my attention on "industrial safety" and I spent an intensive period of three 
weeks where I met decision makers in the field of risk prevention and of crisis 
management during visits to industrial sites and conferences.  
 
From a methodological viewpoint, my work strongly reflects some research studies I 
have followed in my hosting in the French institution, specifically as regards how DG 
risk is faced in several French companies as well as on some software tools, such as 
ALOHA, that are currently used in France, for example at INERIS. Indeed, as Mines 
Paris-Tech student, I went to INERIS for one day course on Industrial Risk Prevention.  
 
In this occasion I was introduced on research, development and expertise of this 
institute. They described what kind of methods of risk analysis for complex industrial 
systems used, in order to give me practical know-how in the accidental risk topic. 
Finally, the overall research has been inserted and cofounded by the UIF - Italian and 
France University in Turin, (http://www.universite-franco-italienne.org/) that supported 
me for mobility in the joint supervision of my PhD thesis. 
 
The main results of my PhD work have been discussed at International level in 
several contexts. Among others, in 2009, I discussed my PhD work on the risk adverse 
methodology at Imperial College, where Prof. Michael G.H. Bell leaded a specific 
NATO workshop on DGT. Other results have been also discussed in a similar NATO 
workshop co-organised by University of Genova and by Mines ParisTech in Genova in 
2007. In these workshops, I have had the chance to discuss my work with the most 
outstanding scientists in the field such as: 
 
Professor Rajan BATTA 
Associate Dean for Graduate Studies, School of Engineering and Applied Sciences 
Professor of Industrial and Systems Engineering 
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412G Bonner Hall - University at Buffalo (State University of New York) - Buffalo, 
NY 4260, USA. 
 
Professor Michael.G.H. BELL,  
Centre for Transport Studies 
Imperial College London - Exhibition Road, London, SW7 2AZ, UK. 
 
Associated Professor Bahar YETİŞ KARA  
Department of Industrial Engineering 
Bilkent University, 06800 Ankara-Turkey. 
 
Professor Vedat VERTER, 
Desautels Faculty of Management,  
McGill University, 1001 Sherbrooke Street West, Montreal, Canada H3A 1G5. 
 
During these four years of my PhD work I concretely handled a complex subject in 
all its dimensions (scientifically, technically, economically, sociologically and 
environmentally) and I managed a complex problem in a context of uncertainty. I worked 
in teams with people of various cultures and different occupations, in an international 
atmosphere of proficiency, skills and expertise. 
 27
 28
 
1 Introduction 
 
This thesis is based on the need to describe the DGT system to find solutions or 
answers in order to minimize the risks arising from transportation or maximize the level 
of security in freight transport. DG logistics is a complex system of which the DGT 
system is a specific subsystem which can be in turn be modelled in several other 
subsystems. In the thesis work, I have developed approaches and found optimal solutions 
of models - applied to some of these DGT subsystems - with assumptions, 
methodologies and targets ad hoc for each analyzed case study. 
 
The DGT risk is related to the risk derived from human settlements – technologies, 
biological activities, socio-political behaviours – where an action and its consequence, or 
the binomial cause-effect, is strictly links to human factor, and all risk derived from 
human activities are called technological risk, (Rinatech, 2010). 
 
When a dangerous event happens, caused by human error, and involving DG, the 
consequences cannot sometimes be reduced or contained. So, it is essential to apply 
preventive measure to reduce the probability of occurrence, or/and magnitude of the 
consequences.  
To achieve this goal, it is possible to implement monitoring and control systems, 
using new and state-of-the-art Information Communication Technologies (ICT), sensors 
and failure (or leak) detection systems, alarms, but also using models and methods to 
develop possible scenarios or simulation.  
 
Using simulations, it is possible to have more information about the DGT system 
behaviours in different situation, considering many decision makers, on the bases of 
different what-if hypothesis and taking into account different approaches.  
In case of emergency management, or for planning activities, such as operative 
training, models and simulations could be useful for technicians, drivers, controllers, 
fireman, emergency operators and others DGT subjects.  
 
In this context, in the following chapters, I propose some original models and 
methods of risk assessment in DGT systems, because of the multiplicity of approach that 
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could be followed to evaluate risk. I focused my attention on risk linked, not only to 
vehicles transporting DG incidents (or accidents), but also to infrastructures used for 
transporting DG, and the surrounding territory. This kind of risk is defined as an 
accidental risk, and the consequences associated to a DGT hazardous event can be, for 
example, explosions, thermal accidents, fires in urban areas, toxic releases and plums, 
air, or water or soil pollution, and acid rains. 
 
All the models that I have described and defined are based on the classical definition 
of technological risk – related to human activities – categorized as accidental risk, where 
the risk is related to the failure – or accident – of a DGT vehicle or pipeline. 
This risk definition is the same for the pipeline and road, but I can use different 
methodological approaches to evaluate the risk. 
 
 
Figure 1. Thesis architecture: starting from DGT risk definition until mathematical 
formalization in case study solving. 
 
 
1.1 Risk assessment 
Generally speaking and as I mentioned in the foreword, the DGT system has a 
complex architecture, and there is not one way to evaluate risk. For the sake of simplicity 
I want to report what are the most common methods used in risk assessment. 
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Actually, the chemical industry makes use of eleven different procedures for hazard 
assessment, (Muhlbauer, 1996): 
− checklists; 
− safety review; 
− relative ranking 
− preliminary hazard analysis; 
− “what if” analysis; 
− hazard and operability studies (HAZOP); 
− failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis (FMEA); 
− fault tree analysis; 
− event tree analysis; 
− cause-consequence analysis; 
− human-error analysis. 
 
Examples of Qualitative Risk Assessment are: 
− Job Safety Analysis (JSA) 
− Logic diagrams 
− What-if/Checklist 
− Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
− Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP). 
 
Each process has a cost, effectiveness and a degree of appropriateness for the system 
analyzed. With regard to the formal techniques used by industry and companies that 
transport DG, the methods mainly used are: 
− hazard and operability studies (HAZOP); 
− quantitative risk assessment (QRA); 
− probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). 
 
HAZOP - which is the acronym for HAZard OPerability studies - is a technique 
that must be performed by a group of experts, who know in detail the system that they 
intend to analyze. This is a very expensive process, both in terms of hours worked and 
number of skills involved. This technique requires a deep knowledge of the plant because 
the experts have to examine any possible failure or rupture, using a variety of keywords 
that drive this analysis.  
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(Figure 2 part A)       (Figure 2 part B) 
 
 
Figure 2. - Part A: HAZOP structured technique description, following a systematic study of a 
process, using guide words to discover how deviations from the design intent can occur in 
equipment, actions, or materials, and whether the consequences of these deviations can result in a 
hazard. - Part (B): A block diagram of the HAZOP process. 
 
QRA is the acronym for Quantitative Risk Assessment and it is a strictly 
mathematical technique that numerically determines the absolute frequency of 
"accidents". This technique is used not only in the petro-chemical, but also in the nuclear 
and aerospace industries.  
 
With this technique it is possible to quantify the risks on their own and the social risk 
related to a process, activity or system analysis, management plans for internal and 
external security for an industrial system concerned, (Muhlbauer, 1996). 
Examples of Quantitative Risk Assessment are: 
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− Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
− Probit statistical analysis 
− In-process energy modeling 
− Event probabilities 
− Risk/cost trade-off. 
 
PRA stands for Probabilistic Risk Assessment and is a technique obtained by 
linking the probability of individual events, such as failures or disruption of plant 
components and poorly functioning security system. The probabilistic risk assessment 
(or analysis / probabilistic assessment of safety) is indeed a complex and systematic 
methodology for assessing the risk associated with complex technological devices (such 
as aircraft or power plants), (Kumamoto and Henley, 1996). 
 
The PRA is a well established technology, where PRA analysts aim to estimate 
parameters used to determine the frequencies and probabilities of different events 
modelled. The cause of an event is an accident. In a PRA model, the parameters are 
estimated - on the bases of data used to evaluate each of the parameters - and the 
uncertainties in estimation can be quantified using methods and sources of information 
that delineate the response of systems and operators to accident initiating events. In this 
context, performance and plant reliability are enhanced by monitoring equipment 
performance and evaluation of equipment trends. (Atwood et al., 2003) 
 
The probabilistic risk assessment usually answers three questions, (Muhlbauer, 
1996): 
− What can go wrong? What are the initial events that lead to adverse 
consequences? 
− How likely is it? What are the likely consequences of this unwanted, or 
what is their frequency? 
− What are the adverse consequences and how serious are the potential 
damage? 
 
The two methods normally used to answer these questions are the Event Tree 
Analysis and the Fault Tree Analysis. 
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The probability of failure or the probability of having an event - in terms of 
importance – is associated to the consequences of that event, and this relationship is 
plotted and qualitatively in the matrix of probability of hazard-effects shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Likelihood-consequence risk matrix - (Muhlbauer, 1996). 
 
ERA, an Environmental Risk Assessment is a process leading to problems that are 
caused by pollutants in the environment, and it is evaluate predicting whether there may 
be a risk of dangerous effects on the environment caused by a chemical substance, (EEA, 
1998). “Environmental Risk Assessment (ERA) is the examination of risks resulting 
from technology that threaten ecosystems, animals and people. It includes human health 
risk assessments, ecological or eco-toxicological risk assessments, and specific industrial 
applications of risk assessment that examine end-points in people, biota or ecosystems”, 
(EEA, 1998). 
 
There is an environmental risk only if there is an exposition to a hazard, and one - or 
more than one -outcomes associated to the exposition. First of all, to evaluate the risk a 
hazard identification is requested. Secondly, a dose-response assessment has to be 
evaluated: what is the link between exposure and severity, how many factors might 
influence this relationship, and what is the relationship between animal responses, human 
responses, high-dose and low-dose responses. Thirdly, the intensity, frequency and 
duration of an individual exposition is described characterizing an exposure assessment. 
Finally, a risk characterization is needed. 
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Identify, evaluate, and assess risk leading to environment is a complex task, because 
of its complexity in system architecture, levels of decision, and subjects – public or 
private - involved. Indeed, ERA depends, at least, on four sub-systems: 
− Ecological risk assessment; 
− Health risk assessment; 
− Industrial risk assessment leading to facilities at strategic and planning level; 
− Industrial risk assessment leading to supply chain and system utilities, such as 
transportation, at strategic, planning, operational or real time level. 
 
Moreover, the economical efforts and the great amount of indirect costs associated to 
a risk evaluation have to be taken into account to better understand another level of 
complexity of this system. 
 
Each sub-system can be characterized by many other smaller systems, in which 
others decision and subjects are involved. So, to conduct an ERA the socio-political, 
economical, territorial, industrial, and heath systems have to share decisions and 
objectives having a common target: reduce the occurrence and severity of consequences 
in risk estimation on the environment. This is a management goal, in which 
communication and information must be shared to reach the goal. So, communication 
protocol and standards, tools, software or methods adopted have to be defined and the 
knowledge have to be shared in order to respect low and regulation in ER prevention, 
and protection. Also data acquisition, elaboration, and visualization should be in 
common at each level, and a continuous control and monitoring might be performed to 
update the levels of risk in each sub-system and also in the ERA system. 
 
Only one subject has not the economic power, the skills, and the ability to develop 
an ERA, this kind of assessment must be manage by an ad hoc Authority, with an 
extraordinary political, decisional and economical power, that can coordinate all the 
other subject involved in the system analysed, considering also al the phases of a risk 
assessment, before the initial accidental event, during the accident and after. 
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Figure 4. Typology of Risk Assessment - (EEA, 1998). 
 
 
Figure 5. GMES Fast Track Emergency Response Core Service Strategic Implementation Plan* 
- Final Version, 24/04/2007 Author: Professor Bernardo De Bernardinis. 
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In the risk assessment definition, many are the concepts involved: 
 
Hazard is defined as "the potential to cause harm", (Royal Society, 1992). Hazard is 
related to the intrinsic characteristic of a material, good, condition, or activity that has the 
potential to cause harm to people, property, or the environment, and it is often defined in 
terms of a probability, (EEA, 1998). For Gilles Dusserre (Analyse des risques TMD, 
2010), hazard is the probability of an event that may affect the system studied. 
 
Elements exposed are resources (goods, people) and the environment that may 
suffer damage, (Dusserre, 2003). 
 
Sensitivity is the propensity to recover or resist damage assessment, (Dusserre, 
2003). 
 
Vulnerability is the measurement of the consequences of the event (hazard with a 
certain intensity) on the exposed elements involved. It can be defined as the sensitivity of 
the element exposed studied taking into account the ability of emergency response, 
(Dusserre, 2003). 
 
Danger is define as all processes involved in the chain or sequence of events leading 
to an undesirable event which could have a destructive nature on population, ecosystems 
and goods, (Dusserre, 2003). 
 
Severity is defined as the effect of an undesirable event on the targets point, or on 
the elements exposed. Can be defined as a function of the elements exposed and the 
vulnerability of those elements, (Dusserre, 2003). 
 
Probability is defined as a value between 0 and 1 and in some words is the 
likelihood of a sequence of events to an event not desired, (Gilles Dusserre, 2003). 
 
Industrial risk is defined as a function (usually the product) of the probability of 
occurrence and the phenomenon (occurrence) and severity of consequences, (Gilles 
Dusserre, 2003). 
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In the context of natural hazards, the definition by UNESCO (1972) is generally 
adopted, which allows computing the risk on a set of territorial elements that may be 
damaged by a natural hazard, as a function (specifically, a product) of the likelihood of 
the hazard, of the value of elements at risk, and the so called vulnerability, that is the 
capacity of an element to resist to a hazard event. 
 
Risk is most commonly defined as "The combination of the probability, or 
frequency, of occurrence of a defined hazard and the magnitude of the consequences of 
the occurrence" (Royal Society, 1992). 
 
“Risk is used in everyday language to mean "chance of disaster", but hazard and risk 
are not the same. Risk is a function of hazard. […] The distinction between hazard and 
risk can be made clearer by the use of a simple example. A large number of chemicals 
have hazardous properties. Acids may be corrosive or irritant to human beings for 
example. The same acid is only a risk to human health if humans are exposed to it. The 
degree of harm caused by the exposure will depend on the specific exposure scenario. If 
a human only comes into contact with the acid after it has been heavily diluted, the risk 
of harm will be minimal but the hazardous property of the chemical will remain 
unchanged”, (EEA, 1998). 
 
In the risk evaluation it is essential to say that the zero risk does not exist. In the 
process of DGT there is always a level of acceptability, even if the perception of hazard, 
danger, and also of risk is not so easy to quantify. 
 
“The risk assessment may include an evaluation of what the risks mean in practice to 
those affected. This will depend heavily on how the risk is perceived. Risk perception 
involves people's beliefs, attitudes, judgements and feelings, as well as the wider social 
or cultural values that people adopt towards hazards and their benefits. The way in which 
people perceive risk is vital in the process of assessing and managing risk. Risk 
perception will be a major determinant in whether a risk is deemed to be "acceptable" 
and whether the risk management measures imposed are seen to resolve the problem”, 
(EEA, 1998). 
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The notion of acceptability is most important in the risk study, but it is difficult to 
define because of its subjectivity depending on different dynamic factors. The evaluation 
of acceptability is not the same in each United Europe Country. The Netherlands used a 
probabilistic approach in risk definition, at a planning level, and the acceptability is 
determined as follow in Figure.6: 
 
 
Figure 6. Risk management policy and criteria of acceptability in The Netherlands. (Ale, 
B.J.M., 1991). 
 
To quantify the risk in term of cost-benefits trade off, the values of risk are 
determined by a political choice, derived from the art. 5, of the Seveso Directive 
82/501/EEC, approved by Parliament (1990). Risk criteria have only been defined for 
people, and three regions of acceptability are considered: 
− MAL (Maximum Acceptable Level) – should not be exceeded, 
irrespective of the economic or societal benefit that could result from the activity under 
consideration. 
− NL(Negligible Level) – it is not sensible to try to further reduce the risk, 
in view of the fact that man and the environment are already subject to other risks 
resulting from nature or society. 
− IN THE MIDDLE – risk needs to be reduced according to the ALARP 
concept. 
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Figure 7. The ALARP region is defined in: Vrijling et al., 1995; Vrijling et al., 2004; and Hoj et 
al., 2002. 
 
Risks are “acceptable only if reasonable practical measures have been taken to 
reduce risks” (IAEA 1992).  
The level of acceptability is quantified considering an Individual Risk (IR) to people, 
a Societal Risk (SR) to people, and a Potential Loss of Life (PLL).  
 
INDIVIDUAL RISK (IR) is defined as the probability that an unprotected person, 
who permanently is located at a specific position in the vicinity of a risk source, is 
affected by the undesired consequences of an event, and he/she will be killed. IR is 
expressed as a period of year. It can be pictured on a map by connecting points of equal 
IR around a facility, the risk contours. (Ale, 2002). 
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Figure 8. Provisional risk criteria for people, considering (IR) and its acceptable limits. (Ale, 
2002). 
 
SOCIETAL RISK (SR) is defined as the relationship between the number of people 
killed in a single accident (N) and the chance (F) that this number will be exceeded. It is 
the probability that in an incident more than a certain number of people are killed. 
Societal risk usually is represented as a graph in which the probability or frequency F is 
given as a function of N, the number of people killed. This graph is called the FN curve. 
 
 
Figure 9. Provisional risk criteria for people, considering (SR) and its acceptable limits. (Ale, 
2002). 
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POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE (PLL) is the expectation value of the number of 
people killed per year. It is the sum of all individual risks and it is the area under the FN 
curve. 
 
The probability of a hazard referring to people has to be compared to its severity of 
consequences, and both the Netherlands, and French Policy, adopt a Risk Assessment 
Decision Matrix approach to determine qualitatively a level of risk. RADM can be 
employed to measure and categorize the risk. This procedure is based on probability and 
consequences parameters.  
 
This approach is well assessed in fixed plants, subjected to SEVESO Directives, and 
for the evaluation of major technological risk. But, there is a substantial difference 
between the Netherland approach and the French one: while the accidents with a low 
probability are not considered in the first approach (probabilistic risk approach), the 
second one considers and studies all the accident scenario happened (deterministic risk 
approach). 
 
 
Figure 10. Risk Assessment Decision Matrix (RADM) - Official Journal of France Republic – 
Regulation 7 October 2005. (Reniers et al., 2005). 
 
In Italy, four levels of risk are taken into account, (Fabiano et al., 2002). The risk is 
divided into "Acceptable", "Region of tolerability: type A", "Region of tolerability: type 
B" and "unacceptable." The criteria for assessing the degree of risk are not standardized 
at the European level.  
 
 42
To compare the RADM criterion with the Italian one, Italian analysts processed 
ISTAT data for 20 years of accidents, showing that the rate of IR is between 10^-3 and 
10^-4, precisely, the IR for DGT accidents is about 5 x 10 ^ -4; while the SR is modeled 
with an approach that uses the frequency curve of deaths, (F/N curves), related to 
transport, as established by the Netherlands standards, and adopted by Italian case study 
(Fabiano et al., 2002).  
For SR, the limits are set as a guidelines: They are also set as a limit per kilometer of 
the route, F=[1x10-2/yr]. In addiction, advisory limit is given for fixed installation and 
transport, and it should be noted that in spatial planning the limit for transport will only 
be observed within 200 m from the route. 
 
Figure 11. Advisory limits referring to societal risk, where transport SR and installation SR are 
compared. (Ale and Piers, 2000); (Ale, 2002). 
 
“Risk management is the decision-making process through which choices can be 
made between a range of options which achieve the "required outcome". The "required 
outcome" may be specified by legislation by way of environmental standards, may be 
determined by a formalised risk-cost-benefit analysis or may be determined by another 
process for instance "industry norms" or "good practice". It should result in risks being 
reduced to an "acceptable" level within the constraints of the available resources”, (EEA, 
1998). 
 
On the other hand, actually, this methodology, both in France and in Italy, is not 
systematically adopted in DGT, because of lack of data in frequency or probability of 
 43
accident evaluation, but I hope that in a near future it might be adopted in French using a 
deterministic approach, collecting all the accident scenario happened in DGT. 
 
Risk Evaluation Criteria Description 
Acceptable risk 
( )25 /10 NP −<  Verify that risk remains at  this level, no need for detailed 
study. 
Region of tolerability:  
type A 
( ) ( )NPN /10/10 425 −− <<  Tolerable risk. If cost of  reduction would exceed 
the improvements achieved. 
Region of tolerability:  
type B 
( ) ( )2324 /10/10 NPN −− <<  Tolerable only if risk  reduction is impracticable or  
the cost is disproportionate in relation to th
improvements obtained. 
Unacceptable risk 
( )23 /10 NP −>  Risk intolerable: risk  cannot be justified  
even in extraordinary  
circumstances. 
 
Table. 1. Risk acceptability criteria. P is the cumulative frequency in one year, and N is the 
number of deaths. Analysis performed by Dutch studies. (Hoj and Kroger, 2002). 
 
Also in Italy many DGT Companies are implementing tools and technologies able to 
detect accidents or abnormalities during the routing, for reasons of safety and security, 
and those observed data represent a set of accident really happened, that could helps 
analyst to define classes of probability of hazard, and new IR, and SR limits. 
 
The risk definition is also a hard task because of not only the socio-political context, 
but also the economic and utilities and services - leading to the dangerous activity - can 
influence the risk estimation. 
 
In this context, especially in France, the so called “retour d’expériences”, or “REX”, 
is a sort of feedback after an accident scenario really happened, it is an “experience 
feedback”. Lessons learned from past experiences or dangerous events, especially the 
most serious ones, are highly instructive to prevent recurrence of accidents and increase 
the level of safety related to the systems analysed, (Van Wassenhove and Garbolino, 
2008). 
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Indeed, negative REX focuses on accidents, failures, technical problems, and errors, 
which have consequences on the system considered, and it is an essential tool in the risk 
management. On the other hand, positive REX focuses on good practices and techniques 
implemented. In our study, REX is a methodology for understanding safety dimension 
after a dangerous event, to prevent future accidents, and helps people to be ready and 
arranged for the effects of a similar event. It is also an approach to both individual and 
collective level, where each operator (or generally, a subject) is invited to share his 
experiences and to benefit from the other actors, (Van Wassenhove and Garbolino, 
2008). 
 
“One of the major difficulties concerning the use of risk assessment is the 
availability of data and the data that is available is often loaded with uncertainty”, (EEA, 
1998). 
 
To this end, there are many databases that collect all accident and incident occurred 
in the past; some of them are public and their access is direct, others are private and have 
an authorized or restricted access: 
− ARIA, (http://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/barpi_3252.jsp); 
− HSELINE, (http://www.datec.lavoisier.fr/fr/not_bdd.asp?bdd_id=628); 
− ICHEME, (http://www.prosim.net/fr/resources/liens.html); 
− MHIDAS, (Major Hazardous Incident Data Service: 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-10875699.html) ; 
− TNO, 
(http://www.tno.nl/content.cfm?context=markten&content=product&laag1=186&laag2=
151&item_id=443&Taal=2). 
 
Studying an accident - a failure or generally a dangerous event - after its occurrence 
prepare technicians, and all the subject involved, for estimation of damages, for 
establishing an event chronology, for a realistic hypothesis of accident scenario 
evaluation, for identifying barriers, and defence in depth, but also for quantifying the 
organizational and human dimensions, and, finally, for defining recommendation. 
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The right management of DGT is a hard task and get complicated because of many 
subject, who have to take different decisions, with objectives that are partially orientated 
to risk reduction. 
Surely, to manage DGT system: 
− first of all, a good knowledge and skills in transportation types and 
dangerous goods identification is required; 
− secondly, principal risk leading to DG and its transport are taken into 
account; 
− thirdly, not only, the nature of risk and the principal dangers and 
consequences leading to DGT, but also the principal causes of accident are taken into 
account; 
− fourthly, perusing and investigating accident reports need to better 
understand the dynamics of an event, to be more able to prevent, act and deal with future 
incidents or accidents; 
− fifthly, preventive actions and disaster relief are to be taken into account 
in the management chain; 
− sixthly, the emergency organization is a tricky task not only at a planning 
level, bat also at operational and real time levels; 
− seventhly, prevention through training of stakeholders is an effective goal 
to risk prevention at a public and private level of liability; 
− eighthly, informing people before, during and after an event using 
codified instructions is to be hoped; 
− finally, a compensation could be foreseen, and provided for low, deriving 
from DGT accidents. 
 
“Risk assessment is carried out to enable a risk management decision to be made. It 
has been argued that the scientific risk assessment process should be separated from the 
policy risk management process but it is now widely recognised that this is not possible. 
The two are intimately linked” (EEA, 1998). 
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Figure 12. The elements of risk assessment. (EEA, 1998). 
 
1.2 Systems and Models to support decisions 
To narrow the gap between scientific risk assessment and policy risk management 
process models designed and implemented to support stakeholders in the decisional 
process exist. 
 
The DGT topic and especially the accident prevention and crisis management 
interest a huge panel of decision makers. We all recognize that some decisions are more 
important than others, whether in their immediate impact or long term significance.  
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The significance of a decision is a measure of understanding, and especially the 
knowledge about how much resources and time to spend on a decision is a crucial point. 
So, the decisional process could be divided in levels of decision, on the bases of time and 
space information and priority. To project an informative system able to manage the 
infrastructure of the transport of dangerous goods, (for example, as done in the TMDNIS 
project), it is useful to refer to a classification hierarchy of the decisional levels that may 
be associated with the management of that type of transport. This classification consists 
of four levels: 
 
− The strategic level; 
− The tactical level; 
− The operative level; 
− The level of control in real-time. 
 
The four levels are ordered according to the time horizon (in decreasing order) 
considered and the level of detail of the model used (in increasing order, see Figure 13 
and Table 2). 
 
Figure 13. The four decisional levels. 
 
In the strategic level decisions are taken on models on a national scale with a time 
horizon of a few years (generally 5-10 years); it mainly regards the dimension of the 
infrastructure of the transport as well as the definition of the types of dangerous goods 
that can be transported in the considered infrastructure. These decisions are made based 
on an estimate of the demand for transport (scenario) for the time horizon considered. 
This level of planning due to its nature requires a long time and enormous resources and 
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has the Public Administration as its main component, which could require the 
collaboration of external experts, also private, who could be involved in the creation 
and/or the running of the activity or service. 
 
In the tactical level a time horizon of a few months or a maximum of one or two 
years is considered, decisions are made on a model with a level of detail corresponding 
to a multi-regional geographic area. The choices made at this level are substantially 
connected to the planning of the transport of the average period. At this level therefore 
how much and which dangerous goods can be transported in the considered territory in 
the chosen period of time is defined. These decisions are made based on accurate 
estimates of the demand for the transport of dangerous goods and based on the 
infrastructure network configured at the strategic decision level. At this level who makes 
the choice could also be private and, even under the control of the Public Administration, 
is assigned the management of the transport of dangerous goods.  
 
The operative level considers a time horizon of a few days and the activities of this 
level are aimed at the scheduling of the transport in the present week/month. The 
decisional models are at a regional level or, at maximum, a multi-regional level; the 
definition of the transport can be based on specific algorithms of scheduling, strategies of 
the route of vehicles or specific heuristics defined for the problem under consideration, 
and must take into account the risk levels connected to the infrastructure in order to 
minimize the risk deriving from the transport of dangerous goods. This level can be 
managed directly by the local Administration, by the managers of road infrastructures 
and by single transport companies. 
 
The level of control in real-time is aimed at the continuous monitoring of the 
transport resources through suitable hardware instrumentation installed in the vehicles 
and in the infrastructure; potential decisions in the control of this traffic are taken on a 
local scale and regard a time horizon of a few seconds, minutes or at most some hours. 
The strategies present at this decisional level are necessary to contrast any hitches in the 
transport network such as the temporary unavailability of infrastructure or excessive 
density of vehicles that transport dangerous goods in a certain stretch of the network. 
This phase is initially run by the transport companies able to interact with the vehicles in 
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a fast and efficient way, but with the view of preventing risk the local Administration and 
managers of road infrastructure would also need to participate in this phase. 
 
 Time Horizon Level of Detail 
Strategic level Years (>2) national scale 
Tactical level months, years (≤2) multi-regional scale 
Operational level days regional scale 
Level of control in real-time seconds, minutes, hours local scale 
 
Table 2. The four decisional levels. 
 
The various subjects involved in the decisional process regarding the transport of 
dangerous goods, and above all in the evaluation of the risk derived from it, are not 
always clearly distinguishable and the roles assigned to them can be in a certain way 
interchangeable. 
 
The problem can in fact be faced by the different decision makers involved: 
− From the point of view of the manager of the network; 
− From the point of view of the user of the network; 
− From the point of view of the public body or the administration that has a 
social objective in the network. 
 
The decision maker can furthermore be identified: 
− In the transport company that is materially and daily occupied with the 
distribution of the high risk products along national and international roads; 
− In the concessionary companies of the road infrastructure that are 
therefore interested in the management of the flow from both a viability and safety point 
of view; 
− In the public administrations of the territory involved, to which are 
assigned the roles of supervision of the materials transported, safety and prevention. 
 
The complicated decisional process regarding the problems of management and the 
evaluation of the risk derived from the transport of dangerous goods therefore involves 
different components who should communicate, converse and comprehend each other 
with the aim of maintaining a correct and efficient organization. 
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In this decisional process at different levels of importance, using models and 
methods to describe a system studied - and then collecting the output of models and 
methods into a decision support system - help decision maker to spent less time, and 
resources (man and tools) in the decision process, and what is more, the decision, that is 
subjective for definition, could be taken on the bases of an objective and technical 
support. 
 
Jean-Jacques Chevallier (1993, and 1994), for example, said that "A Decision 
Support System (DSS) is a Geographic Information System (GIS) tool, which support a 
complex activity or a process of developing and evaluating scenarios, to identify the best 
actions according to a well assessed situation, clear objectives, and criterions or 
standards. […] A DSS must allow the possibility of integrating applications: 
− For identifying, describing and manipulating a set of data to reach 
decision on the bases of actions, scenarios, and assessments; 
− to jointly use original data and different forms of data representation; 
− to link databases and geo-referenced data to applications and software 
specialized in developing simulations and specific analysis leading to the studied 
problem; 
− to have tools to evaluate, compare scenarios, and then using techniques of 
multi-criteria analysis." 
 
An interesting approach to fill the gap between science and policy is presented by 
Chevallier and Caron, (2002), where only developing information and data well 
structured and linked to organizational aspects, human aspects and Communication and 
Computer Science aspects it is possible to share information and manage it from a local 
or territorial point of view, in other words using a “géomatique” infrastructural approach. 
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Figure 14. Chevallier and Caron (2002) approach to share and manage data from a territorial 
point of view. 
 
Another example is reported by Walliser, (1977), where the concept of models and 
methods are strictly linked to the concepts of system. Indeed, one system can be divided 
in sub-systems to be modelled, and each sub-system interacts with the others. The overall 
system can be known through models, and the various sub-systems components play 
their parts at different levels, and interact to describe and define the real system analysed.  
 
In describing the overall system we have to take into account the data variability, the 
environment diversity, the complexity of the physical-chemical processes involved in the 
system considered, static and dynamic aspects involved in system description and in the 
DGT process. 
 
In this approach an hard task is to test and apply the various models making up a 
models system, where data variability, models complexity, time and space scale, can 
change rapidly, so we needs a very large set of hypothesis, for a great variety of possible 
scenario, and the models system have to satisfy all the scenario hypothesis in an effective 
and efficient way. Too much effort in time, skills and cost are required to reach this goal, 
so one reasonable target is to collect and integrate al the models – describing the system - 
in a decision support system architecture, for managing them, at an appropriate scale of 
space and time, to take a decision as optimal as possible at a specific level of decision. 
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Figure 15. DGT System architecture. This system can be divided into its sub-systems, that are 
connected each others, and a decision process can be follow to find an optimal solution for the DGT 
system. 
 
But the only way to control and master the overall system, and the evolution of risk 
is using methodologies and models that describe the risk assessment. 
 
Using the DGT system architecture in the occurrence of a dangerous event, three are 
the principal phases of management: 
− A strategic one, a pre–accident phase - where the subjects involved have 
to define plan of intervention, contingency plan, action plan, regulations to prevents risk, 
as well as a shared and well assessed territorial governance knowledge about the 
resources available, and time for intervention in case of an accident have to be defined; 
− An operative and real time one - the response phase - during the accident 
occurrence, where all the subject involved in the DGT accident chain have to act on the 
bases of standards, protocols, and regulations for the emergency response; 
− An operative or tactical phase – the post-accident phase– when the 
consequences of the accident have been estimated and perceived and the plan, defined in 
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the first phase have to be enforced, people have to be supported to react to the dangerous 
event, (medical treatment, evacuation, assurance compensations, expropriations). 
 
In this process of management the risk in the DGT system, a continuous prevention, 
monitoring, control and check plan - on the bases of Deming cycle –is the core for an 
effective and efficient risk management system, to improve safety and reduce risk in 
DGT, as shown in Figure 16. 
 
 
Figure 16. Risk management  in case of a DGT accident event. 
 
So the principal and not negligible aspect of this study that I want to highlight is that 
the risk characterization needs a decision system to support policy and regulations, 
encouraging clear, transparent, reasonable, and consistent risk characterizations. In this 
study I want to emphasize that the interface between carriers, infrastructure owners or 
managers, territorial Authorities, risk assessors, risk managers, technicians, and 
stakeholders is critical for ensuring that the results of the assessment can be used to 
support a management decision. 
 
1.3 PhD thesis structure 
In the current chapter, I wished to highlight a general description of DGT, starting 
from risk assessment techniques, definitions link to risk, perception and risk 
acceptability, going through the tricky risk management and the “experience feedback”, 
until the crucial point: how relate subjective decision and scientific methods in risk 
estimation. According to time horizon, and level of detail, it is possible describe the DGT 
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system according to analytical model formalization - as I have done - but also using, for 
example, a knowledge base approach, or using a “géomatique” infrastructural approach. 
 
A scientific approach, based on analytical models, could be supported by 
information communication technologies, able to connect models with a realistic 
representation of the system studied - such as a DGT routing into a portion of territory - 
to evaluate and quantify a certain level of risk.  
This last concept is on the bases of this PhD work, and using this basic assumption 
that “an accident could happened” I have developed more than one models and methods 
of risk assessment in DGT systems. I focused my attention on risk, susceptibility and 
hazards links, not only to vehicles transporting DG and their incidents (or accidents), but 
also to infrastructures used for transporting DG, and the surrounding territory. 
 
In Chapter 2 what a DG is and which DG type is considered in this study, has been 
defined. Which modalities are generally taken into account, and which of them have 
been chosen for this research activity, have been described. Finally, what are the 
regulations and laws, for each type of transport, have been introduced.  
 
Chapter 3 deals with the risk definition in the transport of DG, respectively, in 
pipeline and on road, starting from one risk definition, based univocally on the risks 
related to humans activities, until exposing similarities and differences between pipeline 
and road transport risk definition. 
 
Chapter 4, then, identifies how many pipeline segments are highly potentially at risk 
of failure. This chapter tackles a dual problem: firstly, to describe the most significant 
causes that may lead to a pipeline segment failure; secondly, to evaluate the occurrence 
of these causes leading to a failure, according to technical characteristics of the pipeline, 
infrastructures, territorial elements, and land use activities in the pipeline neighbourhood. 
A quantification of risk, based on an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) statistical 
approach has been implemented, and the methodology use to describe pipeline risk 
assessment has been tackled. 
 
Chapter 5, subsequently, handles an innovative and technological model used to 
describe a DG accident scenario by road, and the population involved. Specifically, 
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Chapter 5 described the complex problem of integrating real-time data information about 
the tracking of a DG vehicle with classical risk evaluation methodologies in order to 
describe possible accident scenarios. The application described as case study deals with 
the transport of a hydrocarbon dangerous goods, where the accident consequences may 
involve the population exposed along the infrastructure used for transportation. 
 
Chapter 6 describes the definition of models which enhance the overall transport 
planning process because of the increasing need for sustainable freight transportation due 
to economic, environmental, and risk aspects. The crucial point is that, as far as DGT is 
concerned, current decision making tools do not sensibly differ from traditional planning 
tools for general freights, that is they support decision makers in the computation of the 
best route based on the economical factors related to covered distances and transport 
operational costs. 
The approach based on “risk-adverse” in the routing of hazardous material is used 
for problems whose aim is to find the best and safest routes to connect various origin-
destination (OD) pairs, taking into account the objective of minimizing either the 
maximum risk or the maximum exposure. In chapter 6, it is also demonstrated that 
further improvements can be obtained scheduling the deliveries with different delays, 
that is spreading the risk both in space and in time. The improvement is particularly 
relevant when the vulnerability of the network is also time dependent. 
 
Chapter 7, as chapter 6, tackles one specific model and method of risk assessment 
and control in DGT by road, considering an optimal control of DGT flow approach in a 
critical infrastructure, and a preliminary study as regards the possibility to define optimal 
control strategies for the DG traffic flowing towards one critical road infrastructure (e.g. 
as in the case study a tunnel) at the macroscopic level is introduced. 
 
Chapter 8 describes, finally, not only the limits of models, improvements, and 
comparison between methodologies, but also an overall conclusion for this PhD work as 
well as future possible developments. 
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2 Dangerous goods transportation 
 
DGT includes all goods - liquids, gasses, and solids -  that include radioactive, 
flammable, explosive, corrosive, oxidizing, asphyxiating, biohazardous, toxic, 
pathogenic, or allergenic materials (Berman et al., 2007), (DGT, 2010) and (Zhang et al., 
2000). All substances that induce severe risk for health, that can harm people, 
environment and surrounding properties, or other living organisms, are characterized as 
DG (Zografos et al., 2000). DG are all the substances and materials described in Annex 
A and B of the ADR, the “Accord Européen relative au transport international des 
merchandises Dangereuses par Route” (ADR, 2009). The MEEDDM, in France, defines 
DG all products highly toxics, explosives, and pollutants, but also a great variety of 
materials and products using every day. 
 
 
Table 3. The classes of dangerous goods according to ADR 2009. (ADR, 2009 - Copiright® 
United Nations. All right reserved). 
 
In the U.S.A., also the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, Transportation, Parts 
100-199, (CFR, 2010), in the “HAZARDOUS MATERIAL TRANSPORTATION 
GUIDES” (DG Guidelines, 2010), report and define more than 3300 goods considered 
hazardous (Zografos et al., 2000). Approximately 1.5 billion tons of DG - of which 65% 
are carried by truck and rail - are being transported yearly in the United States. 
Worldwide generation of DG is estimated as 3–4 billion tons/year (Akgün et al., 2007). 
[See, Attachment N.1] 
 
The US Department of Transportation, for example, has estimated that there were 
300 million dangerous goods shipments in 1998 and has forecasted a 2% annual growth 
in the amount of DG produced in the country (Berman et al., 2007). Indeed, in the US, 
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approximately 300 million shipments per year are of DGT (Berman et al., 2007); while, 
in Canada, about 27 million shipments of DG are transported (Kuncité et al., 2003), of 
which, 48 million tons of DG freight was carried via rail, while 64 million tons was 
shipped via trucks in 2000 (Verma and Verter, 2007). 
 
In European Union, the “Europa – RAMON, International statistical classifications 
and nomenclatures” classify what goods are transported, and also dangerous goods are 
reported (Europa-RAMON, 2010). In the UK, some 70 000 chemical substances are in 
use from industry to domestic life, of which some 2000 are considered potentially 
harmful. Overall, millions of tonnes are produced annually and more than 200 000 
tonnes are freighted daily (Moles, 1999).  
 
2.1 Hydrocarbons 
In this PhD work, I focus my attention on Crude oil, and Oil products. Oil products 
are composed of hydrocarbons. In organic chemistry, a hydrocarbon is an organic 
compound consisting entirely of hydrogen and carbon.  
 
With relation to chemical terminology, aromatic hydrocarbons or arenes, alkanes, 
alkenes and alkyne-based compounds composed entirely of carbon and hydrogen are 
referred to as "pure" hydrocarbons, whereas other hydrocarbons with bonded compounds 
or impurities of sulfur or nitrogen, are referred to as "impure", and remain somewhat 
erroneously referred to as hydrocarbons. 
 
Hydrocarbons are referred to as consisting of a "backbone" or "skeleton" composed 
entirely of carbon and hydrogen and other bonded compounds, and have a functional 
group that generally facilitates combustion. 
The majority of hydrocarbons found naturally occur in crude oil, where decomposed 
organic matter provides an abundance of carbon and hydrogen which, when bonded, can 
link together to form seemingly limitless chains. 
 
To summarized some basic concepts: 
− Hydrocarbons are Carbon (C) and Hydrogen (H) compounds: 
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– Hydrocarbon’s examples: methane, ethane, benzene, paraffin, bitumen, white wax 
oil, polyethylene, polypropylene, [...]; 
– Non Hydrocarbon’s examples : ethylic alcohol, sugar, wood, olive oil, butter, 
margarine, PVC, PET, [...]. 
 
− Crude oil is a hydrocarbon mixture ranging from very light (gas) to heavy ones 
(bitumen). 
 
− Oil products are mixtures of hydrocarbons produced by ”cutting” crude oil by 
fractional distillation and often refined. 
 
Paraffins: 
 
 
 
Olefins: 
 
 
 
Naphthenes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 60
Aromatics: 
 
 
Figure 17. Structural formula of different hydrocarbons, divided in paraffins, olefins, 
naphthenes, and aromatics. 
 
The principal hydrocarbons, that are transported on road are oil products, which are 
schematically reported hereinafter, considering their physico-chemical most important 
characteristics, while Crude oil is the only DG considered for the pipeline transport case 
study.  
 
2.1.1 Crude Oil  
− Density:  the density of Crude Oil can range from 800 kg/m3 to 950 kg/m3 
− Viscosity:  the viscosity can remarkably vary in function of its composition. Usually, it 
is not less than 2 cSt; 
− Flammability: the flash point for a crude oil is very low and usually it is less than 0°C. 
 
2.1.2 Oil products 
LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas): 
− Density: the LPG density can range from 500 to 600 kg/m3; 
− Vapour pressure:  about 1500 kPa (38°C); 
− Flammability: the flash point for a LPG is very low (< -40 °C). 
 
GASOLINE OR PETROL: 
− Density: gasoline density can range from 730 to 770 kg/m3; 
− Evaporability: vapor pressure of petrol can range from 0.7 to 0.850 kg/cm2 at 37 °C; 
− Distillation: gasoline distillation (curve) ranges from 40 to about 200 °C; 
− Flammability: the flash point for a gasoline is very low and usually is lower than 0°C. 
 
PETROLEUM or KEROSENE: 
− Density: the density can range from 780 to 830 kg/m3; 
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− Distillation: distillation ranges from 150 to about 250 °C; 
− Flammability: the flash point for a petroleum is not less then 21.5 °C. Usually it is 
about 40 °C. 
 
DIESEL OIL: 
− Density: the diesel oil density can range from 820 to 860 kg/m3; 
− Distillation: distillation ranges from 180 to about 350 °C; 
− Viscosity: the viscosity (40°C) can range from 2 mm2/s (Centistokes) to 4.5 mm2/s; 
− Flammability: the flash point for a diesel oil is about 55 °C. 
 
FUEL OIL: 
− Density: the fuel oil density can range from 920 ( for a half-fluid) to 970 (for a fluid) to 
990 kg/m3 (for a dense one); 
− Viscosity: the fuel oil viscosity can range from 30 (very fluid) to 700 cSt (very dense); 
− Flammability: the flash point for a fuel oil is not less then 65 °C. 
 
LUBRICATING OIL: 
− Density: the density can range from 870 to 950 kg/m3; 
− Viscosity:  the viscosity can range from 100 to 200 cSt; 
− Flammability: the flash point is not less than 200 °C. 
 
BITUMENS 
− Density: the density can range from 990 to 1.100 kg/m3; 
− Auto ignition temperature: not less than 300 °C; 
− Flammability: the flash point is not less than 200 °C. 
 
2.1.3 Oil products and their potential risks 
Flammability. Flammability is defined at how easily something will burn or ignite, 
causing fire or combustion. 
 
Anesthetic and asphyxiating properties. For example, nitrous oxide, commonly 
known as laughing gas and nozz, is a chemical compound with the formula N2O. At 
room temperature, it is a colorless non-flammable gas, with a pleasant, slightly sweet 
odor and taste. It is used in surgery and dentistry for its anesthetic and analgesic effects. 
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It is known as "laughing gas" due to the euphoric effects of inhaling it, a property that 
has led to its recreational use as a dissociative drug. 
 
Blood disease. Blood diseases affect the production of blood and its components, 
such as blood cells, hemoglobin, blood proteins, the mechanism of coagulation, etc. 
Hematology, also spelled haematology (from the Greek αἷμα haima "blood" and -
λoγία), is the branch of internal medicine, physiology, pathology, clinical laboratory 
work, and pediatrics that is concerned with the study of blood, the blood-forming organs, 
and blood diseases. 
 
Skin disease. Clinically, the diagnosis of any particular skin condition is made by 
gathering pertinent information regarding the presenting skin lesion(s), including the 
location (such as arms, head, legs), symptoms (pruritus, pain), duration (acute or 
chronic), arrangement (solitary, generalized, annular, linear), morphology (macules, 
papules, vesicles), and color (red, blue, brown, black, white, yellow). 
 
Ingestion. Ingestion is the consumption of a substance by an organism. Some 
pathogens are transmitted via ingestion, including viruses, bacteria, and parasites. 
 
Irritation. Irritation or exacerbation, in biology and physiology, is a state of 
inflammation or painful reaction to allergy or cell-lining damage. A stimulus or agent 
which induces the state of irritation is an irritant. Irritants are typically thought of as 
chemical agents (for example phenol and capsaicin) but mechanical, thermal (heat) and 
radioactive activity (for example ultraviolet light or ionising radiations) can also cause it. 
 
Environment pollution. Pollution is the introduction of contaminants into an 
environment that causes instability, disorder, harm or discomfort to the ecosystem. 
Pollutants, the elements of pollution, can be foreign substances or energies, or naturally 
occurring; when naturally occurring, they are considered contaminants when they exceed 
natural levels. Pollution is often classed as point source or nonpoint source pollution. 
 
2.1.4 Dangerous substances in oil products 
A synthesis of dangerous substances in oil products are hereinafter reported: 
 
 63
− 1,3 - BUTADIENE (LPG); 
− HEXANE (crude oil, petrol); 
− HEPTANE (crude oil, petrol); 
− BENZENE (crude oil, petrol, kero); 
− TOLUENE (crude oil, petrol, kero); 
− XYLENE (crude oil, petrol, kero); 
− ETHYLBENZENE (crude oil, petrol, kero); 
− ISO-OCTANE (petrol); 
− PNA (crude oil, gasoline); 
− LEAD ALKYL (petrol); 
− SOME ADDITIVE (Es. MTBE). 
 
2.1.5 Oil products hazard classification 
A synthesis of oil products hazard classification is therefore proposed: 
 
CRUDE OIL: extremely flammable, carcinogenic, dangerous for the environment. 
LPG: extremely flammable, dangerous for the environment 
PETROL: extremely flammable, carcinogenic, dangerous for the environment.  
KEROSENE: flammable, irritant for the skin, dangerous for the environment.  
DIESEL OIL: harmful, dangerous for the environment.  
FUEL OIL: carcinogenic, dangerous for the environment.  
 
2.1.6 Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) 
A material safety data sheet (MSDS) is a form containing data regarding the 
properties of a particular substance, [See, Attachment N.2]: 
 
1. Identification of producer/distributor; 
2. Composition/Ingredient information; 
3. Hazard Measure and Type; 
4. Emergency Response; 
5. Fire Exposure; 
6. Spillage Disposal; 
7. Packaging & Labeling and Storage; 
8. Exposition Control/Individual Protection; 
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9. Physical and Chemical Properties; 
10. Stability and reactivity; 
11. Toxicological Information; 
12. Environmental Information; 
13. Waste Disposal; 
14. Transport Information; 
15. Laws and Regulations; 
16. Others Information. 
 
2.2 Transportation modalities 
DGT is a worldwide problem of growing interest, mainly because of the increasing 
transported volumes of materials that can be classified as DG, and because of a globally 
challenge in the goods transportation performance (Table 4).  
 
 
 
Table 4.Comparative goods transport performance. The data, concerning different 
Geographical entities, are qualitatively comparable – (“Panorama of Transport”, 2009).  
 
Actually, in European Union (EU) large quantities of DG are moved throughout the 
transport networks by different modality of transport – by air, by sea, by inland 
waterways, by road, by rail lines, and by pipelines, (Figure 18). It is estimated that, in 
2007, about 4 billions tons of DG were transported yearly worldwide (Carotenuto et al., 
2007), and container, general cargo, RO cargo, refrigerant cargo, carriage in packages, 
bulks and tanks (Liquid Gas Tanker, Chemical Tanker, Oil Tanker, Rail tanker) might be 
used in DGT, using thousands of km of networks to move (Figure 18). 
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Figure 18. Goods transported in EU-27 - (“Panorama of Transport”, 2009) and (“Annual road 
freight transport of dangerous goods, by type of dangerous goods and broken down by activity”, 
2010).  
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Figure 19. Length of main transport networks - (“Panorama of Transport”, 2009) and (“Annual 
road freight transport of dangerous goods, by type of dangerous goods and broken down by 
activity”, 2010).  
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Figure 20. Comparison between tons of DG and freight traffic transported by different 
transport modalities in France, (1996-2001 and evolution), (Analyse des risques TMD, 
DDE42/STI/TDP, Source: Cypres). 
 
In this work, only two types of transport, pipeline and road, are taken into account, 
because of their relevance in France and in Italy, as well as in Europe. The aim of this 
agreement is developing research in the general field of DGT to reduce risk, and to 
increase security and safety in transport, using also Information and Communication 
Technologies - ICT. So, the next two sub-chapters the DGT on road and the DGT in 
pipeline will be described more in detail. 
 
2.2.1 Dangerous goods transported on road 
In the 90’, in the U.S., there were over 500,000 shipments of DG made every day. 
More than 90 percent of these shipments are transported by truck on the U.S.A. 
highways. At any given time, 5 to 15 percent of the trucks on the road are transporting 
DG regulated under the HMTA of 1975 (HMTA, 2010). Almost 50 percent of these 
materials are gasoline and other corrosive or flammable petroleum products, and 13 
percent are chemicals. The remaining shipments represent any of the 2,700 chemicals 
considered hazardous.  In this context, in the US, each year, many companies ship over 
263 million ton-miles of DG, and over 60% of that is on tucks (Cutter and August, 
1997). Whereas, in European Union the percentage of DGT on road is reported by 
Eurostat, (Figure 21), where more than 50 percent of shipments by trucks transported 
flammable liquids. 
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Figure 21. Dangerous goods transported by road [% tkm] - (“Panorama of Transport”, 2009) 
and (“Annual road freight transport of dangerous goods, by type of dangerous goods and broken 
down by activity”, 2010).  
 
In this context, considering that the number of vehicles per km transporting DG in 
EU is, in average, 4800 million kmveh ⋅ , of which 14 percent are Italian vehicles, and 13 
percent France one, (Figure 22). In this two Countries the DGT quantity is comparable in 
terms of [million kmveh ⋅ ] (Figure 23), and in terms of flammable liquids and gases 
transportation, respectively, (Figure 24) and (Figure 25). In both countries flammable 
liquids represent more than 50 percent of DG transported on road, while gases represent 
approximately 25 percent of the total DGT, (Figure 24) and (Figure 25). 
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Figure 22. Dangerous goods transported on road [million kmveh ⋅ ] in European Union. Italian 
and France particular - (“Panorama of Transport”, 2009) and (“Annual road freight transport of 
dangerous goods, by type of dangerous goods and broken down by activity”, 2010).  
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Figure 23. Dangerous goods transported on road [million kmveh ⋅ ]. Italian and France 
comparison in ten years data - (“Panorama of Transport”, 2009) and (“Annual road freight 
transport of dangerous goods, by type of dangerous goods and broken down by activity”, 2010).  
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Figure 24. Comparison between the total amount of dangerous goods, flammable liquids, and 
gases – respectively -transported in Italy, expressed in [million kmveh ⋅ ] - (“Panorama of 
Transport”, 2009) and (“Annual road freight transport of dangerous goods, by type of dangerous 
goods and broken down by activity”, 2010).  
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Figure 25. Comparison between the total amount of dangerous goods, flammable liquids, and 
gases – respectively -transported in France, expressed in [million kmveh ⋅ ] - (“Panorama of 
Transport”, 2009) and (“Annual road freight transport of dangerous goods, by type of dangerous 
goods and broken down by activity”, 2010).  
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In Europe, the overall trend of DGT seems to be increasing up to 30 percent in 2010 
(White Paper, 2001). In Italy about 80 percent of goods is transported by this mean, with 
a 30 percent increase with reference to the 2010 forecast, and its 18 percent is currently 
represented by DGT (Fabiano et al., 2005).  
 
At present, in Italy, about 74 million tons of DG are transported annually on trucks 
(Carotenuto et al., 2007). Indeed, more than 800 million trucks per km [million veh.km] 
travel each year on road (“Annual road freight transport of dangerous goods, by type of 
dangerous goods and broken down by activity (Mio Tkm, Mio Veh-km, 1000 BTO)”, 
2010), of which 200 million trucks per km representing vehicles transporting gas (Class 
2 according to ADR 2009), and 450 million trucks per km representing vehicles 
transporting flammable liquids (Class 3 according to ADR 2009), (ADR, 2009).  
 
Each truck transport, on average, 40 tons of product, so there are 240.000 tons per 
day and 90 million of tons per year of Oil product transported in Italy, and this quantity 
represent more than 80 percent of DGT.  
 
The entire Italian road network has an overall length of more than 170.000 km, 
among which 6.500 km correspond to highways. In particular, Italian highways are very 
crowded with trucks, considering that 17% of the whole good traffic on road of European 
Union is transported on these highways (White Paper, 2001). In our Country, for 
example in 2005, were transported on road 78 million tons of DG, for a total of 12.000 
million tons per km, where most of the goods are oil products (70 million tons, and about 
9.000 million tons per km), (MIT, 2007). 
 
The DGT by road represents two thirds of the transport of goods in France and Italy - 
(“Panorama of Transport”, 2009) and (“Annual road freight transport of dangerous 
goods, by type of dangerous goods and broken down by activity”, 2010). 
 
DG are substances that due to their physical and chemical properties or the nature of 
the reactions they provoke, represent a grave danger to man, property or the 
environment. 
According to the Ministry of the Infrastructure of French Transport (METL), more 
than 3000 substances circulate in the French territory. These goods are classified by the 
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ADR (European agreement regarding the international transport of dangerous goods by 
road, recently revised in 2007 and 2009) into 9 classes: goods are included in a class 
according to their physical-chemical characteristics, the principle type of risk they 
represent. 
 
The transport of dangerous goods can be done in tankers, as unpacked goods, or 
packaged in cylinders or bags. There is also special packaging for radioactive and 
biological goods. The transport of packages, at times grouped with other types of goods, 
is carried out in accordance with regulation on quantity, type of package etc. 
 
The risk attached to the transport of dangerous goods by road is a risk that is 
complex to understand as it is connected to all the road network and depends on multiple 
factors such as traffic density, weather conditions, the necessities of undesired events 
(road accidents, natural phenomenon etc.)  
 
This risk is also strongly linked to the nature of the transported goods and to the 
presence of exposed humans and materials in proximity to the place of incident. For 
example, the transport of fuel such as petrol or GPL can provoke considerable fires or the 
explosion of the tankers in which it is transported, with heat, excess pressure and missile 
effects. 
 
Other substances have toxic properties and can be the origin of toxic gas clouds in 
the case of leakage due to the accidental puncturing of the tanker. 
 
On a national scale it is shown that DGT accidents on the roads make up no more 
than 0.1% of total accidents. But, even though this risk is minimal, the consequences are 
important when dangerous substances are involved. In France on the 8th September 
1997, the collision between a vehicle transporting hydrocarbon and a lorry caused the 
deaths of 13 people and injured a further 43. In Italy on 9th February 1997 in a motorway 
accident a collision between a lorry transporting kerosene and a tanker caused a fire and 
a pile-up which resulted in 1 death and 40 injured. 
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Figure 26. The risk of TDG (Source: Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development – 
France). 
 
Despite the high risks the public authorities and the management of the motorway 
and road infrastructure do not precisely know the nature, number and route of the 
dangerous goods transported on the territory.  
 
The only statistics produced are the result of manual surveys carried out in various 
periods of the year, furthermore, carried out by different bodies such as motorway 
companies, territory institutions or some state services (for example the Ministry of 
Transport and Infrastructure). The results show that the transport of dangerous goods by 
road represents between 5 and 10% of the flow of goods transported by lorry. 
 
The following table shows the statistics computed by the French motorway company 
ESCOTA regarding the numbers and categories of vehicle that cross the toll barrier at 
Ventimiglia (Italy). These figures show that around 5000 lorries pass the barrier each day 
and that this tendency has been on the increase for more than 20 years. 
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Figure 27. Calculation of the vehicles that pass the toll barrier of Ventimiglia (Italy). Data 
supplied by the company ESCOTA. Source: Union Routière de France. 
 
Based on the approximation that 10% of those vehicles transport dangerous goods, 
the number of TDG vehicles that cross the toll barrier at Ventimiglia is around 500 
vehicles per day (13,000 vehicles per month, 156,000 vehicles per year excluding the 
days when lorries are not allowed (Sundays). 
 
 
Figure 28. Number of vehicles that cross the toll barrier at Ventimiglia (Italy). Data supplied by 
the company ESCOTA. Source: Road Union of France. 
 
Considering the figures for the flow of TDG vehicles in the cross-border area of 
Nice, Imperia and Savona, the public authorities have demonstrated their interest in the 
topic by supporting the TMDNIS project of which the objectives and development are to 
be found in this document. 
Authorised traffic between France and Italy: the Mediterranean coast 
(vehicles/day) 
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Figure 29. Figures of the flow of the two types of dangerous goods. Indicating the origin and 
destination of the goods. Data supplied by the company Eni. 
 
 
 
Figure 30. Different classes of dangerous goods transported on road and comparison with the 
road freight traffic in three years of data acquisition in France. 
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2.2.2 Dangerous goods transported by pipeline  
Natural gas, crude oil and petroleum products represent the main products 
transported by pipeline networks. The total length of European High Pressure networks 
for natural gas transport was approximately 200.000 km in 2003, compared to ~180.000 
km in 1996 (Eurogas, 2005).  
 
The combined traffic volume in the CONservation of Clear Air and Water in Europe 
(CONCAWE, the oil companies’ European association for environment, health and 
safety in refining and distribution) system in 2001 was 130 billion cubic meters/km, of 
which ~70 percent was crude oil (16 percent higher than in 1994). A network of ~10.000 
km pipelines convey more than 150 different DG such as: ethylene, propylene, chlorine, 
ammonia, hydrogen, oxygen, butadiene and styrene, (Papadakis, 1999). 
 
In Europe, the quantity of oil transported by pipeline increased of 10 percent in 2006 
compared to 2000 (Eurostat, 2008). In total, more than 500 million m3 of crude oil and 
300 million m3 of refined products were transported by pipeline in Europe in 2006 
(CONCAWE, 2008).  
 
Based on available data, oil pipelines in the EU-27 extended to around 33.500 km in 
2005, more than half the length of the motorway network for example. Compared to the 
estimated length in 1990, this represented an increase by about one eighth (12.8 %), 
(“Panorama of Transport”, 2009). 
 
However, the EU-27’s density of oil pipelines of approximately 8 km per 1.000 km2 
is smaller when compared, for example, with that in the United States of around 26 km 
per 1.000 km2. The total length of the U.S.A. network was nearly eight times as long, 
(“Panorama of Transport”, 2009). 
 
France had the longest oil pipeline network of 5 746 km, contributing a 17 percent 
share of the EU-27 total. The other longest networks could be found in the United 
Kingdom, Italy, Spain and Romania, while pipeline length in Germany – only crude oil 
pipeline, Hungary and Poland also stood above 2.000 km. The length of oil pipelines in 
the EFTA country Norway was about 1.200 km in 2005, (“Panorama of Transport”, 
2009). In Italy, the overall length of pipelines for the transport of oil products is 
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estimated to 4179 km in 2006 (Eurostat, 2009). Finally, the world’s longest oil pipeline – 
measuring around 4.000 km – reaches from Russia to the EU. 
 
In France, after the accident occurred in Bondy (Seine-Saint Denis) the 30 of 
October 2007, the MEEDDM, taking charge of gas security policy, asks prefects for 
support DRIRE to make more aware the stakeholders in the prevention of such accidents 
and to conduct inspections of sites near the gas distribution networks, (DRIRE, Rhône-
Alpes, “Sécurité des canalisations de distribution de gaz”, 3rd of July 2008). The total 
length of the French network of pipelines transporting DG is 50000 km distributed as 
follows: 
• 73% for natural gas, 
• 19% for petroleum products (crude oil and refined products), 
• 8% for chemicals (ethylene, oxygen, nitrogen, hydrogen, ...) 
Most of these pipes is buried, with the exception of the bodies necessary for their 
operation (pumping, compression, relaxation, sectioning, interconnection), (“Risques liés 
aux canalisations de transport”, MEEDDAT, 2009). 
 
In 2007, CONCAWE reports that over 150 pipeline systems have a combined length 
of 34,721 km, the reported volume transported was 762 million m3, (533 million m3) of 
crude oil and (229 million m3) refined products, and the total volume was estimated at 
kmm ⋅⋅⋅ 3910129  – kmm ⋅⋅⋅ 391091  for crude oil, and kmm ⋅⋅⋅ 391038  for products 
(CONCAWE, 2009). 
 
In this study an oil pipeline, only dedicated to the transport of a very restricted group 
of goods (liquid oil products), is taken into account, because of the agreement between 
Eni and DIST. But, before going through the methodologies and methods used to 
evaluate risk in these two type of transport, an overview on DGT regulations, and then a 
risk definition framework will be introduced. 
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2.3 Regulations 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Laws and regulations on the use, loading, downloading, storing, transporting, and 
handling of DG may differ depending on the activity, status of the material, and modality 
of transport used (DGT, 2010). Most countries regulate some aspect of DG at UNECE 
level (UNECE, 2010), that is the most widely applied regulatory scheme. The UN 
Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods form the basis of several 
international agreements, such as UNECE regulations and many national laws (UN 
Recommendations on the TDG, 2002) and (UN Recommendations on the TDG, 2007). 
 
The transport of dangerous goods is an activity which is increasingly international 
and multi method; the regulation involved can therefore not disregard connecting itself to 
international level to sustain a future integrated logistics system with multi method 
efficiency. 
 
The ONU Recommendations for the transport of dangerous goods, published for the 
first time in 1957 and periodically updated, are the point of reference for all the laws 
specific to the different methods of transport (sea, air, road, railway, rivers/canals) at 
international, community and national level. For each method of transport the following 
international regulations are in place concerning dangerous goods. 
 
ADR – for the transport of dangerous goods by road; 
RID – for the international transport of dangerous goods by railway; 
ADN - for the international transport of dangerous goods on internal rivers/canals; 
ICAO and IATA – for transport by aeroplane; 
IMDG Code – for maritime transport. 
 
For instance, the International Civil Aviation Organization has developed regulations 
for air transport of DG that are based upon the UN Model but modified to accommodate 
unique aspects of air transport. Individual airline and governmental requirements are 
incorporated with this by the International Air Transport Association to produce the 
widely used IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations. Similarly, the International Maritime 
Organization has developed the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code ("IMDG 
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Code", part of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea) for 
transportation on the high seas, and the Intergovernmental Organization for International 
Carriage by Rail has developed the Regulations concerning the International Carriage of 
Dangerous Goods by Rail ("RID", part of the Convention concerning International 
Carriage by Rail). Many individual nations have also structured their DGT regulations to 
harmonize with the UN Model in organization as well as in specific requirements, (DGT, 
2010). 
 
Regulations on DGT, for instance in Canada and Australia, regard many aspects of 
transportation, and for this reasons are divided in tables of contents, where there are 
taken into account (Transportation of dangerous goods regulations, 2010) and (Best 
practice and internationally harmonized legislation for the land transport of dangerous 
goods in Australia, 2010): 
− Coming into Force, Repeal, Interpretation, General Provisions and Special Cases;  
− Classification;  
− Documentation;  
− Dangerous Goods Safety Marks;  
− Means of Containment;  
− Training;  
− Emergency Response Assistance Plan;  
− Accidental Release and Imminent Accidental Release Report Requirements;  
− Road;  
− Rail;  
− Marine;  
− Air;  
− Protective Direction;  
− Permit for Equivalent Level of Safety;  
− Court Order;  
− Inspectors.  
 
The transport of dangerous goods by railway in Europe is subject to the RID 
(Regulation concerning the International transport by railway of Dangerous goods) 
which forms Attachment B of the COTIF convention (Convention of international 
transport by railway). 
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Due to the acknowledgement of the European Directive 96/49/CE and its updates, 
the RID is also applicable to the national transport of dangerous goods by railway. 
The RID regulation, from the point of view of its contents, is substantially aligned to 
the ADR, for the way it classifies the goods, the method of transport, the package, the 
labelling, the recommendations etc. 
 
Therefore it is greatly beneficial taking into consideration the growing demand of 
multi-method land transport with the aim of optimizing the transport both from the point 
of view of efficiency and safety. 
The RID is divided into two main parts: 
− The 1st part is dedicated to the “general limitations”; 
− The 2nd part is dedicated to the “particular limitations for the various classes”. 
 
The transport of dangerous goods by canal and river is regulated by the ADN, signed 
at Geneva in May 2000. This agreement, excluding the obvious differences due to the 
different characteristics of the method of transport, is, in terms of content, very similar 
to, and at times the same as, the text of the ADR and RID. For this reason there is direct 
reference to these regulations in particular to the parts concerning package and tankers. 
 
The transport of dangerous goods by airplane is instead regulated by attachment 18 
of the Chicago Convention concerning international civil aviation, managed by ICAO 
(International Civil Aviation Organization). 
 
The regulation of reference for maritime transport is managed by IMO (International 
Maritime Organization) and is created from the IMDG Code (International Maritime 
Dangerous Goods). The IMDG Code contains the same classes of danger as the RID and 
ADR but contains some differences regarding the criteria of classification and the 
placement of goods inside a class. From the 1st August 2005, following the publication 
of DPR 134/2005, the IMDG code was also applied to Italian and French national 
transport from the 23rd November 1987. 
The IMDG code is also separated into seven parts: 
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− Part 1: General arrangements, definitions and training of the figures involved in 
transport, in particular the training of coastal personnel for the risk connected to the 
transport of particular loads; 
− Part 2: Classification of the goods; 
− Part 3 and 4: Arrangements for the package and tankers; 
− Part 5: Procedure of the delivery; 
− Part 6: Construction and checking of the package, large containers for bulk 
transport, GIR, large packages, mobile tankers, containers for gas and multiple elements 
(CGEM) and road tanker vehicles. 
− Part 7: Arrangements concerning the operation of the transport. 
 
Currently, The EC Directive 2008/68, says that “The ADR, RID and ADN lay down 
uniform rules for the safe international transport of dangerous goods. Such rules should 
also be extended to national transport in order to harmonise across the Community the 
conditions under which dangerous goods are transported and to ensure the proper 
functioning of the common transport market […]. Art. 1 Scope: «1. This Directive shall 
apply to the transport of dangerous goods by road, by rail or by inland waterway within 
or between Member States, including the activities of loading and unloading, the transfer 
to or from another mode of transport and the stops necessitated by the circumstances of 
the transport. This directive establishes a common regime for all aspects of the inland 
transport of dangerous goods, by road, rail, and inland waterway», (Directive 
2008/68/EC, 2010).” 
 
This low is transposed into France execution measures, from: 
− Arrêté du 29 mai 2009 relatif aux transports de marchandises dangereuses par 
voies terrestres (dit « arrêté TMD »); 
− Arrêté du 9 décembre 2008 modifiant l’arrêté du 5 juin 2001 modifié relatif au 
transport des marchandises dangereuses par chemin de fer (dit « arrêté RID »); 
− Arrêté du 9 décembre 2008 modifiant l’arrêté du 1er juin 2001 modifié relatif au 
transport de marchandises dangereuses par route (dit « arrêté ADR ») – (Source: 
National Execution Measures, 2010). 
 
This low is transposed into Italian execution measures, from: 
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− Attuazione della direttiva 2008/68/CE, relativa al trasporto interno di merci 
pericolose; 
− Attuazione della direttiva 2006/87/CE che fissa i requisiti tecnici per le navi della 
navigazione interna, come modificata dalle direttive 2006/137/CE, 2008/59/CE, 
2008/68/CE e 2008/87/CE - (Source: National Execution Measures, 2010). 
These execution measures are transposed into Italian low, with a National 
Legislative Decree, 27/01/10, No. 35, and it is applicable from 12/03/10.  
 
2.3.2 Dangerous goods transported by pipeline 
There is no international agreement about pipeline regulations, and many Countries 
in the world have no lows and regulations for the pipeline transportation.  
In the US, pipelines are regulated by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration (PHMSA). Offshore pipelines are regulated by the Minerals Management 
Service (MMS). In Canada, pipelines are regulated by either the provincial regulators or, 
if they cross provincial boundaries or the Canada/US border, by the National Energy 
Board (NEB) (Pipeline transportation, 2010). 
 
The U.S.A. are the most well-advanced Country on the pipeline regulations. Indeed, 
the pipeline safety regulations are collected in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), 
Title 49 Parts 190 to 199, called “Transportation”; where, in Subtitle B, Chapter I, 
Subchapter D, are taken into account in a table of contents the following headings (CFR, 
2010): 
− pipeline safety programs and rulemaking procedures;  
− transportation of natural and other gas by pipeline; annual reports, incident 
reports, and safety-related condition reports;  
− transportation of natural and other gas by pipeline: minimum federal safety 
standards;  
− liquefied natural gas facilities: federal safety standards;  
− response plans for onshore oil pipelines;  
− transportation of hazardous liquids by pipeline;  
− regulations for grants to aid state pipeline safety programs;  
− drug and alcohol testing.  
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In addiction, first of all the “Pipeline inspection, protection, enforcement, and safety 
act of 2006” gives much more information about inspection, protection, enforcement, 
and safety in terms of technical and operational characteristics for pipelines (“Pipeline 
inspection, protection, enforcement, and safety act of 2006”, 2010). Secondly, the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) includes (FERC – Regulationg Oil 
Pipelines, 2010): 
− regulation of rates and practices of oil pipeline companies engaged in interstate 
transportation; 
− establishment of equal service conditions to provide shippers with equal access to 
pipeline transportation; 
− establishment of reasonable rates for transporting petroleum and petroleum 
products by pipeline. 
 
In Europe, Switzerland has a federal low for the gas and oil pipeline (CH federal 
low, LITC1, 2010), and an Executive Decree on the plants and pipeline carrying gaseous 
and liquid fuels (CH pipeline, 2010). In France, not only the European standards EN 
1594 and EN 14161 are adopted for the safety of dangerous substances transported in 
pipelines; but also the “Arrêté du 4 août 2006” (INERIS, 2010). This decree regulates the 
safety of gas, liquid or liquefied hydrocarbons and chemicals fuels transportation in 
pipelines. This Order sets out minimum requirements for the design, construction, 
operation and shutdown, temporary or permanent pipelines transporting gas fuels, of 
liquid or liquefied hydrocarbons and chemicals to preserve the safety of persons and 
property and protect the environment. The main lows and regulations are divided by type 
of substance: 
−  Natural gas: «Décret n° 85-1108 du 15 octobre 1985 modifié et décret n° 
70-492 du 11 juin 1970 modifié» ;  
−  Hydrocarbons: «Décret n° 59-998 du 14 août 1959 modifié, décret n°59-
645 du 16 mai 1959 modifié, et décret n° 89-788 du 24 octobre 1989 modifié»;  
−  Chemical produts: «Décret n° 65-881 du 18 octobre 1965 modifié». 
 
Where the regulations collect a multiplicity of materials, liquid or gas, the texts are 
harmonised: 
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−  Décret n° 91-1147 du 14 octobre 1991 modifié relatif à l'exécution de 
travaux à proximité de certains ouvrages souterrains, aériens ou subaquatiques de 
transport ou de distribution; 
−  Arrêté du 4 août 2006 portant règlement de la sécurité des canalisations de 
transport de gaz combustibles, d’hydrocarbures liquides ou liquéfiés et de produits 
chimiques; 
−  Circulaire du 4 août 2006 relative au porter à connaissance à fournir dans 
le cadre de l'établissement des documents d’urbanisme en matière de canalisations de 
transport de matières dangereuses. 
 
2.3.3 Dangerous goods transported by road 
The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1975 (HMTA) is the major 
transportation-related statute regulating the transportation of DG. In 1990, Congress 
enacted the Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act (HMTUSA). Like 
the HMTA, the HMTUSA requires the Secretary of Transportation to promulgate 
regulations for the safe transport of hazardous material in intrastate and foreign 
commerce (Panwhar et al., 2000). 
 
The Federal Hazardous Material Transportation Law (October 1994) states that “The 
secretary of transportation shall design material (including explosive material, 
radioactive material, etiologic agent, flammable or combustible liquid or solid, poison, 
oxidizing or corrosive material, and compressed gas) or a group or class of materials as 
hazardous when the secretary decides that transporting the material in commerce in a 
particular amount may pose an unreasonable risk to health and safety or property” (Frank 
et al., 2000).  
 
The European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods 
by Road (ADR) is the main regulation on DG transport on road. ADR has been written at 
Geneva on 30 September 1957 under the auspices of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, and it came into force on 29 January 1968. The Agreement 
itself was modified by the Protocol amending article 14 approved at New York on 21 
August 1975, which entered into force on 19 April 1985 (ADR, 2009). The ADR was 
approved by law in Italy on 12th August 1962 n. 1839 and in France with act n. 60 – 794 
on 22nd June 1960. 
 84
 
A set of new Amendments came into force on 1 January 2005, and consequently, a 
third consolidated "restructured" version was published as document ECE/TRANS/175, 
Vol. I and II (ADR 2005). Really, the ADR 2007 is almost ready effective. After gaining 
experience with the implementation of the early Seveso Directive (Council Directive of 
24 June 1982), the Seveso II Directive (Directive 96/82/EC) was issued in 1996 (Council 
Directive of 9 Dicember 1996) as a legislative framework in the European Union for the 
control of major accident hazards in fixed installations. Each member country, by 
adopting the Directive, establishes a national legislative and regulatory framework for 
risk management (Contini et al., 2000).  
 
The Agreement itself is short and simple. The key article is the second, which say 
that apart from some excessively dangerous goods, other dangerous goods may be 
carried internationally in road vehicles subject to compliance with: 
the conditions laid down in Annex A for the goods in question, in particular as 
regards their packaging and labelling; and  
the conditions laid down in Annex B, in particular as regards the construction, 
equipment and operation of the vehicle carrying the goods in question.  
 
In ADR appear the limitations applicable to the various operators of the logistics 
chain (buyers, transporters, manufacturers of packaging and tankers etc.) giving specific 
treatment to their field of interest, ordered in Parts 1 to 9 with attachment regulations A 
and B. 
 
The regulation topics of law ADR are: 
 
− The method of identification of dangerous goods, 
− The lists of dangerous goods permitted transport on the roads, 
− The modality regarding transport, type of packaging and the connected approval 
tests, 
− The planning and construction of the tankers, 
− The checks and the recognition of technical suitability of the vehicles used to 
transport the dangerous goods, 
− The training and recognition of the vehicle drivers. 
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The ADR imposes that, except for some excessively dangerous goods, that the 
dangerous goods can be transported at an international scale on road vehicles that 
conform to: 
 
− Conditions regarding package and labelling (attachment A); 
− Conditions regarding the construction characteristics of the equipment and the 
installation of the vehicles (attachment B). 
 
The ADR agreement is updated every two years and with Directive 2006/89/CE of 
3rd November 2006 (GU of the European Union L305 of the 4/11/2006), the 2007 
edition was acknowledged and became effective from 1st January 2007. 
 
The attachments of ADR are separated into 9 parts: 
 
ATTACHMENT A: 
Part 1: general arrangement; 
Part 2: classification; 
Part 3: list of the dangerous goods, special placements, exemptions connected to the 
dangerous goods packed in limited quantities; 
Part 4: arrangement connected to the use of the packaging and tankers; 
Part 5: transport procedure; 
Part 6:  limitations connected to the construction of the packaging, large containers 
for bulk transport (GIR), large packaging and tankers and the tests which they must 
sustain; 
Part 7:  arrangement concerning the conditions of transport, the loading, the 
unloading and the movement. 
 
ATTACHMENT B 
Part 8: limitations connected to equipment, gear, the running of the vehicles and the 
documentation; 
Part 9: limitations connected to the construction and approval of the vehicles. 
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An important change has been made with the modification of paragraph 1.10 in 
2005. A paragraph has been added which cites the arrangements concerning safety which 
must be taken into account by every person involved in the transport of dangerous goods. 
In this chapter the transporters and all others involved in the transport of dangerous 
goods at high risk are required to adopt, carry out and follow a safety plan. 
 
This must include: 
− Specific roles of responsibility in the matter of safety; 
− The recording of the dangerous goods in question and their typology; 
− The monitoring of the vehicles; 
− Definition of the measures to adopt to reduce the safety risks; 
− Efficient procedures to identify and face threats, safety violations and incidents 
connected to safety; 
− Procedure of evaluation and verification of the safety plans; 
− Measures to assure the physical protection of information connected to the transport 
contained in the safety plan; 
− Measures to assure that the distribution of information connected to the transport 
operation, contained in the safety plan, is limited according to necessity. 
 
Furthermore, it is foreseen that vehicles that DGT must be installed with devices, 
equipment and other protection systems for protection from the theft of the vehicle or the 
load, and therefore guaranteeing both security and safety. 
 
The use of a system of data transmission or other method of following the movement 
of the goods is proposed, if the device is installed and deemed useful. With the 
stipulation of ADR the Kemler Code was also introduced, representing a method of 
identification coding for dangerous substances transported by road and railway. 
 
Through the reading and decoding of this code, in the case of an incident, it is 
possible to deduct the following information: 
− Potential harm to the health of the people involved and/or first-aiders; 
− The minimum equipment advised for the protection of the first-aiders; 
− Precautions to take while waiting for the arrival of the Fire Brigade. 
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In accordance with this code two types of sign must be attached to the vehicles 
which transport dangerous goods: 
 
A code of danger sign: of a rectangular shape (30 cm x 40 cm, readable also after a 
fire of no more than 15 minutes) containing in the upper part the code of danger, of two 
or three figures, and on the lower part the code of the substance transported (ONU 
number), of four figures, as shown in the following example: 
 
 
Figure 31. Example of a code of danger sign for dangerous goods, in accordance with the 
Kemler code. 
 
Ticket: of a square shape, displayed on a vertex, with different colours and with 
different pictographs indicting the type of danger based on the substances transported 
(minimum dimensions 25cm x 25cm). The following is an example for the transport of 
flammable liquid: 
 
 
Figure 32. Example of a ticket for dangerous goods in accordance with the Kemler code. 
 
In attachment A of the previous edition ADR 2007 particular relevance is given to 
the topic of training for the operators in the transport of dangerous goods, safety 
obligations and control and support measures for these figures and the confirmation of 
the need for a new professional role of “safety consultant”. 
 
Annexes A and B have been regularly amended and updated since the entry into 
force of ADR. The last amendments entered into force on 1 January 2009, and 
consequently, a revised consolidated version was published as document 
ECE/TRANS/202, Vol.I and II ("ADR 2009"). 
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Figure 33. DG classification on the bases of type of DG and hazard label (ADR, 2009). 
 
In the transport of dangerous goods the problem is how to optimize transport and 
distribution, minimizing the risk of accident. So, not only ADR 2009, but also national 
regulation, such as Italian National Legislative Decree No. 286, and applications from 
the 21.11.2005, and the other Italian National Legislative Decree No. 214, and 
applications from 22.12.2008, and “Decreto interministeriale 30 giugno 2009 pubblicato 
sulla G.U. 153 del 30 giugno 2009 - Circolare esplicativa Ministero dell’Interno e 
Ministero dei trasporti del 19 luglio 2009” need to be implemented and modify to 
improve safety and security. Also the laws on road traffic control could be update in 
monitoring and control actions and administrative and penal sanctions (Directive 
2004/112/CE). 
Regulations are essential to prevent not only risk, but also to reduce hazard. After 
this explanation in locate each low in different countries and for different type of 
transport, what is important regard the control and the low application. Such technical 
regulations need a continuous fitting to satisfy the DGT requirements, but always taking 
into account safety and security. On the other hand, in risk definition, technical 
regulations are a fundamental part in the decisional level and management, and also in 
defining methodologies, the regulation represents constraints in model formalization. 
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3 Risk definition 
 
“Risk is defined as a measure of frequency and severity of harm due to a hazard”. 
“The hazard in our context is the presence of DG having toxic, explosive, and/or 
flammable characteristics with the potential to cause harm to humans (and property or 
the environment if a broader context is considered). In the context of public safety, risk is 
commonly characterized by fatalities (and injury) to members of the public”, (Risk 
Assessment – Recommended Practices for Municipalities and Industry, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 34. Risk definition and its classification. 
 
Several factors contribute to making it difficult - to assess risk in transporting DG - 
including: 
− the diversity of hazards: the substances transported are multiple and can be 
flammable, toxic, explosive, corrosive or radioactive materials; 
− diversity of accident sites: highways, county roads, local roads, in or out of town 
(75% of road accidents take place in open country), facilities, pipelines, etc; 
− Diversity of causes: failure mode of transport, containment, human error, etc., 
(«Le transport de marchandises dangereuses», Prim.net, 2010). 
 
Risk of DGT could be classified and identified into three types: 
− a close risk: when the risk is near a facility subject to a specific response plan 
(this facility generates the bulk of the DGT flow); 
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− a diffuse risk: the risk is spread over the entire road network, rail and river; 
− a linear risk: this risk is plainly and easily identifiable, and for example in 
France, it is listed in various documents, («Le transport de marchandises dangereuses», 
Prim.net, 2010). 
 
3.1 Risk definition introduction 
When the transport network crosses heavily populated areas, a large number of 
persons could be affected by an accident such as a toxic spill or an explosion (Leonelli et 
al., 1999). There is a substantial difference between incident and accident. “The accident 
begins with an incident” (Crowl et al., 2007). An incident is defined as an event 
involving the transportation of DG that results in an unanticipated cost to the shipper, 
carrier or any other party. It is, also, defined as “the loss of containment or control of 
material or energy”; “most incidents are followed by a series of events that propagate the 
accident” (Crowl et al., 2007). 
 
An accident is an event that occurs and fires, explosions, and toxic releases could be 
included (Battelle, 2001). The accident in DGT can be related to high consequence and 
low frequency risks (Cozzani, 2007), and (Bell, 2006). Transportation risks are relevant 
to the occurring of sudden events, generally characterized by a low probability of 
occurrence, even though they can give rise to extreme impacts on population, goods, 
services, and environment (Beroggi and Wollace, 1998).  
 
3.2 DGT risk by pipeline 
Generally, pipeline transport risk is defined as the product of the probability of 
leakage or bursting and the related magnitude (Muhlbauer, 1996). Moreover, in this 
context, an accident is classified according to the probability that a loss (or release), a 
hole or a rupture can occur in a pipe (Cooke, 2002). So, in a quantitative risk analysis, 
safety and security must be evaluated by decision makers and planners both analytically 
and statistically, developing a quantitative estimation of risk in terms of mathematical 
techniques and engineering evaluation for estimating not only incident consequences, but 
also frequencies. Indeed, risk is also a “measure of human injury, environmental damage 
or economic loss in terms of both the incident likelihood and the magnitude of the loss or 
injury” (Crowl et al., 2007). 
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The risk along a pipeline is not a static component, but its changes continuously. 
Through the pipeline path, the boundary conditions are changeable, and the type of 
incident changes as much as the boundary conditions change. So, before assessing the 
risk is better find an answer to these three questions: 
− What kind of incident might happen, and what are their causes? – Hazards detection; 
− How probable an incident is? – causes of accident and frequency inspection; 
− What are the consequences on humans and environment? – Intensity, damage 
distances, impact areas, exposed elements vulnerability, (Muhlbauer, 1996). 
 
To assess the risk, then analyse and estimate the level of risk of accidents, in 
Dziubinski et al., (2006), three different methods (Figure 35): qualitative, semi-
quantitative and quantitative are defined. The semi-quantitative methods are applied to 
identify hazards and to select the so-called incidental events reasonably foreseeable ( 
"creditable failure events"). 
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Figure 35. Methods of risk assessment. 
 
Qualitative methods are used mainly in the validation of safety standards with regard 
to legal rules on the pipeline transport behaviour. These rules are usually considered as a 
minimum requirement that must be used to achieve certain levels of acceptable safety. 
However, for pipelines of great length, it is often necessary that the risk assessment is 
undertaken using a quantitative analysis, based on the concept of probabilistic risk. The 
quantitative assessment of risk is complex and involves a series of analysis and 
calculations, using many simulation models, particularly the physical analysis of the 
effects. 
Another classification of methods for the definition of risk is proposed by Canadian 
Standards Association, (2001), as shown in Figure 36. 
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Figure 36. Methods for estimating the risk – Canadian Standard Association, 2001. 
 
Some authors (Dziubinski et al., 2006) suggest a methodology that includes a 
sequence of analysis and calculations to determine the main reasons of failure of a 
pipeline and the related possible consequences, taking into account the Individual and 
Societal Risk (Ale, 1991). A specific feature of this methodology is therefore the 
combination of qualitative techniques (analysis of historical data, compliance tests, and 
assigning a score on the risk of accidents) and the quantitative definition of the state of 
security for the transportation pipeline. A general outline of the proposed methodology is 
as follows (Figure 38) 
 
This methodology takes into account the main factors for risk definition: 
− Technical features of the pipeline; 
− Sources of risk detection; 
− Historical data analysis about incident and near-miss; 
− Compliance tests;  
− List of the possible accidental events; 
− Definition of the layer of protection analysis (LOPA); 
− Definition of the accidental events frequency; 
− Consequences assessment (Figure 37). 
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Figure 37. Model architecture for assessing and evaluating – computing -  the potential 
consequences. 
 
The type of event and the relative consequences depend on the different factors, such 
as the spill source location, the quantity of release, the state of the system, the process 
conditions, the release modalities, and finally the boundary conditions (Guidelines for 
Ecological Risk Assessment, 1998). The effects analysis is shown in Figure 37. 
 
 
Figure 38. Methodologies for risk assessment in long pipelines. 
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For an event of blast or explosion - an overpressure – and for a thermal radiation – a 
fire – the overall standard is to define circular areas, with a distance radius equal to the 
value of the threat zone (critical range). In the case of toxic or flammable substances, 
without explosion, the threat zone area depends on the wind direction, as shown in 
Figure 39. 
 
 
Figure 39. Potential hazard zone, defined after an accidental release of a dangerous goods into 
the air. 
 
A diagram for the environmental risk definition is shown in Figure 40. The risk is 
caused by a dangerous good release in a specific point of the pipeline. The possible 
consequences depend on, not only the pipeline construction and characteristics, but also 
by the boundary conditions, such as type of soil, river crossing, elements in the vicinity 
of the pipeline, and so on. On the bases of historical data, (HSE, Contract Research 
Report 210, 1999), the explosion likelihood  - when a crude oil release happens -  is 
relatively low: the 96 percent of releases of petrol, or diesel oil, produce no one 
explosion. 
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Figure 40. General diagram that formalize the environmental consequences caused by a 
pipeline failure or rupture. 
 
The article of Romano et al. (2008) shows the methodology used to conduct risk 
analysis on pipelines carrying flammable substances and involving several elements 
exposed along the territory. The pipeline is considered transporting liquid, but the 
proposed methodology is also applicable to pipelines carrying gaseous fluids. Risk 
analysis has been developed considering different types of statistical and historical 
ruptures, using the CONCAWE database for determining the frequency of occurrence of 
the incidental hypotheses. The accident scenarios considered have also determined the 
effectiveness of leakage detection, acting on the definition of response times and 
repairing time that the damage has caused as a result of spillage or release. The study has 
examined two configurations: the first consists of an analysis of risk without considering 
the action of the leak-detection system, while the second considers the presence and 
effectiveness of the detection system losses. The results show a reduction of the 
consequences of accident scenarios considered, given the reduction in the time of 
intervention and therefore the quantity of dangerous fluid released. The results of risk 
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analysis have determined a safe distance that should be respected in order to give the 
authorization by the local authorities for the construction of buildings, palaces, houses, 
commercial areas and other elements potentially exposed, (Romano et al., 2008). 
 
3.3 DGT risk by road 
 
Several methods can be found in literature to assess risk derived from dangerous 
goods transport (DGT). In particular, the risk associated to accidents involving DG 
shipments have attracted considerable attention by researchers and practitioners. 
Risk derived from DG may derived from two type of sources: 
− Industrial fixed installations 
− Transport of dangerous goods, (Tixier, 2002). 
Transportation risk can be considered at various levels. What is the probability of an 
accident on a road segment? What is the average DG trucks flow in the same road 
segment? Research is still going on in this direction to find answers to these questions. 
Several researchers have tried to provide sound quantitative definitions about 
transportation risk. 
The accident is not only dependent on DG, as above explained, but also on the truck 
by which DG is transported. Each truck route has an origin and one, or more than one, 
destinations; thus, a transportation route can simply be viewed as a risk source on a 
segment constituted by a great number of (moving) point risk sources. Furthermore, in a 
corridor along the route, through the linear risk source, there are people living, in areas 
with different density population (Leonelli et al., 1999). For this reason, the 
characterizations of the transportation network, of the vehicles carrying DG and of the 
potential impact areas are of fundamental importance for transportation risk assessment.  
 
First of all, transportation risk falls within the area of technological risk. In fact, it 
refers to accidents that may arise in systems closely related to human activities. In 
general, an accident is an unplanned event or series of events which causes or has the 
potentiality to cause injury to people and/or damage to property and/or equipment. For 
the U.S. Department of transportation an accident is an accident involving a moving 
vehicle. It includes collisions with a vehicle, object, or person (except suicides) and 
derailment/left roadway, producing unintended injury, death or property damage. 
Accident refers to the event, not the result of the event (U.S. DOT, 2010). 
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Lassarre et al., (2001), analysed the progress in road safety using a classic model 
based on a decreasing exponential form of the rate of fatalities per [ kmvehicles ⋅ ], for ten 
different European Countries. He realized that the traffic each year is increasing 
maintaining the number of fatalities constant. 
 
In this connection, equity in DG routing and designing safer networks for DG 
transport are viable approaches to reduce the DG transport risk. However, a fundamental 
requirement for route design is the assessment of the risk imposed by shipments 
traversing each link in a network (Zografos et al., 2000). Shipments of DG, not only by 
road but also by rail, expose the population near the routes to the possibility of an 
accident resulting in a spill (Glickman et al., 2007). 
 
For instance, an analysis of the available UK data on road accidents involving 
tankers containing DG showed that releases could occur from two sources: firstly by 
puncture or rupture following collision or, secondly, from failure of the tanker 
equipment. For instance, 25 accidents were found over a four year period, for road 
transportation in UK. Analysis of these data yielded a spill frequency of 1.4×10-8 per 
loaded tanker km for large spills (>1500 kg) from collisions, and 0.7×10-8 per loaded 
tanker km for large spills (>1500 kg) arising out of equipment failure, (Purdy, 1993).  
 
According to Suchman, (Suchman, 1961), an event can be classified as an accident if 
it is unexpected, unavoidable, and unintended.  What’s more, accidents involving DG 
can be broadly categorized into two major groups: fixed installation accidents and 
transportation accidents. The major hazards with which the DGT is concerned are DG 
releases (spills), or fires (thermo release), and explosions (pressure release). Spill is the 
most common, but explosion is more significant in terms of its damage potential, often 
leading to fatalities and damage to property (Khan and Abbasi (b), 1999).  
 
In general, risk definitions include a term related to the probability of the hazard 
(UNESCO, 1972), and a term related to the strength of the effects on the elements that 
are in the geographic and temporal neighbourhood of the event. These two terms may be 
also adequate to the risk definition of DGT, taking into account that the probability of an 
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event and its magnitude are time/space varying, since they are subject to several 
external/internal time/space varying factors. 
 
Particularly, Current and Ratick, (1995), assert that DG management system must 
consider the cost and risk associated with the transportation of DG as well as those 
associated with the facilities that generate, process, or dispose such materials, being the 
two aspects of the problem strictly correlated. 
 
Leonelli et al., (1999), indicate that risk assessment is typically structured as a 
process resulting from the interaction among (a) the transportation network, (b) the 
vehicles or travelling risk source and (c) the impact area. The same author, in a further 
paper, define the individual risk as corresponding to the yearly death frequency of an 
average person permanently staying, without protective devices, at a fixed point of the 
impact area. Then, they define a social risk, as corresponding to the cumulated frequency 
of having an accident with one or more fatalities, (Leonelli et al., 2000). 
 
Zhang et al., (2000), consider risks that affect human populations by airborne 
contaminants, defining this risk as the product of the probability of an undesirable 
consequence (such as injury, illness, or death) and the population affected. The author 
structure the evaluation procedure into three stages: (a) determining the probability of an 
undesirable event, (b) estimating the level of potential exposure, given the nature of the 
event, and (c) estimating the magnitude of consequences (fatalities, injuries and property 
damages) given the level of exposure.  
 
Frank et al., (2000), discusses several strategies that may be followed in order to 
mitigate risk. First of all, a careful choice of the route can reduce the probability of an 
accident. Besides, choosing a route passing through less populated areas reduces the 
number of people exposed to high risk. Next, vehicle and container design could be 
modified, in order to reduce the severity of a release once an accident has occurred. 
Finally, accident probability could also be reduced by an improved driver training.  
 
Serafini, (2006), highlights that the travelling of DG has raised the problem of 
determining vehicle routes minimizing not only the length (related to cost and/or time), 
but also the risk of damages caused by accidents. Indeed, two quantities are typically 
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involved in the assessment of the risk associated to a certain route. First, the probability 
of accident occurrence on a certain route link, and, second, the cost incurred in case of 
accident on that link. 
 
In this connection, Akgün et al., (2007) underline that weather conditions 
dynamically affect the accident probabilities, as well as the costs involved.  
Despite such significant contributions, at the moment, in the literature, a well 
established definition of DGT risk can not be found. On the other hand, the literature in 
this field is growing and deepening the various issues related to transportation risk. Thus, 
it is realistic to assume that, in a very short time, a common framework could be set as 
regards DGT risk assessment, as regards its evaluation and quantification, as well as the 
development of strategies allowing this risk and/or the mitigation of its impacts. 
 
On the other hand, the analysis and management of risk of major accidents in 
transport activities involving DG is a subject not completely clear, since there are not 
universally accepted definition and classifications. As a matter of fact, the research on 
DG transport risk has still many open issues, and is still in a rapid evolution phase. 
 
In Italy, 168×103 accidents per year occur on the roads, where 18×103 are related to 
trucks in general reference. The truck accident frequency is 1.8×10-7 [accident/year∗ km], 
(Fabiano et al., 2002). However, such information refers to heavy traffic accidents and 
not specifically to DG tracks. What we know about DG accident frequency in Italy is not 
enough in comparison with other countries. We know that spill probability during DG 
pick up and delivery is 1.4×10-4. Moreover, the probability that a spill causes a pool fire 
is 1.4×10-5 with a radius of impact equal to 20÷35 m (depending on the quantity of spill) 
and a thermo release of 12.5 kw/m2. In addiction, the probability that a spill causes a 
UVCE (Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion) is 1.4×10-7  with a radius of impact equal to 
20÷91 m (depending on the quantity of spill) and a pressure release of  0.3 bar (Khan and 
Abbasi (b), 1999), (Khan and Abbasi (a), 1999), and (Khan and Abbasi, 2000). 
 
So, in which way the risk assessment has been analyzed? One of the first approaches 
related to risk assessment regards the article of Abkowitz and Cheng, (1988), in which a 
Risk/Cost Framework for routing truck movements of DG had been developed. 
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The main idea of this study was firstly, representing accurately the risk in transport, 
secondly, defining a framework for this type of system, then designing a permanent set 
the shipping routes based on optimizing across risk and cost, and finally estimating risk 
and uncertainty. 
In this approach the movement of DG differs from fixed facility risks because of its 
dynamic nature of exposure to the population and environment along routes of travel. 
Moreover, risk assessment involves not only determining the frequencies and 
consequences of undesirable events, but also evaluating the associated risk in 
quantitative terms, (Glickman, 1991). In any case, risk assessment is typically structured 
as a sequential process: 
− beginning with understanding the level of involvement; 
− the frequency and type of incident occurrence; 
− finally, the consequence for a given incident. 
 
In this sub sequential approach no systematic procedure has emerged, because the 
risk assessment is characterized as a quantitative one, and it is based on historical data or 
data available. So, if there is a lack of data the risk assessment is compromised, if there is 
a great amount of historical data the risk assessment is particularly accurate. On the other 
hand, the purpose of the risk assessment and the preferences of the analyst could also 
vary the quantification of risk. 
 
There are many methods to estimate risk. Expressing risk as a single measure is the 
simplest way to do that, but it does not provide as much information as a risk profile. A 
risk profile is a probability distribution of incident likelihood and severity. The shape of 
the risk profile particularly helps in distinguishing between high-probability/low-
consequences events and low-probability/high-consequence events. 
The estimated consequences of an incident involving a shipment of DG depend on a 
variety of factors, such as: 
− the amount released; 
− toxicity of the chemical; 
− health effects; 
− population and environment exposed; 
− Weather conditions at the time of the incident. 
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Estimated the consequences of an incident, in general, there are two types of 
damages, as the result from the consequent impact of material spill: 
− Direct damages; 
− Indirect damages. 
Direct damages are damages to individuals, who are directly involved in an incident 
or properties damaged during the incident, while, damages to individuals residing in the 
vicinity of the incident site, or for example ecological effects, are indirect damages. To 
estimate the indirect damages it is useful determine the area of exposure. The length of 
this area, in others words the impact radius, depends on: 
− the material; 
− severity of spill; 
− Weather conditions present at the time of incident.  
But, in general the determination of indirect damages is the most difficult task to 
reach, as a matter of fact, environmental effects include: 
− release into air; 
− surface water; 
− Groundwater. 
 
Erkut and Verter, (1995) considered the approach proposed by Abkowitz and Cheng, 
(1988) to talk about how to estimate the probability of an incident. Generally speaking, 
traffic accidents are the main cause of unintentional DG releases during transport. In the 
context of DGT, risk refers to the likelihood of incurring the undesirable consequences of 
a possible release event. The probability considered by Erkut and Verter, (1995), is an 
incident probability, reasonably assumed as a constant value over segments, since road 
characteristics are uniform within each segment. This probability takes into account three 
types of probability definitions: 
− Probability of an accident [per unit distance movement]. 
− Probability of an incident given an accident on road segment s during transport of 
material. In others words it is the product of the probability of the release of material m, 
given an accident at road segment s, and the probability of an incident, given the release 
of material m. 
But how estimate this kind of probability? 
If historical data is available, it is possible to use the statistical inference to infer 
future expectations. Actually, the existing data and observed data are usually insufficient, 
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so it is impossible to estimate directly the condition of a release and the incident 
probability. In order to overwhelm this gap logical diagrams, like fault trees and event 
trees can be used.  
In any case, these techniques need basic events, in others words, sufficient historical 
data or expert judgments, to be able to estimate the probability of an event on the basis of 
the probability of a set of basic events. 
Then, another aspect of the probability evaluation is to estimate the probability of the 
consequences of interest occurring after an accident. This is a task usually difficult to 
reach.  
 
Also in the approach of Zhang et al., (2000), the target to reach is to assess the 
potential risk imposed by shipments traversing each link in a network. All the subjects 
involved in DG transport, such as shippers, DG producers, governments and 
communities are held to reduce the potential negative impact of this kind of transport. 
The principal reason is that all the dangerous goods could be, by definition, extremely 
harmful to environment and to human health. It is follows that transporting dangerous 
materials is also inevitable not only in populated areas but also through environmentally 
sensible areas. So, Zhang et al., (2000), assessed the risk of DG, using a traditional 
method, which was imposed on human population by such airborne contaminants, 
considering the area impacted and the number of persons involved. 
 
In the literature there are many others approaches to assess risk. Some authors 
consider possible to apply a Quantitative Risk Assessment to the DGT. 
Scenna, and Santa Cruz, (2007), said that the five components of a Quantitative Risk 
Analysis for transport of DG are: 
− involvement of a dangerous vehicle in an accident; 
− breakage occurrence and characteristics (type, size, etc); 
− release occurrence; 
− calculation of Individual Risk and Societal Risk for each segment of the road; 
− calculation of the risk distribution over a given area for each scenario. 
In this study a road risk analysis has been applied due to the transport of chlorine in 
Rosario city. The case study shows what are the potential consequences and the 
catastrophic accidents involving dangerous goods along a road; where the most 
important indicator for consequence calculation is the population density and the most 
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probable hazardous event is the toxic gas cloud diffusion. This study was encouraged by 
the municipal government agency. 
 
Ronza et al., (2007), used transport accident data bases to investigate ignition and 
explosion probability of flammable spills. They defined a Quantitative Risk Analysis to 
determine Individual and Societal Risk in or around an area characterized by certain 
activities to which accident scenarios can be associated. They based their analysis on 
event trees method to assess the risk of DG spill and blast scenario. They calculated the 
probability of occurrence for events, such as, spill ignition and blast formation. 
 
Brown, and Dunn, (2007), applied a Quantitative Risk Assessment Method to define 
emergency response planning. Firstly, they collected data from past accidents, which 
were characterized by statistical analysis of historical DG accident data. Secondly, they 
described how to apply QRA to societal risk estimation (societal impact analysis), 
routing optimization and container safety optimization. Finally, they developed a risk 
assessment method for evaluating consequence distributions associated with DGT, where 
the range of consequences depends on: 
− local weather conditions; 
− population density; 
Specific attributes of the spill itself. They used a physical model for describe DG 
releases. 
The variables take into account in this work are: 
− variability in container type; 
− incident type; 
− accident severity (release amount); 
− location; 
− time of day; 
− time of year; 
− meteorology. 
Also in this approach total risk for many of these materials is greatly influenced by 
low-probability/high-consequence events. 
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For the definition of risk, strictly links to risk perception and acceptability, as 
introduced in Chapter number one, the distinction of the following two indicators is 
fundamental: the individual risk and the social risk. 
 
The individual risk is defined as the probability in a year that an exposed person, 
positioned at a precise distance to the source of risk, is hit by the undesired effects of the 
event (Ale, 1991). This is formally defined by the following expression: 
 
fdf PPIR ⋅=        (3.1) 
where: 
fP  is the probability of accident happening; 
fdP is the probability of death of the individual if the accident happened. 
 
The individual risk is graphically represented by a curve at the same risk, (isorisk 
curve), which links points with identical values of individual risk. 
 
The social risk is instead defined, (Ale, 1991), as the relationship that exists between 
the number of people affected (killed) following a single accident (N) and the probability 
(F) that the number of people affected is exceeded. 
 
The most convenient representation of the social risk is the F-N curve; this curve, 
expressed in log scale and characterised by the monotonous upwards trend, represents 
the frequency (F) of accidents and the number (N) of victims with N varying from 1 to 
the maximum possible number.  
 
There are two general methods for the construction of the F-N curve: the first is to 
calculate the F-N curve directly from the empirical frequency of the data of passed 
accidents; the second is to develop and use a probabilistic model to estimate the 
frequency (F). 
 
The indicators of individual and social risk, initially defined by fixed installation and 
then for precise source of risk, can extend to the road arches and then the linear sources, 
even if with notable computational effort (Leonelli et al, 2000). 
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To calculate the F-N curve associated with each arch it is in fact necessary to know 
information such as: the number of journeys per year, the frequency of accidents (F). the 
probability that a particular accident happens, the dimensions of the area potentially 
involved in the accident and the population density in the area under examination. 
 
The approach proposed by Pastorino et al.,(2002) is therefore innovative as the 
frequency of an accident on the i-esimo stretch can be expressed by the following 
equations: 
 
iiii nLf γ=        (3.2) 
∏
=
=
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0
j
ji hγγ
       (3.3) 
 
where: 
=iγ frequency expected on the i-esimo stretch of road [accidents km-1 per vehicle] 
=iL  road length [km] 
=in  number of vehicles [vehicles] 
=0γ basic frequency [accidents km-1 per vehicle] 
=ih parameters of amplification / local mitigation 
 
In their study the authors proposed gauging the parameters of the amplification and 
mitigation, for a stretch of the A7 motorway near Genoa. They were subdivided into 6 
categories; in particular h1 and h2 refer to geometric characteristics of the road, h3 to the 
type of roadway, h4 to the weather conditions, h5 to the type and intensity of traffic, h6 
to the presence or not of tunnels and bridges. 
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Intrinsic characteristics h1 h2 h3 h6 
Direct road 1    
Curve of the road (distance> 200m) 1,3    
Curve of the road (distance < 200m) 2,2    
Level road  1   
Ascending road (gradient< 5%)  1,1   
Steeply ascending road (gradient > 5%)  1,2   
Descending road (gradient < 5%)  1,3   
Steeply descending road (gradient > 5%)  1,5   
Two lanes for every roadway    1,8  
Two lanes plus the emergency lane for every roadway   1,2  
Three lanes plus the emergency lane for every roadway   0,8  
Tunnel     0,8 
Bridge    1,2 
  
Table 5. Factors interrelated to the intrinsic characteristics of the road. 
 
 
Weather Conditions h4 
Fine weather  1 
Rain/fog 1,5 
Snow/ice 2,5  
 
Table 6. Factors interrelated to the weather conditions. 
 
Traffic Characteristics h5 
Low intensity < 500 vehicles/hours 0,8
Medium intensity <1250 vehicles/hour with heavy traffic <125 lorries per day 1 
High intensity >1250 vehicles/hour 1,4
High intensity  <1250 vehicles/hour  with  heavy traffic >250 lorries per day  2,4
  
Table 7. Factors interrelated to the characteristics of traffic on the A7 motorway. 
 
 
Figure 41. Dynamic and static parameters involved in risk definition. 
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Another approach, based on the calculation of the population, is that of Carotenuto et 
al., (2007). The authors, in this work, consider unitary segments of risk, or rather each 
road arch is subdivided in segments of unitary length. Assuming furthermore that the risk 
is connected to a segment of unitary length x, belonging to a generic arch, and to the 
population, that resides in the proximity of the segment next to the unitary length y. The 
risk is defined as the product between the probability, per unitary length, that is verified 
as an accident in segment x and the consequences of that accident for the population that 
lives in the proximity of segment y:  
 
( ) 2],[ yxd
yx
y
x epopP
ασ −⋅⋅=        (3.4) 
 
where: 
xP  = probability that an accident happens in the stretch of unitary length x 
ypop  = population in the proximity of the segment of unitary length y  
),( yxd  = euclidean distance between the centre of the 2 segments x and y of unitary 
length  
α = factor of impact, dependent on the particolar dangerous goods considered. 
 
 
Figure 42. Representation of the area of pertinence of a segment and the distance between the 
centres of the two different segments. 
 
The risk σx associated to segment x for the population that lives in proximity to the 
arch considered can be evaluated by the comparison: 
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where S is the combination of the segments of unitary length that make up the entire 
network under consideration. At this point the risk associated to the arch can be 
calculated as the sum of the risk associated to each segment of unitary length that makes 
up the same arch, and therefore: 
 
∑
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σ
        (3.6) 
 
Therefore combining the definition of the frequency of accidents, calculated using 
the approach of Pastorino, with that of the population involved proposed by Carotenuto, 
a complete definition of risk associated with a road arch is obtained. This solution is 
displayed in the following figure: 
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Figure 43. Summary diagram regarding the definition of risk in the transport of dangerous 
goods relative to a h arch. 
 
This last risk definition – shown in the previous scheme (Figure 43) - is one of the 
results of project n. 176 titled “Definition, planning and prototype creation of an 
information distribution system, the monitoring and the management of the transport of 
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dangerous goods by road aimed at the strengthening of the security measures of the 
transport infrastructure cross-border area of Nice – Imperia – Savona” of the programme 
InterregIIIA - Alcotra (www.interreg-alcotra.org). 
 
3.4 Monitoring a DGT vehicle – state of the art 
The first applications in Italy in the telly-control of vehicles that transport dangerous 
goods, an activity foreseen in the recent modifications of the ADR, were carried out in 
the ReLaMP and SIMAGE projects. 
 
The first, supported by Regione Liguria and set up by Filse (Finanziaria Ligure per 
lo Sviluppo Economico) in partnership with Elsag and Set Italia, was developed with the 
help of the Ministry of the Environment and is based on a system that plans the itinerary 
for the vehicles’ journeys thanks to a combination of territory data and data from the 
telly-control of the vehicles during the transport. The aim of the project was to supply an 
efficient product to support the Fire Brigade, Traffic Police and other authorities in case 
of emergency, supplying useful data for giving aid. 
 
SIMAGE instead, is a programme between the Italian Ministry of the Environment 
and the Joint Research Centre of the European Community (JRC), that consists in putting 
into practice a pilot system for the monitoring and management, in case of accident, of 
the transport of dangerous goods throughout the Italian territory and in particular the 
provinces of Taranto, Brindisi and Porto Marghera. The main objectives of the system 
are: 
(a) to construct and install an information system for the monitoring in real time of 
the vehicles that transport dangerous goods; 
(b) to supply alarm signals to the authorized authorities in case of emergency; 
(c) to supply functionality in risk management; 
(d) to supply an estimate in real time of the vulnerability in the territory; 
(e) to validate the system through the installation of a significant number of data 
transmission sensors operating simultaneously. 
 
The definition of the typology characteristics and the vulnerability of the 
infrastructure network and the relative flows of traffic assume great importance in the 
analysis of risk in the transport of dangerous goods. 
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On this subject the work finished in 2006, by Maja, Studer, Rainoldi et al. of the  
Politecnico di Milano in collaboration with the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, 
is interesting. It regards the definition of the origin – destination itineraries, of great 
interest for the analysis of risk applied to the region of Lombardia. The objective of the 
study was to individuate, among all available itineraries, that with the most interesting 
telly-control of the vehicles used for the transport of refinery products, aimed at 
minimizing the risk connected to that transport. After the first phase of geographic 
aggregation of data, carried out for the analysed origins (Rho-Pero and Sannazzaro de 
Burgundi) and for each goods category transported (petrol/oil and GPL), the social risk 
for each route was calculated, defined as the relationship between the frequency of an 
accidental event and the number of deaths which followed, represented graphically with 
curve F-N (Ale, 2002). Comparing the results obtained with the established threshold, 
three classes of risk are defined: 
 
• Not interesting: the social risk curve does not exceed the threshold; 
• Interesting: the social risk curve slightly exceeds the threshold; 
• Very interesting: the social risk curve greatly exceeds the threshold.  
 
This allowed to obtain the thematic maps in which the arches are differently 
coloured according to the level of risk which it characterises.  
 
Another objective of the work was to define four operational levels of alarm of the 
anomaly detected by the telly-control and, for each of them, an operative protocol to 
apply in case of a detected emergency. 
 
In France, different studies based on the integration of information supplied by the 
transport companies and public authorities have been carried out on a national, regional, 
departmental and local scale. In particular two of these have caught our attention, 
connected to the types of transport of dangerous materials: 
 
1. Data collection relative to the definition of the TDG flow in Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d’Azur (PACA) carried out by DRIRE PACA (Direction Régionale de l’Industrie, de la 
recherche et de l’Environnement), CYPRES (Centre d’information du Public pour la 
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Prévention des Risques industriels et la Protection de l’environnement), DRE PACA 
(Direction Régionale de l’Equipement) and the Prefecture  PACA. This activity set out to 
collect information on dangerous goods transported, the quantity, destinations and 
itineraries etc. in order to prevent the risk of TDG accidents and for preparation of crisis 
management. The information is collected starting from the interested companies and in 
the administration. A large part of this data is available on the website CYPRES, from 
the GIS interface. 
 
2. The GLOBAL project regards the global evaluation of the technological risks 
connected to the transport and storage of dangerous goods. This project, carried out by 
CIRANO of Ecole Polytechnique de Montréal and INERIS (Institut National de 
l’Environnement Industriel et des Risques), tries to define and propose a method of 
evaluation of risk in all the logistics chain integrating Quantitative Risk Assessment and 
the aspects connected to costs, professional risk, impact on the environment etc. 
 
3.5 DGT risk definition comments and comparison 
 
At the end of Chapter 3 about risk definition, one thing is clear, that there is not only 
one way to define risk in DGT. 
 
The general assumption that DGT risk is define as the product between probability 
of accident occurrence and magnitude of its consequences is generally accepted by all 
the Authors mentioned in this chapter. Then, both road and pipeline transportation are 
characterised as accidental risks, strictly related to technological risk definition. 
 
Both risks are dynamic, because of their dependency from dynamic parameters and 
variables, and they can be define as linear risk, because of the shape of infrastructure 
used to transport. The causes of accident can be different, but the possible outcomes to 
an accident are the same: explosion, fire, release of substance. Therefore, the models and 
methods used to quantify the threat zone area are the same, in term of boundary 
conditions, (wind direction, atmospheric condition, chemical and physical parameter 
considered, etc..), and in term of levels of concern. 
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There are also some differences. Each risk evaluation model is an ad hoc risk 
description. This depends not only on the targets that the decision makers want to reach, 
but also on the type and quantity of substances involved (different case by case), the 
amount of elements exposed (different area by area considered), and the boundary 
conditions considered. 
 
In this two type of transport we can apply various approaches - a qualitative one, or a 
semi-quantitative one, or a quantitative one - to define risk, using all the techniques 
described in Chapter 1 to assess DGT risk. So, a continuous approach or a discrete 
approach could be investigated to define quantitatively or qualitatively the risk. 
 
In this PhD work, considering and taking my stand on all the literature on risk 
definition reported before, I have developed, and tested the risk definition reported in 
project n. 176, that represent a new, but reasonable approach to define risk in a 
quantitative way, consider not only static parameter, but also dynamic variables. Data 
considered in the risk formulation represent a realistic description of the DGT system 
studied. 
 
The risk algoritm can be implemented in real time, using real time data deriving 
from metheorological information, motorway traffic condition, and also other static 
parameters, such as infastructure geometry, population density, and many others. The 
value of risk resulted by the computational analysis can be compare with the limit of 
acceptability defined in the Netherlands, reported in Chapter one, so each segment of 
road can be identified by a color. Three are the colors considered: 
− Red if the risk is unacceptable; 
− Yellow if the risk is acceptable, adopting measure for its reduction; 
− Green if risk is acceptable. 
 
Regarding different aspects of risk definition the publications that follows are related 
to my work in this field, during my PhD studies: 
 E. Garbolino, A. M. Tomasoni, E. Trasforini (2007). “Chapitre 3 / Capitolo 3 – 
Aspects méthodologiques du risque de transport de marchandises dangereuses sur 
route / Aspetti metodologici del rischio legato al trasporto di merci pericolose su 
strada” in  “LIVRE BLANC/LIBRO BIANCO, Modèle technologique et 
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méthodologique de référence pour le contrôle et le suivi du trafic de matières 
dangereuses sur route sur l’axe Nice-Imperia-Savona/Modello tecnologico e 
metodologico di riferimento per il controllo ed il monitoraggio del traffico di 
merci pericolose su strada sull’asse Nizza-Imperia-Savona”, Eds C.Bersani, E. 
Garbolino, R. Sacile, DIST – UNIGE Septembre/Settembre 2007 – ISBN – 978-
88-901 344-4-9. 
 E., Garbolino, A. M. Tomasoni, E. Trasforini (2008). “Assessment of Risk and 
Accident Impacts related to dangerous Goods Transport in a Dense Urbanized 
Area” in  “Advanced Technologies and Methodologies for Risk Management in 
the Global Transport of Dangerous Goods”, Eds C.Bersani, A. Boulmakoul, E. 
Garbolino, R. Sacile, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - E: Human 
and Societal Dynamics (ISSN 1874-6276) Volume 45 ISBN 978-1-58603-899-1. 
Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2008. 
 C. Bersani, R. Minciardi, R. Sacile, A. M. Tomasoni, E. Trasforini (2008). “An 
Integrated System for the Hazardous Material Transport in a Sub-Regional Scale 
Area” in  “Advanced Technologies and Methodologies for Risk Management in 
the Global Transport of Dangerous Goods”, Eds C.Bersani, A. Boulmakoul, E. 
Garbolino, R. Sacile, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - E: Human 
and Societal Dynamics (ISSN 1874-6276) Volume 45 ISBN 978-1-58603-899-1. 
Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2008. 
 Davide Giglio, Roberto Sacile, Riccardo Minciardi, Roberto Rudari, Angela 
Tomasoni, Domenico Pizzorni, Eva Trasforini. Towards A Decision Support 
System for Real Time Risk Assessment of Hazardous Material Transport on 
Road, in: Pahi-Wosti, C., Schmidt, S., Rizzoli, A. E., Rizzoli, Jakeman, A. J. 
(eds). Proceedings of the iEMSs Second Biennial Meeting: "Complexity and 
Integrated Resources Management ". International Environmental Modelling and 
Software Society, Osnabrück, Germany, June 2004. CD ROM. Internet: 
http://www.iemss.org/iemss2004/sessions/all.html#S11, ISBN 88-900787-1-5. 
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4 Accident occurrence evaluation in the pipeline 
transport of dangerous goods  
A pipeline is a complex system, geographically spread on a wide territory, requiring 
technologies and methodologies to support the identification of pipeline segments that 
are highly potentially at risk of failure. This Chapter 4 tackles a dual problem: to describe 
the most significant causes that may lead to a pipeline segment failure; to evaluate the 
occurrence of these causes leading to a failure, according to technical characteristics of 
the pipeline, infrastructures, territorial elements, and land use activities in the pipeline 
neighbourhood. This analysis constitutes the methodological basis to implement a 
Geographic Information System to support decisions as regards risk analysis and land 
planning criteria. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Natural gas, crude oil and petroleum products represent the main products 
transported by pipeline networks. The total  length of European High Pressure networks 
for natural gas transport was approximately 200,000 km in 2003, compared to ~180,000 
km in 1996 (Eurogas, 2005). The combined traffic volume in the CONservatio of Clear 
Air and Water in Europe (CONCAWE, the oil companies’ European association for 
environment, health and safety in refining and distribution) system in 2001 was 131 
billion cubic meters/km, of which ~70 % was crude oil (16 % higher than in 1994). A 
network of ~10, 000 km pipelines convey more than 150 different DG such as: ethylene, 
propylene, chlorine, ammonia, hydrogen, oxygen, butadiene and styrene, (Papadakis, 
1999). 
 
In Europe, the quantity of oil transported by pipeline increased of 10% in 2006 
compared to 2000 (Eurostat, 2008). In total, 526 Mm3 of crude oil and 279 Mm3 of 
refined products were transported by pipeline in Europe in 2006 (CONCAWE, 2008). In 
Italy, the overall length of pipelines for the transport of oil products is estimated to 4179 
km in 2006 (Eurostat, 2009). 
 
Generally, pipeline transport risk is defined as the product of the probability of 
leakage or bursting and the related magnitude (Muhlbauer, 1996). Moreover, in this 
context, an accident is classified according to the probability that a loss (or release), a 
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hole or a rupture can occur in a pipe (Cooke et al., 2002). So, in a quantitative risk 
analysis, safety and security must be evaluated by decision makers and planners both 
analytically and statistically. 
 
In this chapter, the problem is to evaluate the occurrence of a failure in a pipeline. 
From a statistical point of view, the main issue is represented by the collection and 
analysis of data about accidental events occurred in similar pipeline over the years taking 
into account information relevant to construction and operation elements, and various 
technological, operative and environmental features of the selected pipes. This statistical 
analysis is a hard task due to the fact that, auspiciously, pipeline failures are extremely 
rare events.  
 
Hereinafter, the main types of accidents in a pipeline are described, as well as the 
main factors that directly or indirectly may lead to them. Then, a methodological 
approach based on Artificial Neural Networks and preliminary results are shown for the 
case of accidents due to third parties activities. 
 
4.2 Types of accident 
Several types of accidents have been identified by the gas and oil pipeline industry in 
the past according to US Department of Transportation (DOT) Office of Pipeline Safety, 
1991 and CONCAWE 1996 (Papadakis, 1999).  
 
They are most frequently classified in five cause categories:  
− Third parties activities, that represent a damage caused by operations carried out 
by others in the pipeline vicinity and not related to its management;  
− Corrosion, when pipeline is subject to two types of corrosion, the first one is an 
inside corrosion, derived from water or other substances transported with hydrocarbons 
(viscosity and temperature are crucial information for the accident analysis), the second 
one is an outside corrosion related to the pipe coating and cathodic protection;  
− Mechanical failure, that are fractures or cracks that occur when efforts go 
beyond the efforts of the system permits;  
− Operational error, which are caused by excessive pressure or system 
malfunction;  
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− Natural events such as landslides, floods, erosion in general, subsidence, 
earthquakes, frost or lightning.  
 
On the bases of CONCAWE (CONCAWE, 2008), and DOT statistics (U.S. DOT, 
2009), in a time period of twenty five years data (1971-1996) the cause of accident can 
be classified as follows (Table 8): 
 
CONCAWE[%] DOT[%] 
Third Parties 33 34 
Corrosion 30 33 
Mechanical 25 18 
Operational Errors 7 2.5 
Natural Events 4 4.5 
Others 1 8 
 
Table 8. Relevant causes leading to an accident or failure and their percentage. 
 
In this work, three causes of accident (corrosion, mechanical, third parties) have 
been taken into account, first of all, since the percentages from CONCAWE and DOT 
are comparable and because the sum of their percentage value (88% for CONCAWE and 
85% for DOT) has a statistical significance. 
 
4.3 Factors leading to an accident 
Several works present in the literature (among others Cooke et al., 2002, 
Mazzucchelli et al., 1999 and Muhlbauer, 1996) have analyzed the factors that may lead, 
either directly or indirectly, to a pipeline failure and to a related accident.  These factors 
can be grouped into three main subsets: hydrological, anthropogenic, and technical 
factors. The first table, (Table 8) reported above describes what factors are leading to 
hydro geological, anthropogenic or technical factors, the second table, (Table 9), shows 
the factors which are mainly related to a pipeline failure respectively for corrosion, 
mechanical, third parties causes (Mazzucchelli at al., 1999). 
 
Hydrogeological factors Anthropogenic factors Technical factors 
1. Crossing of rivers 1.Land use (six classes): 1. Operating pressure (bar) 
 120
2. Groundwater depth 
3. Zone of landslide 
4. Lithology divided in 
 four classes: 
-Bedrock; 
-Weathered rock; 
-Alluvial coarse deposits; 
-Alluvial fine deposits; 
5. Soil permeability 
divided in four classes: 
-A: Deep sands and  
rapidly permeable gravel, 
with very little silt and clay; 
-B: Mostly sandy soils less 
 deep and aggregated than A; 
-C: Shallow soils and soil 
containing considerable clay 
and colloids; 
-D: Mostly clays of high 
swelling percentage and/or 
with nearly impermeable 
sub-horizons near the surface. 
- Farmland: grass, crops 
- Farmland: trees 
- Woodland 
- Quarries & bare ground 
- Urban areas 
- Surface water 
2.Population density  
(habitants/km2) 
3. Street crossing 
4. Railways crossing 
5.Sewage systems crossing 
6. Aqueduct crossing 
7.Electrical system crossing 
8.Other utilities crossing. 
2. Diameter (inch) 
3. Wall thickness (mm) 
4. Burial depth (meter) 
5. (MAOP)Maximum available  
operating pressure (bar) 
6. Specified Minimum 
Yield Strength (SMYS) (bar) 
7. Year of construction 
8. Kind o f metal jointPIG data 
9. (FRS)Index to identify  
imperfection severity. 
Imperfections significant for  
FRS> 0,9 
10. Number of internal and  
external imperfections of the  
Tube. 
11. Absence of metal in 
the imperfections of the tube. 
 
Table 9. Main factors leading to a cause of accident. 
 
Causes Hydro geological 
factors 
Anthropogenic 
factors 
Technical factors 
Corrosion 1. – 4. (Bedrock) – 5. None 5. – 9.  
Mechanical  1. – 2. – 3. – 4. – 5. None 1. – 2. 
Third parties 1. 1. – 2. – 3. – 4. 2. 
 
Table 10. Main factors leading to failure due to corrosion, a  mechanical cause, and third 
parties causes. 
 
4.4 Data sources 
Three databases have been implemented to collect data, one for each of the main 
causes of accidents: corrosion, third parties, mechanical failure. The databases includes 
records describing either accidents or non-accidents. As regards corrosion, data from a 
specific crude oil pipeline in Italy (MonteAlpi Taranto, Italy) have been taken into 
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account. For the other two causes, data from the US Department Of Transport (DOT) 
have been used, (U.S. DOT, 2010). These databases are used as the training and testing 
sets to identify a relationship between “factors” and “failures”.  
 
4.5 Evaluation of failure occurrence  
The main goal of risk assessment is to encourage the implementation of preventive 
measures by eliminating risk evaluation’s subjectivity. The idea of this approach to 
assess failure occurrence is to find a relationship between boundary conditions of an 
existing pipeline and the boundary conditions recorded in sites were a previous failure 
took place.  
Since the relationship between “factors” and “failures”, when existing, is very 
complex to be modelled, a “black-box” approach has been adopted. Specifically, in this 
work an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) approach has been used. A three-layered 
ANN, with factors as input unit, the fact that a failure happened or not as output unit, and 
choosing an adequate number of hidden units (equal to the number of input units) have 
been implemented for each of the three causes of failure, as shown in Figure 44 and 45. 
 
 
 
Figure 44. Artificial Neural Network architecture implemented for third party activity cause of 
failure. 
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Figure 45. Artificial Neural Network architecture implemented for corrosion cause of failure. 
 
4.6 Third party activity results 
A study has been performed on the third party activity factors causing an accident. In 
this case, 128 significant accidents has been extracted from the DOT database and 
characterised by the factors described in Table 9. These accidents often occurred in 
pipeline with very short diameters (90% of them were less than 12’). So, this factor, that 
is the pipeline diameter, was not taken into account in this study since it strongly affects 
the results. 
 
 
 
Figure 46. Tube diameter influence in accidental events caused by third party activity. 
 
Specifically the following factors have been taken into account: 
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 Average population density in an area surface of 1km2, in the neighbourhood of 
the pipeline, coded as follows:  
• 0 low (less than 50inh/km2),  
• 0.144 when population density equal to 72inh/km2,  
• 0.286 when population density equal to 144inh/km2,  
• 0.32 when population density equal to 160inh/km2,  
• 1 high (population density more than 500inh/km2). 
 Land use, classified in three classes as:  
• Other (000),  
• farmland grass, crops, (100), 
• woodland, (010),  
• bare ground, (001), orthogonally coded. 
 Crossing of roads, coded with 0 no crossing, 1 crossing.  
 Crossing of rivers, coded with 0 no crossing, 1 crossing. 
 Crossing of railways, coded with 0 no crossing, 1 crossing. 
 
The ANN training also requires a set of negative patterns, in this case pipeline 
locations were an accident did not happen. Since, as it is widely reckoned, the pipeline 
accident is an extremely rare event, this set was generated taking into account all the 
possible permutations, that is defining the five factors quoted above (coded according to 
seven numbers), with the average population density assuming the values of 0, 0.144, 
0.286, 0.32, 1, resulting in 128 different patterns. It is important to underline that for the 
128 positive cases, just 35 of them were unique, while the others are duplicated patterns. 
 
An ANN with 7 input units, 1 output unit, and 7 hidden units has been so trained. 
The figure below shows the trend of the square mean error of the output unit per number 
of learning iteration. The learning process was stopped after 10000 back propagation 
learning iterations (mean square error, mse, less than 6%). The trend in the figure shows 
the mse as a function of the learning step (Figure 47). 
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Figure 47. Mean square error as a function of the learning step during the ANN training on the 
set of 256 patterns (128 accidents, 128 no accidents). 
 
The ANN was then tested, in this approach on all the possible 128 permutations, so 
that to put in evidence the patterns that are more sensible to the occurrence of an 
accident. Table 11 shows the 6 patterns that have shown a significant (greater than 0.85) 
prediction of accident occurrence. From this table some preliminary considerations or 
rules may be inferred. For example that higher population density seems to be a safer 
factor for third parties accidents, that roads crossings seems to be highly related to these 
types of accidents. 
 
 
 
Table 11. Significant (greater than 0.85) predictions of third parties accident occurrence by the 
ANN. 
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4.7 Preliminary results 
A preliminary study has been performed on the third parties factors causing an 
accident. In this case, 128 significant accidents has been extracted from the DOT 
database and characterised by the factors described in Table 9. These accidents often 
occurred in pipeline with very short diameters (90% of them were less than 12’). So, this 
factor, that is the pipeline diameter, was not taken into account in this preliminary study 
since it strongly affects the results.  
 
The ANN training also requires a set of negative patterns, in this case pipeline 
locations were an accident did not happen. Since, as it is widely reckoned, the pipeline 
accident is an extremely rare event, this set was generated taking into account all the 
possible permutations, that is defining the five factors quoted above (coded according to 
seven numbers), with the average population density assuming the values of 0, 0.144, 
0.286, 0.32, 1, resulting in 128 different patterns. It is important to underline that for the 
128 positive cases, just 35 of them were unique, while the others are duplicated patterns. 
 
4.8 Future Developments  
In this preliminary results, the fundamental of the work to predict the occurrence of a 
pipeline accident has been exemplified. However, it is quite obvious that similar results 
could have been obtained using more classical statistical approaches. However, the aim 
here is to use a methodology that can be easily adapted to peculiarities of a pipeline, 
adding for example historical data on accidents of a specific pipeline or of a set of 
National / regional pipelines. The ANN approach allows easily to customize the 
predictions of accident occurrence by properly modifying the training set. 
 
In the next future research, the proposed statistical model and analysis will be 
applied to a specific case study located in the Monte Alpi -Taranto pipeline, in the south 
of Italy, adding also specific data of historical failures or accidents of that pipeline. This 
pipeline transports oil production from the Viggiano Oil Center to the Taranto refinery 
and it is 136 km long with a transportation capacity of more than 150,000 bopd (barrels 
of oil per day). Each sector of the pipeline network will be divided in segments of 50 
meters of length, and for each of these segments the boundary variables related to 
territorial, technical and environmental conditions and other externalities will be 
retrieved through a complete geological study and several other sources of information. 
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In Attachment N.3 some preliminary results of a risk characterisation on the bases of 
factor of accident are reported. These figures are the results of a GIS application. Indeed, 
an ArcGis platform has been used to identify and positioning territorial elements leading 
to a cause of accident relating to the study pipeline. 
 
On the bases of this work a publication is available: 
 Chiara BERSANI, Lucia CITRO, Roberta V. GAGLIARDI, Roberto SACILE, 
Angela M. TOMASONI. “Accident occurrence evaluation in the pipeline 
transport of dangerous goods”. Chemical Engineering Transactions, proceedings 
of "CISAP4" 4th International Conference on Safety & Environment in Process 
Industry - Florence. Italy, 14-17 March 2010. Vol.19, 2010, Simberto Senni 
Buratti (Ed.), ISSN 1974-9791. 
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5 Risk evaluation of real-time accident scenarios 
in the transport of dangerous goods on road 
 
To transport DG from the depot, to the final destination, a truck may transit through 
urbanised areas, using overcrowded infrastructures, in the neighbourhoods of dense 
populated areas, industrial facilities, and every kind of environmental and territorial 
vulnerable elements.  
This Chapter tackles the complex problem of integrating real-time data information 
about the tracking of a DG vehicle with classical risk evaluation methodologies in order 
to describe possible accident scenarios. The application described as case study deals 
with the transport of a hydrocarbon dangerous goods, where the accident consequences 
may involve the population exposed along the infrastructure used for transportation.  
 
Three different approaches are taken into account:  
− the acquisition of real-time data about the travel and the carried DG at 
transportation level, using the Transport Integrated Platform (TIP); 
− the evaluation of the risk area using the Areal Location Of Hazardous 
Atmospheres (ALOHA) tool have been made; 
− a Geographic Information System (GIS) interface to visualize, analyse and 
evaluate the scenario results, as regards infrastructures, territorial elements, and land use 
activities in the point of accident neighbourhood. 
 
The results of this analysis constitute the methodological basis to implement a 
decision support system (DSS) as regards risk analysis, also in real time, with import 
evaluations for planning criteria. The goal of this study is to use a technology, based on 
the integration of existing methodologies and tools, which can not only predict the toxic 
or flammable, or overpressure effects of a DGT accident, but also to enhance the safety 
of a territory by an efficient and effective use of technology. 
 
The accident scenario representation is based on distances of impact that are defined 
according to the use of a software tool. So the research limitations are related to the 
software limitations, in terms of data quality in input, mathematical model accuracy used 
and computational complexity. However, the information displayed by the GIS interface 
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is easy to use, the software output is quick on the draw and give to the final users few 
clear information about the accident consequences in term of area of impact in the time 
and space scale requested.  
 
In terms of the total impact from the DGT system to the whole environment 
(humans, goods, infrastructures, services and natural elements), the paper focuses on the 
importance of creating a historical real-time database implemented from a real time 
information (by TIP), that represents a standard set of information necessary to define a 
accident scenarios, for DG transport.  
 
5.1 Introduction 
There are several ways to transport DG all over the world, using terrestrial, water, or 
air ways (Michel Nicolet-Monnier et al., 1996). Some ways are more ecologically 
sustainable (ferry, rail) than others (terrestrial vehicles) for example because of emission 
reduction but also as regards the related risk on the territory.  
 
In this Chapter, a decision support system (DSS) integrating different methodologies 
and technologies is proposed for the evaluation of DG transport risk on road, with the 
aim to enhance its sustainability. In fact, sustainability entails structuring the future with 
responsibility, and, with respect to DG transport, sustainability would regard the need to 
safeguard and to multiply the opportunities of future generations while making this 
transport possible when it is really needed. Nowadays, this is the case for example of the 
transportation of fuel to service stations.  
 
In Italy, more than 797.106 [ kmveh ⋅ ] DG vehicles travel each years on road 
(Eurostat, 2009), 203.106 [ kmveh ⋅ ] representing vehicles transporting flammable liquid 
(Class 2 according to ADR 2009), and  429.106 [ kmveh ⋅ ] representing vehicles 
transporting gas (Class 3 according to ADR 2009), (ADR, 2009). This implies that a 
great amount of DG pass through urbanised areas, representing a potential risk, first of 
all, for people living in, or passing through, the infrastructure neighbourhoods.  
 
In this context many authors tries to quantify risk derived from DG transport 
(Carotenuto et al., 2007, Erkut et al., 2007 and Fabiano et al., 2002) and in a traditional 
method of DG transport risk assessment the DG vehicle represent a potential hazard, that 
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associated to its possible consequential accident effects, involving elements exposed, 
defines a risk (Garbolino et al., 2008 and Zhang et al., 2000).  
 
In this study, different methodologies and tools are integrated to estimate the 
numbers of inhabitants involved in the consequential effect of a release due to a DG 
transport accident. In this respect, the approach can be taken into account as a 
consequence-based approach, such as the approach reported in Cozzani et al., 2006. The 
aim is to define a quantitative area risk assessment (QARA) at a planning level, along a 
piece of infrastructure, for a specific kind of vehicles, that transports a well known DG.  
 
In Zhang et al., 2000, the risk is quantified in a two step process: firstly, it consists of 
estimating the area impacted by an DG accident, secondly, counting the number of 
persons within the impact area. Also in Zografos et al., 2000, methods and techniques are 
implemented for the consequence minimization in case of an accidental release.  
 
In Cozzani et al., 2007, different scenarios, caused by fires, or overpressure, or 
fragments are taken into account to calculate the various consequence distances, and in 
Reniers and Dullaert, 2007, it is also possible to know that for each type of installation 
with possible scenarios, each scenario has a quantify frequency. Moreover, the 
Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment (Purple Book, 1999), give us the methods 
and principles used to calculate the various effect distances, using an expected 
consequence approach.  
 
This kind of approach is used in Godoy et al., 2007, where improving available tools 
and developing new ones to compute risk indexes, it is possible to estimate safe 
distances, useful for emergency and contingency planning. Finally in Giglio et al., 2004, 
as in this work, the use of on-board sensors are taken into account to have a measure of 
potential hazard, that added to the potential elements exposed, give us a measure of risk.  
 
5.2 Accident scenario 
 
As previously seen to calculate the number of people involved in an accident caused 
by the transport of dangerous goods it is necessary to know, or at least estimate, the 
dimensions of the area affected by the accident. 
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The accidents that can occur during the transport of dangerous goods can be 
substantially classified into three categories: 
 
−  Release of substances which are toxic to health and the environment; 
−  Release of thermal Energy; 
−  Release of pressure. 
 
The consequences that derive depend on the type of transport, the characteristics of 
the vehicle, the substances transported and how the event happened. 
 
Furthermore, above all for the degree to which it concerns the transport of rubber 
accident scenario, the domino effect cannot be ignored, made more probable by energy 
releases in conditions of traffic congestion and the proximity of storage, production and 
distribution systems to the substances of risk. 
 
During this research and development work the impacts connected to the release of 
energy will be evaluated, in particular the two types of phenomenon BLEVE and UVCE. 
 
BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion) is a scenario similar to the 
explosion generated from the rapid expansion of inflammable vapours produced by gas 
substances kept under pressure in a liquid state; from this event can derive both effects of 
excess pressure and fire balls dangerous for people and structures. This type of event 
entails three main dangers: the wave from the explosion, the thermal flow and 
projectiles. 
 
The wave from the explosion is due to the abrupt pressure variation and consists of 
two phases: he wave of excess pressure and the wave of depression. The thermal flow 
expressed in kW/m2, is often caused by the fire ball; for hydrocarbon the diameter of this 
is calculated by the formula: 
D=6,48 M 0,325        (5.1) 
where M represents the mass of hydrocarbon measured in kg 
 
The thermal flow radiated from the ball of fire depends on the distance and is 
expressed by: 
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F = F0(R/X)²        (5.2) 
 
With : 
 F0 = flow on the surface of the ball of fire; 
 R = beam from the ball of fire in metres; 
 X = distance in respect to the centre of the ball in metres. 
 
To evaluate the effects of the thermal flow it is necessary to also know the exposure 
times. Through the following formula it is therefore possible to calculate the time of 
combustion of the hydrocarbon ball of fire: 
 
t = 0,852.M 0,26        (5.3) 
 
With: 
 M = mass of the ball of fire in kg; 
 t = duration of the ball of fire in seconds. 
 
Finally, you can calculate the area in which there is a strong possibility of lethal 
burns: 
DG = 1,26 DBF        (5.4) 
 
Where : 
 DG = area of strong possibility of lethal burns; 
 DBF = diameter of the ball of fire in m. 
 
 
The projectiles are the fragments generated by the tanker explosion; studies carried 
out on the types of tanker have demonstrated that: 
 80% of the fragments are thrown to around 250 m; 
 10% of the fragments are thrown to around 400m; 
 the maximum distance of projection has been recorded as around 1200 m. 
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UVCE (Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion) is an accident scenario determined by 
the release and dispersion in an open area of inflammable substances in a gas or vapour 
state, from which can derive, if triggered, variable thermal effects and excess pressure, 
often dangerous for man and the environment. 
This explosion has both thermal effects and excess pressure effects that strongly 
depend on local conditions and, in particular, mixes of gases and weather conditions. 
 
The thermal effects are mainly due to the passage of the front of the blaze; as regards 
man, therefore, all people along the route of the blaze are at risk of lethal harm while the 
effect on structures is generally  limited to superficial damage, even if at times metal 
structures can suffer small cracks. 
The effects of excess pressure are, due to the size of the wave of pressure generated, 
directly proportional to the speed at which the front of the blaze spreads. 
 
The pressure threshold values, both for man and for structures, are included in the 
next chapter, in which an accident is simulated. 
 
The model used for the UVCE simulation is, instead, that of a TNT equivalent, based 
on the correlation between the consequences of an explosion of a mass of a certain 
product, a mass of TNT would produce the same consequences at the same distances. 
 
This relationship is defined through the combustion energy of the mass of TNT and 
the potential combustion energy of the mass of product released during the explosion. 
 
prodottoprodotto
TNTequiTNT
xQM
xQM
a =
       (5.5) 
 
With : 
 a =  the TNT equivalent based on the energy (adimensional); 
 MTNTequi = mass of TNT equivalent (kg); 
 Mprodotto = mass of equivalent product (kg); 
 QTNT = combustion energy of TNT per unit of mass (kJ/kg); 
 Qprodotto = combustion energy of the product per unit of mass (kJ/kg). 
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It is noted that, in both models, information regarding the morphology of the terrain 
is not considered; this, which is due to the bi-dimensional nature of the models, is a limit 
for the simulation and the consequent evaluation of risk. 
 
5.3 Problem framework 
In the context of providing a decisional support tool to final users, working in the 
emergency response planning activities, a prototype system is hereinafter proposed. The 
system is composed by three basic tools, as shown in Figure 48: 
− The Transport Integration Platform (TIP); 
− The Areal Location of Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA); 
− a GIS (or WEB GIS) platform to visualize all data collected and show the 
concerning results.  
 
Figure 48. Illustration of a simplified scheme of data model architecture, from TIP to ALOHA, 
until GIS visualization. 
 
5.3.1 Transport Integrated Platform (TIP) 
TIP is a complex system designed and implemented at the University of Genova, 
providing many functionalities to support the DGT on road in Eni Group. One of the TIP 
functionality is to collect data in real time, using on board sensors related not only to 
trucks (GPS position, type of vehicle), but also to the transported DG, (type of good, 
quantity, physical state, temperature, pressure, etc.). 
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TIP can be also taken into account as a web integrated platform, that can collect, 
analyze and report data deriving from trucks and trailers sensors. These sensors can 
collect a great variety of parameters as shown in the Table 12. 
AVAILABLE 
PARAMETERS 
Volumetric 
Tanker
Kilolitric
 Tanker
LPG LPG 
Heat 
 
F.O. 
Bunker 
 
Jet 
Fuel
Wholesale
TRUCK   
Odometer x x x x     
CAN Bus x x x x     
ON OFF x x x x     
Alarm Button x x x x     
Manual Input 
(data from HMI) x x x x     
Odometer x x x x     
- - - - - - - -
TRAILER   
Electronic Oil 
Meter x  x       
Air Suspension 
pressure sensor x x x x x x x
Product 
Temperature   x x     
Product Pressure   x x     
Alarm Button x x x x x x x
Opening/Closing 
Loading Station x         
Opening/Closing 
Manholes x x    x x x
On/Off Vapor 
Recovery x x    x x x
Opening/Closing 
Bottom valves x x x x x x x
Opening/Closing 
Pneumatic EV x         
 
 
Tabella 12. The monitoring parameters using TIP. 
 
In this work, TIP information has been used, to input data as a specific DG travel. 
In real time for monitoring and controlling the overall truck system it is possible to 
know not only the truck position, but also the DG status, as shown in the table 12. 
In this context, as shown in section 5.5 of this chapter, only a sub set of TIP data are 
been chosen and collected as input data for ALOHA tool calculation. 
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5.3.2 Areal Location of Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA) 
ALOHA is a software tool used to describe chemical releases. It is generally used for 
emergency planning, and for public and private technicians training. As mentioned in the 
ALOHA Manual, “ALOHA is an air dispersion model used for evaluating releases of 
hazardous chemical vapors.  
 
ALOHA allows the user to estimate the downwind dispersion of a chemical cloud 
based on the toxicological/physical characteristics of the released chemical, atmospheric 
conditions, and specific circumstances of the release. ALOHA can estimate threat zones 
associated with several types of hazardous chemical releases, including toxic gas clouds, 
fires, and explosions. A threat zone is an area where a hazard (such as toxicity, 
flammability, thermal radiation, or damaging overpressure) has exceeded a user-
specified Level of Concern (LOC).”  
 
The ALOHA dispersion model is a Gaussian plume model (ALOHA Manual, 2009). 
ALOHA is a module of CAMEO (Computer-Aided Management of Emergency 
Operations ) software and all these tools are developed by EPA’s Office of Emergency 
Management (OEM) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Office 
of Response and Restoration (NOAA), to assist front-line chemical emergency planners 
and responders (CAMEO, 2009). ALOHA has been also widely used in Europe, as 
reported in Garbolino et al., 2007, Martin et al., 2004, Mundy, 2004, Lacombe et al., 
2006 and Tixier et al., 2002. 
 
Level of Concern 
In ALOHA, some important outputs are the Levels of Concern (LOCs), that are 
threshold values of a hazard (toxicity, flammability, thermal radiation, or overpressure). 
The LOC is defined as the value above which a specific threat to people or property may 
exist. For each LOC chosen, ALOHA estimates a threat zone where the hazard is 
predicted to exceed that LOC in a defined period after a release begins, (ALOHA 
Manual, 2009). Specifically, ALOHA includes the following LOCs to model different 
hazards:  
− Toxic LOCs 
− Thermal LOCs (thermal radiation and flammable) 
− Overpressure LOCs. 
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Threat Zone Window and Other Output 
The threat zone window allows to display up to three threat zones overlaid on a 
single plot. A threat zone represents the area within which the hazard level (toxicity, 
flammability, thermal radiation, or overpressure) is predicted to exceed a user defined 
LOC at some time after a release begins. If three LOCs are chosen, ALOHA will display 
the threat zones in red, orange, and yellow. By default, the red zone represents the worst 
hazard. For dispersion scenarios, dashed lines along both sides of the threat zone may be 
adopted, representing uncertainty in the wind direction (NOAA, 2009). 
 
5.3.3 GIS Interface 
A geographic information system (GIS) integrates hardware, software, and data for 
capturing, managing, analyzing, and displaying all forms of geographically referenced 
information. In this context, GIS software has been used to acquire data, for example on 
the location of the accident, and to display the resulting threat zone plots. A variety of 
mapping programs, including MARPLOT, ArcGIS, Google Maps, and Google Earth 
(NOAA, 2009) may be adopted. In this work an ArcGIS mapping program has been 
used. 
 
5.4 Case study 
In this section, the functionalities of the overall DSS are shown on a real daily 
planned DG transport and an effect study, using ALOHA, has been carried out for a low 
probability, but realistic, accident scenario. Figure 30 shows the TIP graphical 
representation of the case study area, where the starting point is Marghera depot (near 
Venice, Italy) and the delivery points are three petrol station along the A4 Highway: 
Arino di Dolo Est, Arino di Dolo West, and Bazzera petrol station. 
 
In this example, there is not a pre-software risk analysis, the risk evaluation can be 
taken into account as a consequence based approach, and no inference on the probability 
of such an accident is given. 
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Figure 49. The Case study area – A4 Highway near Padua, Nord-East of Italy: a truck tracing, 
in a specific LPG transport planning day. 
 
5.5 Consequence-based approach methodology 
To assess scenario effect in the accident area, (Arino di Dolo Est petrol station) a six 
step methodology has been developed, as shown in Figure 31.  
 
 
 
Figure 50. Methodology construction, as a flow of information representation, in order to obtain 
accident consequence evaluation. 
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Data gathering for each step can be static and dynamic parameters reported below: 
 
Accident location data (from TIP). Date (dd/mm/yy), Time (h.min.sec.), Address 
and geographical Location (longitude [deg., min.], latitude [deg., min.], elevation [m]) 
of the accident source point, to determine the sun angle, to estimate the incoming solar 
radiation (NOAA, 2009) and atmospheric pressure to compute the ground-air energy 
budget for the atmospheric stability (Arya, 1999). 
 
Building type, (not only most common, single-storied, double-storied, enclosed 
office building, but also unsheltered rather then sheltered buildings) for toxic gas 
dispersion scenarios, ALOHA can estimate the pollutant gas concentration within 
buildings downwind of a chemical release. To estimate indoor pollutant concentration, 
ALOHA first estimate the building’s air exchange rate, and to estimate infiltration rate 
into a building, ALOHA assumes that all doors and windows are closed, (ALOHA 
Manual, 2009). 
 
Chemical data (from TIP). Chemical name and Molecular Weight [g/mol] are the 
first two information requested from ALOHA to characterize a chemical.  Another 
physical property item requested is the Ambient Saturation Concentration [ppm] or [%], 
because it could be useful to compare it with a threshold concentration of concern, such 
as a Lower Explosive Limit. It is also includes values for AEGLs (Acute Exposure 
Guideline Levels, 2009), ERPGs (Emergency Response Planning Guideline, 2009), 
TEELs (Temporary Emergency Exposure Limit, 2009), IDLH (Immediately Dangerous 
to Life and Health limit, 2009), UEL and LEL (Flammability limits, 2009). 
 
Atmospheric data. In  this section, the hypothesis that weather conditions remain 
constant throughout the incident area are supposed. If in this area weather conditions 
change, it is possible to update this information and run ALOHA again. Wind speed and 
direction are determine in terms of [Knots] and [Degrees] respectively. In addition, the 
roughness of the territory where the accident is supposed to happen (for example urban, 
Forest, or Open Country) is required.  
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CLASS OF DATA: TYPE OF DATA: VALUES:
SITE DATA Location:    
 
Building Air Exchanges Per Hour:   
VIA DEI PETROLI, ITALY 
(VE), ITALY 
0.50 (enclosed office)
 
Time: October 5, 2009  1019 hours ST 
(user specified)
CHEMICAL DATA Chemical Name:  PROPANE
  Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol
  TEEL-1 5500 ppm
  TEEL-2 17000 ppm
  TEEL-3 33000 ppm
  IDLH 2100 ppm
  LEL 20000 ppm
  UEL 95000
  Ambient Boiling Point: -42.7° C
  Vapor Pressure at Ambient 
Temperature:
greater than 1 atm
 Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0%
ATMOSFERIC DATA 
(Manual Input of Data) 
 
Wind:  
2 meters/second from N at 10 
meters
  Ground Roughness: urban or forest
  Cloud Cover: 7 tenths
  Ait Temperature: 24° C
  Stability Class: B
  Inversion Height: No
  Relative Humidity: 75%
SOURCE STRENGTH    Description:
    
       
    
   
Leak from hole in horizontal 
cylindrical tank 
   Flammable chemical escaping 
from tank (not burning)
                    Tank contains liquid  
      Tank is 88% full
 Tank Diameter: 2.8 meters
 Tank Length: 8 meters
    Tank Volume: 49.3 cubic meters
 Internal Temperature: 30° C
 Chemical Mass in Tank: 21,067 kilograms
 Circular Opening Diameter: 10 centimeters
 Opening is: 0.50 meters from tank bottom
 Release Duration: 5 minutes
 Max Average Sustained Release 
Rate:
8,720 kilograms/min  
(averaged over a minute or more)
 Total Amount Released: 20,927 kilograms
 Note: The chemical escaped as a 
mixture of gas and aerosol (two 
phase flow)
 
 
Table 13. Data summary required by ALOHA for the case study. 
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Source strength data (from TIP). Others geometrical, geographical, chemical, and 
territorial information are requested. In the case study,  a tank as type source, storing a 
liquefied gas has been taken into account. The supposed accident scenario is due to a 
mechanical rupture causing a sudden pressure loss in a tank of propane. The liquid boils 
violently, the tank contents foam up, and the tank fills with a mixture of gas and fine 
liquid droplets (called aerosol). When such a two-phase mixture escape from the tank the 
release rate can be significantly greater than that for a purely gaseous release (ALOHA 
Manual, 2009). The hazard levels for toxicity, flammability, thermal radiation, or 
overpressure) have been evaluated. 
 
Threat zone data. Threat zone has been define on the bases of previous data, where 
some of them, such as location, data and time, chemical and physical substance 
characteristics, source strength, and quantity and geometry of the release are collected by 
TIP and then implemented in ALOHA. The three zones of threat (red, orange, and 
yellow one) are defined for each type of dangerous event: toxic, flammable and blast 
threshold values of associated hazard. In the case study, more emphasis is done on 
flammability and overpressure hazard, due to the DG considered: propane. 
 
5.6 Solution method and computational results: accident 
scenarios 
Propane, in its liquid phase, stored in a tank at a temperature above its boiling point 
has been taken into account, so the pressure within the tank will be greater than 
atmospheric pressure. When such a tank is punctured, (10 cm of leak), the liquefied gas 
contents may escape as a two-phase mixture of gas and aerosol.  
 
If a flammable chemical escapes from a tank and does not immediately burn, either 
the chemical will go directly into the air, and a flammable vapour cloud will form 
(ALOHA Manual, 2009). This is the first studied accident scenario, but it is not the 
worst, and the resulting threat zone is displayed in Figure 51.  
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Figure 51. ALOHA Toxic Threat Zone Plot for this scenario.   
 
The white zone, in Figure 51, with small red points, the smallest one, of the toxic 
area of vapour cloud represents the airborne concentration [ppm] of propane above 
which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could 
experience life-threatening health effects or death (TEEL-3).  
 
The orange zone with yellow dots, the medium one, is the airborne concentration of 
propane above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible 
individuals, could experience irreversible or other serious, long-lasting, adverse health 
effects or an impaired ability to escape (TEEL-2).  
 
The yellow zone, the larger one, is the airborne concentration of propane above 
which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could 
experience discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic, non sensory effects. However, 
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these effects are not disabling and are transient and reversible upon cessation of exposure 
(TEEL-1). 
 
 
Figure 52. ALOHA Source Strength graph for Propane accident scenario.  
 
ALOHA estimates the toxic area of vapor cloud for one minute release, and the 
release rate give us a measure of flux of mass simulation [kg/min] (vertical axis) from 
the source point in the time scale of the considered scenario. The source effects comes 
decreasing in about 5 minutes (horizontal axis), as shown in Figure 52. This source is the 
same for the three different threat zone displayed. 
 
 
Figure 53. ALOHA Concentration at Point.  
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ALOHA displays a graph of predicted propane concentrations at a specific point far 
from the source point, during the hour after the release begins. In Figure 53, the 
horizontal axis represent time from 0 to 60 minutes after the release starts, and the 
vertical axis represents concentration at the location expressed in parts per million [ppm]. 
Solid lines represent the predicted outdoor, ground-level concentration (LOCs). The 
dashed line represents predicted concentration inside a building of the type selected. 
 
The concentration distribution go decreasing according to the time line, and a 
measure of concentration space variation is given by Table 14. The space scale 
decreasing effect has been described also for the flammable, and overpressure levels of 
hazard. Indeed, we consider that a fire starts, after the toxic release. In Figure 54 we can 
see the graphical result, where this scenario is more hazard then the previous one. 
 
 
Figure 54. ALOHA Flammable Threat Zone Plot for this scenario.   
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We considered that propane burns by detonation at an unknown instant of time from 
the start of release. The red zone, in Figure 54, with small red points, the smallest one 
zone, of the flammable area of vapour cloud describes the 60% of leanest mixture that is 
still flammable, (60% LFL - lower explosive limit). The yellow zone, the biggest one, of 
the flammable area of vapor cloud describes the 10% of leanest mixture that is still 
flammable, (10% LFL). 
 
After the fire, an explosion takes place. This is the worst case scenario. We do not 
known when, but we know the cause of  blast: a detonation, as shown in Figure 55. The 
toxic results and the blast one are visualised in a GIS interface, ArcGIS 9.1, as shown in 
Figure 56 and 57. In this way the hazard information is linked to population density 
information to have a measure of potential people involved in the accident scenario 
effects. 
 
 
 
Figure 55. ALOHA Blast Threat Zone Plot for this scenario. The shift between the centre of the 
coordinate system and the centre of the blast source depends on the time spent between the release 
and the successive explosion, but also on the wind direction and speed. 
 146
 
The blast area of vapour cloud explosion represent the overpressure or a blast waves 
after an explosion. The overpressure values (in pounds per square inch, psi) are based on 
a review of several widely accepted sources on overpressure and explosions respectively 
grater or equal to 8.0 psi (the white zone, in Figure 57, with small black points, the 
smallest one), grater or equal to 3.5 psi (the white medium zone with grey dots), grater or 
equal to 1.0 psi (the light gray zone, the biggest one). 
 
 
Figure 56. ALOHA Toxic vapour cloud applied to the release point in Arino di Dolo Est Petrol 
Station, characterized by longitude and latitude - ArcGIS representation. 
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Figure 57. ALOHA Overpressure (blast force) from vapour cloud explosion – ArcGIS 
representation and number of people potentially exposed. 
 
Model Run: Gaussian 
Threat Modeled: Toxic vapour cloud  
Red : 124 meters --- (33000 ppm = TEEL-3) 
Orange: 171 meters --- (17000 ppm = TEEL-2) 
Yellow: 290 meters --- (5500 ppm = TEEL-1) 
THREAT AT POINT for a TOXIC HAZARD: 
Concentration 
Estimates at the point
Downwind - 50 meters Off Centerline - 1
meters 
Max Concentration: Outdoor - 205,000 ppm Indoor -  4,000 ppm 
Concentration  
Estimates at the point
Downwind - 100 meters Off Centerline - 1
meters 
Max Concentration: Outdoor - 50,800 ppm Indoor -  1,050 ppm 
Concentration  
Estimates at the point
Downwind - 300 meters Off Centerline - 1
meters 
TOXIC 
THREAT 
ZONE: 
Max Concentration: Outdoor - 5,140 ppm Indoor -  103 ppm 
Model Run: Gaussian 
Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosi
FLAMMABLE 
THREAT  
ZONE: Type of Ignition: ignited by detonation 
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Red : 294 meters --- (8.0 psi = destruction of buildings) 
Orange: 419 meters --- (3.5 psi = serious injury likely) 
Yellow: 890 meters --- (1.0 psi = shatters glass) 
THREAT AT POINT for a FLAMMABLE HAZARD: 
Concentration  
Estimates at the point
Downwind - 50 meters Off Centerline -
meters 
Max Concentration: Outdoor - 192,000 ppm Indoor -  3,740 ppm 
Concentration Estima
at the point: 
Downwind - 100 meters Off Centerline -
meters 
Max Concentration: Outdoor - 83,200 ppm Indoor - 1,720 ppm 
Concentration Estima
at the point: 
Downwind - 300 meters Off Centerline -
meters 
Max Concentration: Outdoor - 9,930 ppm Indoor - 200 ppm 
Concentration Estima
at the point: 
Downwind - 550 meters Off Centerline -
meters 
Max Concentration: Outdoor - 2,440 ppm Indoor - 55 ppm 
Model Run: Gaussian 
Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosi
Type of Ignition: ignited by detonation 
Red: 294 meters --- (8.0 psi = destruction of buildings) 
Orange: 419 meters --- (3.5 psi = serious injury likely) 
Yellow: 890 meters --- (1.0 psi = shatters glass) 
THREAT AT POINT a OVERPRESSURE HAZARD: 
Overpressure  
Estimate at the point:
Downwind - 50 meters Off Centerline -
meters 
 Overpressure:  285 psi 
Overpressure  
Estimate at the point:
Downwind - 200 meters Off Centerline -
meters 
 Overpressure:  43.9 psi 
Overpressure  
Estimate at the point:
Downwind - 500 meters Off Centerline -
meters 
 Overpressure:  2.5 psi 
BLAST THREAT
ZONE: 
Overpressure  Downwind - 2000 meters Off Centerline -
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Estimate at the point: meters 
 Overpressure:  0.336 psi 
Overpressure  
Estimate at the point:
Downwind - 5000 meters Off Centerline -
meters 
 Overpressure:  0.109 psi 
 
Table 14. Comparison between the three different threat zone effect  at the same and different 
distance from the point source of release. 
 
Threat Zone Estimated Area [km^2] [ab/km^2] in the Threat Zone
TEEL_1 0,469 11 
TEEL_2 0,427 10 
TEEL_3 0,181 4 
8.0 psi 0,080 2 
3.5 psi 0,283 7 
1.0 psi 1,862 43 
 
Table 15. Comparison between the three different threat zone effect  at the population exposed 
in term of Population density [ab/km^2]. 
 
5.7 Concluding remarks 
A consequence based approach methodology has been developed. This methodology 
has been based on the integration of three well assessed methodologies and related tools: 
a methodology for telecontrolling DG transport (using TIP (Transport Integrated 
Platform)) to collect territorial, DG, truck and trail data; a Gaussian dispersion model 
(using ALOHA) to determine the levels of concerned and verified the value of 
population density exposed to these levels; and a geographic representation models 
(using ARCGIS software).  
 
The levels of concern and the corresponding threat zones have been define also 
setting atmospheric parameters and type of release source. The accident scenario has 
been define for a source strength characterized by a leak, from a 10 cm hole, in a 
horizontal cylindrical tank in which three successive events happened: a toxic release, as 
a mixture of gas and aerosol, than a fire that develops a flammable area of vapour cloud, 
and finally an explosion that determine a blast area, that is the worst case scenario 
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studied. In this study, the population density is been estimated as element exposed to the 
atmospheric release of propane in three different possible scenarios, from the less to the 
worst case (toxic, flammable, and blast) scenario, (See Table 15).  
 
Using TIP, the data collection is in near real time and the scenario construction and 
visualization is a user friendly operation. The computational time is modest, but the 
overall DSS is not user-friendly. In the authors’ opinion, the methodology output is 
effective, efficient for a emergency response use, or also for operator and technicians 
training, and may represent an important step to evaluate risk in DGT, contributing to the 
enhancement of the overall sustainability of DGT. 
 
On the bases of this work a publication on an international journal is available: 
 E. Garbolino, M. Rovatti, R. Sacile, A. M. Tomasoni, (2010). “Risk evaluation of 
real-time accident scenarios in the transport of hazardous material on road”. 
Accepted article to Management of Environmental Quality. 
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6 Risk adverse routing of dangerous goods with 
scheduled delays 
 
The term “risk-adverse” in the routing of DG, is used for problems whose aim is to 
find the best and safest routes to connect various origin-destination (OD) pairs, taking 
into account the objective of minimizing either the maximum risk or the maximum 
exposure. 
 
In literature there are, in fact, different approaches connected to the best routing for 
the DGT, based on the formalisation of bi-objective problems in which there is normally 
the need to minimise both the cost of transport and the risk associated to the DGT 
(Zografos and Androutsopoulos, 2004). 
 
Recently however the problems of routing have been faced through the use of 
decisional models based on the rules of the game. 
 
Among the most interesting approaches is that of Bell (2006) which asserts that the 
best strategy for the decision maker, also irrespective of a principle of exposure equity in 
the territory, is to use more routes for the vehicles that transport dangerous goods. 
 
In fact, given a road network upon which vehicles having the same origin and 
destination can move, and assuming that the probability of accidents associated to each 
arch is not known, it is demonstrated that, under these conditions, the best strategy, from 
the point of view of risk minimisation for the population, is that of dividing the vehicles 
upon the various possible routes rather than concentrating them on just one minimum 
risk route. 
 
The problem can therefore be interpreted as a game between the users of the network 
with he objective of minimising, along all the route, the number of people involved in a 
hypothetical accident, with a body defined as ‘demon’ having the aim of maximising 
exposure. 
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In recent works, it has been demonstrated that - for repeated shipments where the 
accident probabilities over the various links in the network are unknown - the safest 
strategy is generally based on the multiplicity of routes for each O/D pair. In this work, it 
is demonstrated that further improvements can be obtained scheduling the deliveries with 
different delays, that is spreading the risk both in space and in time. The improvement is 
particularly relevant when the vulnerability of the network is also time dependent. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The increasing need for sustainable freight transportation due to economic, 
environmental, and risk aspects, implies the definition of models which enhance the 
overall transport planning process. As DGT is concerned, current decision making tools 
do not sensibly differ from traditional planning tools for general freights, that is they 
support decision makers in the computation of the best route based on the economical 
factors related to covered distances and transport operational costs. 
 
However, from a sustainable transport viewpoint, the best route choice selection may 
also depend on the risk and safety interests which are often in conflict with the economic 
optimality of the transport processes. On the other hand, the DGT risk does not have a 
worldwide accepted definition, as scientific papers are currently present in the literature 
(Akgün et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2007; Carotenuto et al., 2007; Fabiano et al., 2005; 
Verma et al., 2007), and still some work seems to be necessary. In addition high 
consequences scenarios have very low probabilities, despite their high consequences, 
making the DG transport risk definition very hard to be defined from a statistical 
viewpoint. 
 
In this context, the risk adverse routing planning for DG vehicles represents an 
important research approach taking into account the status of transportation 
infrastructures, threat of security and safety concerns, and occurrence of DG and traffic 
incidents. Specifically, the term “risk-adverse” in the routing of DG is used for problems 
whose aim is to find the best and safest routes to connect various origin-destination (OD) 
pairs of a transport network, taking into account the objective of minimizing either the 
maximum risk on a link, or - in case of information lack on risk – the maximum link 
exposure, that is the loss in the event of an incident on the link times the probability of 
link use (Bell, 2006). 
 154
 
From a practical viewpoint, distribution companies and common transport network 
users will be more and more required to make a trade-off between the travel cost 
(including distances, travel time, delay penalty, etc. ) and the risk to use a specific path. 
In case of DGT, the high consequences for an accident event have been a focus for a 
growing literature which models the DG routing planning considering accidents, 
explosion, releases, incidents probability and/or population and environmental 
vulnerability in the risk assessment. 
 
Those research studies are carried by Bonvicini at al., (1998), Frank et al., (2000), 
Leonelli et al., (2000), Fabiano et al., (2002), Erkut et al., (2007) and Zografos and 
Androutsopoulos (2004) just to name a few. In Zografos and Androutsopoulos (2004), 
the authors developed a model that aims at achieving the lowest level of operational costs 
and the highest level of safety during DG transport. 
 
To obtain this goal, the optimization problem is formalised as a bi-objective routing 
and scheduling problem: the minimization of operational costs and the minimization of 
the risk for the population. To solve the bi-objective mathematical problem a new 
heuristic algorithm to calculate the optimal route was proposed. For a complete survey 
the reader is referred to Erkut et al., (2007) and Centrone et al., (2008). 
 
Several studies have deepened the risk-adverse behaviour of route choices. One 
approach is the game theoretic approach (e.g., Bell, 2000, and Bell and Cassir, 2002), 
whose fundamental hypothesis is that network users are pessimistic about the state of the 
road network, and they are behaving with the certainty that one accident will surely 
happen. This model of route choice behaviour deals with events which threaten transport 
network reliability, and where expected cost is minimized with respect to link use 
frequencies and maximized with respect to failure probabilities. 
 
In particular, Bell and Cassir (2002) model user equilibrium traffic assignment, 
known as risk-adverse user equilibrium traffic assignment, but they assume that the 
number of users is fixed. Erkut and Ingolfsson (2000) present three ways of introducing 
risk aversion: minimising the maximum consequence along a route; incorporating the 
variance of the losses along a route into route selection; and minimising the expected 
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disutility of the losses when a convex utility function is used. It is shown that all these 
three approaches can be solved as shortest path problems by appropriately defining arc 
length.  
 
Bell (2006) has demonstrated that - for repeated shipments where the accident 
probabilities over the various links in the network are unknown, - the safest strategy is 
generally based on the multiplicity of routes for each O/D pair. Bell also has observed 
that when there are multiple OD pairs, they may be considered separately, since there is 
no reason for drivers relevant to different OD pairs to share expectations (or fears) of 
link costs. 
 
Other models have tackled the DG routing problem defining paths at minimum risk 
but guaranteeing the equalization of the risk spreading it on the transport network: see, 
for example, the models in Gopalan et al., 1990; Current and Ratick, 1995, Akgün et al., 
2000, Bersani et al., 2008. Specifically, it this latter case, it has been supposed to know 
data about the flows of general vehicles and of DG vehicles on each road of the network 
and the problem is to plan the routing through an equity risk based model.  
 
The objective is so to spread the risk, minimizing it, on the different links of a 
transport network. The decisional variables are the percentage of DG flow to be routed 
from each node towards the output links, taking into account the O/D needs of the trucks 
and the risk on the links.  
 
Other approaches aim to find the risk equity determining a set of minimum and 
equitable risk alternative routes from origin to destination points (Carotenuto et al., and 
2007, Bianco et al.,2008). In Carotenuto et al., (2007), the model assigns a route to each 
DG delivery and schedule them on the assigned routes in order to minimize the total 
shipment delay, while equitably spreading the risk spatially and preventing the risk 
induced by vehicles travelling too close to each other.  
 
This DG shipment scheduling problem is modelled as a job-shop scheduling problem 
with alternative routes. In Bianco et al., (2008) a DG network design problem has been 
implemented with a linear bi-level model, where, at the higher level, the leader aims to 
minimize the maximum link risk over populated links of the whole network, that is, risk 
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equity, and at the lower level, the follower aims to minimize the total risk over the 
network.  
 
In the proposed approach, the case study of a decision maker (DM) planning each 
day several deliveries of DG from more depots (e.g. petrol refineries) to several other 
depots (e.g. petrol service stations) is taken into account. It is supposed that the DM 
wishes to follow a risk-adverse routing in the deliveries and that he/she takes into 
account the combined risk arising from the simultaneous presence of two or more 
vehicles on the same link at the same time.  
 
In addition, as it normally happens in planning practise, the DM has a-priori defined 
a small number of alternative paths for each OD pair. The DM can play on two classes of 
decision variables: the path probability for each OD pair and the time schedule with 
which leaving the depots.  More in details, the main contribution of this paper lies in the 
proof that spreading over time the deliveries generally provides an additional 
improvement as regards the minimisation of the overall maximum exposure. The 
improvement is particularly relevant when the vulnerability of the network is also time 
dependent. 
 
6.2 The problem 
Each day, a single DM must plan the deliveries of a fleet of DG vehicles according 
to customer orders, that must be satisfied within that day but without any other specific 
temporal constraint. These DG vehicles leave from a given depot (origin, for example a 
tank of a refinery) towards another depot (destination, for example a petrol service 
station), according to a full drop (FD) delivery strategy.  
 
This FD delivery strategy means that, after one stop, the vehicle is completely empty 
and thus it does not induce any danger for the territory and its population. The FD 
delivery is quite frequent in the DG delivery, such as petrol products, as well as in the 
general freight transportation, since it has been demonstrated that it is a simple way to 
optimise the overall distribution process. 
 
In this case study, the DM deals with several OD. For each OD pair, it is assumed 
that the DM has already a-priori selected a limited number of eligible paths, having 
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minimum (or near-minimum) cost, by means of a “k shortest paths” algorithm 
minimising for example the OD distance The DM has also a detailed knowledge of the 
flows for example per day, of DG vehicles, for each OD pair, and he/she knows that this 
flow is relevant, so that it makes sense to deal with percentages of the flow for each OD 
pair to be assigned to each possible path. 
 
The DM wishes to follow a risk-adverse routing. In particular, he/she wishes to 
minimise the maximum exposure on a set of clearly identified critical infrastructures (for 
example tunnels) that are present on the different paths. Moreover, it is assumed that in 
case of an accident on a critical infrastructure, the presence at the same time of more than 
one DG vehicle can sensibly amplify the number of persons injured, due to the nature of 
the accident or to other causes such as domino effects.  
 
So, the risk-adverse routing of the DM also corresponds to the wish of avoiding the 
presence of more DG vehicles on critical infrastructures at the same time. Thus, the DM 
wants to determine and use a control law, defining for each delivery the path and the 
scheduled delay with respect to the beginning of the work time, so that he/she can obtain 
daily delivery plans according to a risk adverse criterion. 
 
6.3 The model 
 
6.3.1 Network model 
The road network road is supposed to be represented by a graph ( )LNG , , where each 
link Ll∈  represents a critical infrastructure, where the criticality per unit area is 
characterised by a given exposure ( )tle ,  which can vary in time. Thus, in the adopted 
model, it is supposed that the road network is entirely made by critical infrastructures. 
 
In addition, each link is supposed to be characterized by a unitary travel time - this 
modelling assumption should not represent a limitation, since if a longer time is required 
to traverse a critical infrastructure, then it may be modelled by several links. 
It is assumed that there is no availability of a significant historical data base of 
accidents on the road network, so that it is not possible, for any link, to define an 
objective value of an accident occurrence probability. It is supposed that an accident of 
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one vehicle involves a single unitary area (of predefined extension) – that is an accident 
of one vehicle on link l at instant t causes a loss of ( )tle , . 
 
It is assumed to take into account direct FD deliveries only (FD deliveries, in which 
no vehicle serving multiple destinations within the same tour).  
If two or more vehicles, either related to the same or to different OD pairs, in the 
same interval, travel on the same link, the expected exposure is additive. In particular, it 
is assumed that if an accident occurs on a link, all the DG vehicles present at that time on 
that link are involved.  
Links are assumed to be isolated systems, such as an accident on one link does not 
induce any effect over other links, such as, for example, the adjacent ones. 
 
6.3.2 Decision making behavior 
It is supposed that some demon wishes to cause one accident during the day, with the 
intent to cause the maximum possible loss. Moreover, it is also assumed that such a 
malicious agent has the possibility to spread the probability of such a loss over the links 
of the network and over the possible time intervals within the considered time horizon. 
 
The DM wishes to follow a risk adversion behaviour. The DM knows that an 
accident will surely happen in the day, on one link, at a specific time interval. Thus, two 
possible risk aversion behaviours may be considered: 
− minimising the maximum link loss over the whole time horizon - this may be 
viewed as a true risk adverse behaviour; 
− minimising the sum of the maximum link losses which may be caused at the 
various time intervals. 
 
The choice of this latter behaviour is equivalent to the choice of minimising the 
average maximum risk over the time horizon. 
It is worthwhile to underline that the definition of risk used in this work is not the 
classic one, where the probability of accident is a-priori known. In the present model, 
such a probability is unknown. Instead, in the present case, the risk is evaluated as the 
product of the exposure, in terms of the magnitude of the loss (for instance, in the 
considered case study, the number of persons involved in the accident), times the 
percentage of DG vehicles passing on that link, as it will be clarified in the following. 
 159
 
6.3.3 Set definitions 
l = 1, …, L : the set of network links ; 
t = 0..T-1 : the number of temporal working units of the day (for example hours); 
od = 1…OD: only a limited number of OD pairs are considered; 
p =1…Pod: the DM provides a limited set Pod of predefined paths for each OD pair. 
 
6.3.4 Modeling assumptions and parameters 
( ) ,,...,1,1,..,0,, ODodTttodf =−= is the flow of DG vehicles entering the network for 
each OD pair and at each instant; such value is normalised with respect to the value 
),(max
,
todf
odt , so that ( ) [ ]1,0, ∈todf ; such values are all known a-priori. 
 
It is supposed that, at each time instant t, and for each origin/destination pair, the DM 
has to assign to each vehicle relevant to the flow ),( todf a path ∈p  Pod and an (integer) 
delay 0≥τ corresponding to a number of time intervals that the vehicle has to wait for, 
before starting its route. 
 
It is supposed that the travel time for a DG vehicle on each link is equal to one time 
unit; on this basis, and on the basis of the knowledge of the selected (by the DM) path p 
and delay τ, it is possible to determine the position (i.e. the link over which it travels) in 
any time interval τ+≥+ tttt ),1,( , of any DG vehicle arrived in time interval ;0),1,( ≥+ ttt  
 
then, it is possible to determine the value of the binary variable )ttp,odtr(l τ,,,, , 
which is equal to 1 if a vehicle assigned to path p∈  Pod, with a delay τ in time interval 
)1,( +tt , lies on link l (belonging to that path) in time interval )1,( +tt , and 0 otherwise; 
 
e(l,t) is the exposure, representing the possible loss, per square area unit, when an 
accident take place on link l in time interval )1,( +tt . 
 
6.3.5 Decisional variables 
)th(p,od τ,, , that is the fraction of  ),( todf that is routed (in time interval 
)1,( +++ ττ tt ) through path  p∈  Pod . 
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6.3.6 Other variables 
C which is the maximum risk on a link, for any choice of the link and of the time 
instant;  
c(t) which is the maximum risk on a link, for any choice of the link for a given 
instant t. 
 
6.3.7 Model formulation 
Then, two possible decision models can be considered. 
 
Decision model 1: minimising the maximum link loss over time  
 
C Z1todph =),,,( min τ         (6.1) 
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Decision model 2: minimising the sum of the maximum link losses at each instant 
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Decision model 3: integrating decisional models 1 and 2. 
 
It might be supposed that a risk adverse DM can follow an approach which is a mix 
of the two previous ones. This may accomplished by introducing a weighting parameter 
α, where 0=α  the model tend to model 2, while for α → ∞ corresponds to model 1. 
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6.4 Case study 
Consider the transport network (L=12) shown in figure 58. 
 
O1 D2
O2 D1
link 1 link 2
link 3
link  4
link 5
 link 6 link 7
link 8 link  9 link 10
link 11 link 12
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Figure 58. Transportation network used in this work (adapted from Bell 2006) 
 
In the network, there are two OD pairs (i.e. OD=2), where (figure 1) O1 and O2 
represent the origins and D1 and D2 represent the destinations, respectively for od=1 and 
od=2. 
It is supposed that the overall flow is equally balanced on the two OD pairs and that 
it is different from 0 just in the first instant, i .e.: 
( )
( ) ODodttodf
ODododf
,...,1     0             0,
,...,1             10,
=≠∀=
==
 
As a consequences, hereinafter, t  will be omitted (e.g. )th(p,od τ,,  will be referred 
to as )h(p,od τ,  and ( )todf ,  will also be omitted). 
This scenario corresponds to a fleet of vehicles that should leave at the beginning of 
the day from each origin. 
Time is discretised in hours, and each day is supposed to be made of eight working 
hours, i.e. t = 0..7 and T=8. A DG vehicle spends one hour to traverse each link. 
There are two paths for each OD pair. The links for each path are: 
od=1; p=1: links: 1, 4, 7, 10 
od=1; p=2; links: 3, 6, 9, 12 
od=2; p=1; links: 2, 4, 9, 11 
od=2; p=2; links: 5, 6, 7, 8 
The possible delays that are both feasible and allowed by the DM are the same for all 
the od and p, specifically .3..0=τ   
As regards exposures, it is supposed that they can be observed by statistical methods, 
reproducing a profile that varies during the day but that is constant within each hour. For 
the case study, the following table reports the exposure values. 
 
Link\ 
Hour 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 1000 8000 11000 8000 5000 3000 10000 8000 
2 5000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 500 
3 2000 1000 2000 2000 1500 1000 200 1000 
4 10000 11000 15000 14000 13000 9000 4000 3000 
5 20000 30000 25000 28000 31000 28000 15000 10000 
6 1000 800 1000 800 200 200 1000 500 
7 12000 18000 25000 32000 25000 18000 17000 15000 
8 6000 7000 6000 5000 4000 1000 1000 1000 
9 28000 20000 15000 14000 15000 20000 28000 10000 
10 10000 9000 10000 10000 9000 15000 17000 12000 
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11 20000 18000 10000 18000 22000 18000 10000 8000 
12 5000 6000 8000 10000 14000 12000 5000 1000 
 
Table 16. Exposures (for square unit) on each of the 12 links at each of 8 instants. In bold, the 
maximum values for each link. 
 
Under a worst case view, the previous exposures on each link may be supposed to be 
constant, and for each link, equal to the maximum values expected during the whole day 
as reported in bold in the Table 16. 
 
6.5 Results 
In order to validate the performances the proposed model has been compared with 
the mixed route strategy for risk adverse shipment of hazardous material developed by 
Bell (2006), according to a worst case (that is taking into account the worst hourly loss 
for each link) and to an average loss (according to a loss that for each link has been 
averaged on all time instant). 
 
Link Worst Average 
1 11000 6750 
2 6000 3312.5 
3 2000 1337.5 
4 15000 9875 
5 31000 23375 
6 1000 687.5 
7 32000 20250 
8 7000 3875 
9 28000 18750 
10 17000 11500 
11 22000 15500 
12 14000 7625 
 
Table 17. Worst and average exposures for each link used to compare the proposed model with 
the Bell’s approach (2006). 
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The path probabilities that have been obtained according to Bell’s approach are 
reported in Table 18. 
 
od p h (worst) h (average) 
1 1 0,466667 0,480769 
1 2 0,533333 0,519231 
2 1 0,533333 0,554896 
2 2 0,466667 0,445104 
 
Table 18. Path probabilities obtained according to the Bell’s approach (2006), computed on the 
link costs of Table 17. 
 
Since Bell’s approach (2006) does not take into account delays, the path probabilities 
that have been obtained have been shared in all the eligible time instants as shown in 
Table 19. This strategy should be quite reasonable for a DM following a risk adverse 
behaviour. The ) h(p,od τ, values for  3,...1,0=τ , which have been obtained, are reported 
in Table 19 (worst) and 20 (average). 
 
OD Path ) h(p,od 0,  ) h(p,od 1, ) h(p,od 2,  ) h(p,od 3,  
1 1 0,116667 0,116667 0,116667 0,116667 
1 2 0,133333 0,133333 0,133333 0,133333 
2 1 0,133333 0,133333 0,133333 0,133333 
2 2 0,116667 0,116667 0,116667 0,116667 
 
Table 19. Path probabilities obtained according to the Bell’s approach (2006) on worst link 
exposures, spread in time. 
 
 
OD Path ) h(p,od 0,  ) h(p,od 1,  ) h(p,od 2,  ) h(p,od 3,  
1 1 0,120192 0,120192 0,120192 0,120192 
1 2 0,129808 0,129808 0,129808 0,129808 
2 1 0,138724 0,138724 0,138724 0,138724 
2 2 0,111276 0,111276 0,111276 0,111276 
 
Table 20. Path probabilities obtained according to the Bell’s approach (2006) on average link 
exposures, spread in time. 
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Forcing the ) h(p,od τ, values reported in Table 19 and 20 in (6.1), (6.2), (6.1’) and 
(6.2’), the Z1* and Z2* objectives have been computed and then compared with the 
optimal Z1 and Z2 values obtained solving the problems described in section 6.3. 
The Figure 59 report the solution of the problem for the case study according to the 
decisional models 1, 2, and, in general, 3. The solution is reported in the space Z1, Z2. 
The exposures that have been used in equations (6.2) and (6.2’) are the ones reported in 
table I for the case with variable losses (continuous line), and in the “worst” column of 
table II for the case with constant losses. 
According to the risk adverse approach, the graph shown in Figure 59, showing the 
objectives values in the Z1 Z2 space, underlines that, both in case of constant and 
variable values of arc exposures during the time horizon, the possibility to shift the 
beginning of the work time for some deliveries, produces a significant improvement of 
the performance for the proposed model in respect with the Bell’s model with deliveries 
spread uniformly in time. In particular, the possibility to consider the varying exposure 
during the time horizon on each arc will have the favourable result of reducing the 
deliveries on the critical arc during the high level of exposure. 
 
 
 
Figure 59. Results obtained for the proposed model (Behaviour 3 varying the parameter α. 
 
Another evaluation was performed with an optimal scheduling of a limited number 
of vehicles, modifying the problem 3 defined in section 6.3 in an integer programming 
problem, reported hereinafter with the simplifications related to the case study. 
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Taking into account variable exposures, the model has been tested considering 
different number of available vehicles (nveh) for the scheduled deliveries. Figure 60 
shows that increasing the number of vehicles implies respectively the improvements of 
the model performances and that the models proposed in section 6.3 can be also taken 
into account As a representation of the integer problem described above for an infinite 
number of DG vehicles. 
 
 
 
Figure 60. Results obtained for a varying number of DG vehicles. 
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6.6 Discussion 
In this work, a risk adverse decisional model for DG transport planning on road has 
been proposed, with the intent to show that spreading not only in space (i.e. on multiple 
paths) but also in time (i.e. adding delays in the departure of the deliveries) can decrease 
the overall maximum exposure. 
 
The proposed model is formulated at planning level with one DM wishing to plan a 
relevant number of DG FD deliveries on several OD pairs. The DM can decide the 
routing path on a set of predefined path for each OD pair and whether to make a vehicle 
start immediately or to make it wait a certain delay. Results shown on a simplified 
network demonstrate that there is an enhancement with respect to previous results which 
did not take into account the possibility to delay deliveries. The enhancement is more 
evident taking into account exposures time varying 
 
Future developments regards the possibility to avoid to adopt predefined paths for 
each OD pair for example adapting the method of successive averages (Bell, 2006) to the 
current formulation, to verify whether optimality conditions similar to the ones quoted in 
Bell 2006 can be defined for the proposed formulation, and to verify whether the solution 
of the problem introduced in the current work can give additional insights on the integer 
programming problem quoted in the result sub chapter. 
 
Two scientific works have been discussed on this topic: 
 C. Bersani, R. Minciardi, R. Sacile, A. M. Tomasoni, (2009). “Risk averse 
routing of hazardous materials with scheduled delays”. Published by , NATO 
Science for peace Series 2009, Eds. GH M. Bell et al. 
 C. Bersani, R. Minciardi, R. Sacile, A. M. Tomasoni. “Risk averse routing of 
hazardous materials with scheduled delays”. Conference Proceedings of the 
NATO Advanced Research Workshop “Security and Environmental 
Sustainability of Multimodal Transport” – International Workshop at the Imperial 
College of London. London, Great Britain, 8th – 9th January 2009. 
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7 Optimal control of dangerous goods traffic flow 
- The case of transport through a critical 
infrastructure 
 
In this work, a preliminary study as regards the possibility to define optimal control 
strategies for the DG traffic flowing towards one critical road infrastructure (e.g. as in the 
case study a tunnel) at the macroscopic level is introduced. Specifically, the simplified 
model that is studied is related to part of a highway, on which the DG traffic can flow 
from one entrance. The control variables are represented by the number of vehicles that 
are allowed to enter the highway during a specific time interval, while the state variables 
are the queue of vehicles before the entrance, the number of vehicles in the various tracts 
of the highway, and the number of vehicles that enter the tunnel. The objective function 
to be minimized is characterized by three main terms: the queue, the hazard over the 
road, and the hazard related to the tunnel 
 
7.1 Introduction 
DG cover a wide range of products (explosives, gases, flammable liquids and solids, 
radioactive materials, hazardous wastes, etc. (Verter and Kara, 2008)). Transportation of 
these materials (that is, in general, multi-modal: road, pipelines, railway, ship) is a 
relevant problem to be considered because of the significant amount of material that 
flows among roads, territory and infrastructures (Bersani et al., 2008). Defining 
strategies for DGT management is a complex task  because it is necessary to take into 
account different objectives (minimize risks, satisfy goods demand transportation), 
different decision makers (fleet managers, local authorities, infrastructures managers), 
and different approaches (mainly based on the different spatial-temporal scales to be 
considered: strategic planning, tactical planning, operational management).  
 
In the literature of DGT on road, there are few, thought important and relevant, 
works on this subject (for example: Berman et al., 2007; Verter and Kara, 2007; Kara 
and Verter, 2004; Sadjadi, 2007; Bell, 2009; Bell and Cassir, 2002, Bersani et al., 2008a; 
Serafini, 2006; Beroggi and Wallace, 1994). The majority of these works is based on 
optimization models for planning and design purposes. The preliminary approach 
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presented in this work is instead based on real time operational management (like the 
work presented by Bersani et al., 2008b) with specific reference to the case of critical 
infrastructures. 
 
The DGT on road has important consequences in the overall traffic management 
(Minciardi et al., 2008). This fact is more evident when a vehicle requires to move 
towards a critical road infrastructure, such as a tunnel or a bridge. The control of traffic 
networks has been the subject of a great amount of literature from different viewpoints. 
The main articles related to the case of a tunnel are reported in (Minciardi et al., 2008). 
The aim of this preliminary study regards the possibility to define optimal control 
strategies for the DG traffic flowing towards one critical road infrastructure (e.g. as in the 
case study a tunnel). 
 
A given number of DGT vehicles has to use a highway and to reach one critical 
infrastructure (e.g. a tunnel). They can stop in a park before the highway entrance and 
start their travel according to the exigencies of a decision maker that can be identified as 
the tunnel manager. The park may be taken into account as an inventory in which the 
state of the system is represented by the vehicles that are present at a specific time 
instant. 
 
The flow dynamics of DG vehicles on the highway has also to be modelled. In 
particular,  the problem is defined at a macroscopic level, in which the state and the 
control variables correspond to the number of vehicles, for which the integrity condition 
may be relaxed, in order to obtain a continuous-variable decision problem.  
 
The control variables are represented by the number of vehicles that are allowed to 
enter the highway during a specific time interval, while the state variables are the queue 
of vehicles before the entrance, the number of vehicles in the various tracts of the 
highway, and the number of vehicles that enters the tunnel. The objective function to be 
minimized is characterized by three main terms: the queue, the hazard over the road, and 
the hazard related to the tunnel. 
 
The resulting optimal control problem is linear quadratic with non-negativity 
constraints over the state and control variables. A receding horizon control scheme is 
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used to derive the solution and to allow the model to be suitable in real time decision 
frameworks. An optimization package (Lingo 9.0, www.lindosystems.com) is used to 
solve the problem at each step. 
 
In fact, the explicit form of the optimal control law of a given linear, discrete-time, 
time-invariant process subject to a quadratic cost criterion is well known in the 
unconstrained case, while, even for simple constraints, solution is hard to achieve. In 
(Castelein and Johnson, 1989), the authors use the controllable block companion 
transformation and derive sufficient conditions on the weighting matrices of the cost 
criterion to ensure that the closed-loop response of the original process with the standard, 
unconstrained optimal feedback law will be nonnegative.  
 
Bertsimas and Brown (2007) assess that the celebrated success of dynamic 
programming for optimizing quadratic cost functions over linear systems is limited by its 
inability to tractably deal with even simple constraints, and present an alternative 
approach based on results from robust optimization to solve the stochastic linear-
quadratic control (SLQC) problem.  
 
For this reason, interesting developments of this work will be devoted to the 
definition of methodologies to find efficient solutions for the optimal control strategies. 
In the next subsections, the system model is described in detail. Then, the decision 
problem is formalized. Finally, results and conclusion are drawn. 
 
7.2 The system model 
The Figure 61 shows the schematic representation of the decision framework: the 
highway directed towards one critical infrastructure is modelled as a line divided in 
highway tracts. As a simplification, two highway tracts have been considered. 
 
tV
tI
tU Yt Zt
 
Figure 61. The considered system. 
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The physical inputs of the whole system are the quantities tV , i.e., the (known) 
number of vehicles entering the park near the highway entrance in time interval (t, t +1), 
t = 0,…,T-1. The control variables correspond to the number  of vehicles that enter the 
highway tU  in a specific time interval (t, t+1), while the state variables correspond to the 
number of vehicles in the inventory/queue, tI , the number of vehicles per tract of the 
highway ( tN1 , tN2 ), and the number of vehicles entering the tunnel, and number of 
vehicles going out from the tunnel ( tt ZY , ). 
Two different kinds of state equations have to be introduced, regarding, respectively, 
the queue in the park at the highway entrance, and the highway tracts. Moreover, the 
hazard has been formalized as a function of the state and control variables. 
 
7.2.1 The queue state equation 
The state equation is: 
 
)(1 tttt UVII −+=+        t=0,…, T-1    (7.1) 
where: 
− tI  is the number of vehicles stored, at time instant t, in the park near the entrance, 
i.e., the inventory of the entrance park area, in time interval (t, t+1); 
− tU  is the number of vehicles that enter the highway in time interval (t, t+1), from 
the entrance park area; 
− tV  is the (known) number of vehicles that enters the entrance park in time interval 
(t, t+1). 
 
7.2.2 The highway tract state equations 
These state equations describe the evolution over time of a state variable that 
represents the number of DG vehicles (per unit length) present in a specific tract of the 
highway. The speed of these vehicles is related to the overall vehicle density over the 
considered tract. It is assumed that the vehicle flow can be represented through an 
average speed, which is common to DG and non-DG vehicles. In agreement with the 
literature dealing with traffic models, it is assumed that the (average) vehicle speed is 
never so high to allow the complete covering of a highway tract within a single time 
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interval (of course, this may be also seen as a constraint over the space discretization of 
the highway). The equations are given by 
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with 
 
tvelNY ttt Δ= 11                       t=0,…, T-1     (7.4) 
tvelNZ ttt Δ= 22                     t=0,…, T-1     (7.5) 
 
where: 
 
tN1 , tN2  are the number of (DG) vehicles per unit length that is present in the 
highway road in tract 1 and in the tunnel, in time instant t; 
21 , LL  are the tract and tunnel lengths respectively; 
tΔ  is the time interval length; 
tt velvel 21 ,  are the (average) velocities in the tract 1 and tunnel in time interval (t, t+1), 
which is assumed to be imposed by the ordinary traffic (i.e., non DG), assuming that the 
DG vehicle flow is only a negligible part of the overall traffic flow; 
tY  is the number of vehicles that passes from tract 1 to the tunnel in time interval (t, 
t+1); 
tZ  is the number of vehicles that going out from the tunnel in time interval (t, t+1). 
 
7.2.3 Hazard assessment 
The hazard of accidents depends on different structural and environmental 
parameters that may vary for each time interval and for each highway tract, and on the 
number of vehicles (Fabiano et al., 2002; Fabiano et al., 2005). In this work, the hazard 
tHAZ  is simply represented as a time-varying a-dimensional parameter 
t
HAZη  multiplied 
by the density of vehicles in the specific tract. That is, 
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t NNHAZ 2211 ηη +=                  t=0,…, T-1   (7.6) 
 
7.2.4 The decision problem 
 
The objective function has to take into account the number of vehicles in the park 
entrance, the number of vehicles per unit length in tract 1 of the highway, and the 
number of vehicles that enter the tunnel.  In particular the following terms have to be 
minimized:  
the number of vehicles waiting in the park entrance; 
the number of vehicles per unit length for tract 1, 
tN1 ; 
the number of vehicles per unit length that enter the tunnel, 
tN 2 ; 
 
Thus, the objective function can be expressed as 
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where:  
 
tN1 , 
tN2  are the number of DG vehicles per unit length that is present in the highway 
road in tracts 1 and in the tunnel, in time instant t; 
tI  is the number of vehicles stored, at time instant t, in the park near the entrance, 
i.e., the inventory of the entrance park area, in time interval (t, t+1); 
α , β  are specific weighting factors. 
 
7.2.5 The statement of the optimal control problem 
The optimal control problem reported in equations (1)-(7) can be expressed in the 
following form 
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where tx is the space vector and tQ  a matrix of time dependent parameters. 
Specifically, 
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s.t. 
 
ttttt dubxAx ++=+1                           t=0,…,T-1   (7.11) 
 
0≥tu                                                 t=0,…,T-1   (7.12) 
 
0≥tx                                                  t=0,…,T-1  (7.13) 
 
Where: 
tt Uu =  are the control variables, tA  is a matrix of time dependent parameters, b  a 
vector of parameters, and td  a vector of time dependent parameters. 
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The optimal control problem expressed by equations (7.8)-(7.16) is a linear-quadratic 
one, with non negativity constraints over the state and control variables. 
 
7.3 Results 
The space-time discretization of equations (7.2)-(7.3) has been chosen in order to 
avoid instability of the traffic flow (i.e., in the time interval, the vehicles are not allowed 
to pass the tract length), and in order to have a meaningful time interval for traffic flow 
simulation (Kotsialos and Papageorgiou, 2004). That is, 
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Firstly, the optimization problem (7.1)-(7.7) has been solved, with the following 
inputs: 0] 0, 0, 0, 3, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 3, 10,[=V , and the following weights in the objective 
function:  44 102,102 ⋅=⋅= βα . 
A receding-horizon control scheme has been applied and, in the two table below, 
(Table 21, and 22) the optimization results are reported. 
 
Time tU  tZ  
tI  
0 8.38 0 0 
1 0.56 0 1.62 
2 0.6 41026.0 −⋅  4.06 
3 0.66 41026.0 −⋅  5.46 
4 0.74 41025.0 −⋅  4.8 
5 0.86 41024.0 −⋅  4.06 
6 1 41023.0 −⋅  3.2 
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7 1.19 41021.0 −⋅  2.2 
8 1 41019.0 −⋅  1 
9 2 41017.0 −⋅  0 
10 2.23 41014.0 −⋅  0 
11 0.77 41012.0 −⋅  0.76 
12 0 51083.0 −⋅  0 
13 0 51044.0 −⋅  0 
14 0 0 0 
 
Table 21. Results of the optimization problem: tU , tZ , tI . 
 
Time tN1  tN 2  tY  
0 0 0 0 
1 1101.0 −⋅  0 1.74 
2 2109.0 −⋅  21022.0 −⋅  1.49 
3 21079.0 −⋅  2104.0 −⋅  1.3 
4 21071.0 −⋅  21057.0 −⋅  1.17 
5 21065.0 −⋅  21071.0 −⋅  1.08 
6 21063.0 −⋅  21085.0 −⋅  0.04 
7 21062.0 −⋅  21098.0 −⋅  1.03 
8 21064.0 −⋅  11011.0 −⋅  1.06 
9 21063.0 −⋅  11012.0 −⋅  1.05 
10 21075.0 −⋅  11014.0 −⋅  1.25 
11 21087.0 −⋅  11015.0 −⋅  1.45 
12 21079.0 −⋅  11017.0 −⋅  1.31 
13 21063.0 −⋅  11019.0 −⋅  1.04 
14 21049.0 −⋅  1102.0 −⋅  0.82 
 
Table 22. Results of the optimization problem: tN1 ,
tN 2 ,
tY . 
 
The overall hazard is (summation over time of equation (7.6)) equal to 1978, with 
10321 === tHAZtHAZtHAZ ηηη . 
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Then, the non-negativity constraints have been removed. The optimal values are the 
same like in the constrained case.  
Similar results, in the unconstrained case, can be found through the use of the Riccati 
equation. Instead, for the constrained case an efficient method of solution has to be 
found. A possible approach can be the one reported in (Bertsimas and Brown, 2007). 
Otherwise, one can try to use dynamic programming and reduce the explosion of 
computation that arises. 
 
7.4 Conclusions  
A preliminary approach for the optimal control of DG traffic flow has been 
presented. The novelties of the presented approach in the literature of DG T have been 
highlighted, as well as the methodological approaches that might characterize the 
solution of the optimal control problem. 
 
Future research related to the present work will regard the development of methods 
to derive the optimal control law to the considered problem in a closed form. After that, 
the decision problem could be extended to the optimal control of two fleets of hazardous 
material that have to flow through a tunnel in both competitive and collaborative cases.  
 
Moreover, a hierarchical control can be formalized in which a decision maker related 
to the tunnel has to decide the price to assign to the two fleets on the basis of the costs, 
the goods demand, and the risk to be minimized in the overall system, while the fleets 
aim at minimizing their own benefits and hazards. 
 
This work has been presented at an international conference: 
 Chiara Bersani, Riccardo Minciardi, Michela Robba, Roberto Sacile, Angela M. 
Tomasoni. Optimal control of hazardous materials traffic flow - the case of 
transport through a critical infrastructure. Conference Proceedings of the ICINCO 
Advanced Research Workshop “Security and Environmental Sustainability of 
Multimodal Transport” – International Workshop. Milan, Italy, 2th – 5th July 
2009. 
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8 General conclusion and future developments 
 
The work presented in this PhD thesis on DGT has expressed the need to describe 
the DGT system quantitatively to find solutions or answers in order to minimize the risks 
arising from transport or maximize the level of security in freight traffic. The system of 
DGT logistics has tackled by splitting a complex system – the DGT system - into its 
subsystems, studying specific aspects as well as proposing new methodologies. The 
thesis work has developed in finding resolutions or optimal solutions of models - applied 
to each subsystem - with assumptions, methodologies and targets ad hoc for each 
analyzed case study. 
 
In my PhD work, two transport modalities, pipeline and road, have been taken into 
account, since they represent the most common modalities of transport in Europe, as well 
as in France and Italy. 
 
All the models that I have described and defined have been based on the classical 
definition of technological risk – related to humans activity – categorized as accidental 
risk, where the risk has been related to the failure – or accident – of a vehicle, or a 
pipeline, transporting dangerous goods matters. This risk definition has been the same 
for the pipeline and road, but I used different methodological approaches to evaluate 
transport risk.  
 
The different methodologies that have been used throughout my PhD work are 
strongly oriented to an engineering vision of the hazard and of the related risk, where a 
numerical quantitative evaluation is required. To support this view, I have deepened and 
used methodologies and technologies oriented to Innovative Statistic Approaches based 
on Artificial Neural network in Chapter 4, Geographic Information Systems in Chapter 5, 
Mathematical Programming and in part, Game Theory in Chapter 6, and finally Optimal 
Control in Chapter 7. 
 
At the end of this work I can say that t was not so easy define all the proposed 
approach precisely as a quantitative method, because several techniques are embedded or 
overlap in other ones. What is extraordinary is that some of them are subjective risk 
approach because of the impossibility to quantify all the variables that are involved in an 
 181
accident. All these variables are subjected to change, so the overall system change, but 
sometime do not change the risk perception or evaluation.  
 
So, the first proposal for a future argument of research is a methodology or a method 
to evaluate statistically the weight of each variable in the accident evaluation, and in 
which way the overall system change at every single change of a variable, to understand 
if there are variables much more related or correlated to risk than others. In this way, it is 
possible to define what variables are related to probability, and what variables are linked 
to consequences, in the technological risk definition. Indeed, it is possible to reduce risk 
or in prevention - when the variables are associated to consequences - or in protection, 
when the variables are associated to probability. 
 
This research can be developed both in pipeline and road transport, because of a bi-
level transport of hydrocarbons from the petrol inland extraction platform to this two 
modality of transport through an urbanised territory, and the comparison between risk 
derived from this two type of transport is an interesting and challenging objective for my 
future research. 
 
Another theme of research, that could be developed as a continuation of this work, 
could be the development of a transnational traffic control centre on road – but also using 
other type of transport – that, on the bases of data collection deriving from Italy and 
France, collect, control and monitoring freight traffic to define firstly, systemic 
vulnerability through the boundary territory; to identify secondly, critical infrastructure 
and possible accident scenario; and thirdly to define new routing and alternative paths in 
case of an infrastructure inefficiency.  
 
Then, using suitable communication and information technology it could be possible 
define protocols and standards of communication and levels of shearing information to 
prevent accidents, in case of emergency, and also in real time to control haw many and 
when freight traffic, and specially dangerous goods transport pass through the EU 
territory. 
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Attachment N.1 - The classes of dangerous goods according 
to HAZARDOUS MATERIAL TRANSPORTATION GUIDES. (DG 
Guidelines, 2010). 
 
DOT HAZARD CLASS 
 
UN CLASS  
DEFINITION 
DESCRIPTION 
 An Explosive is any 
chemical compound, 
mixture, or device which is 
designed to 
function by explosion, that 
is 
substantially instantaneous 
with the release of gas and 
heat. Exception — such 
compound, mixture, or 
device which is otherwise 
specifically classified in 
Parts 171-180. (See 49 CFR 
173.50) 
CLASS A - 1 Detonating. Maximum 
Hazard. The nine types of 
Class A explosives are 
defined in 49 CFR 173.53. 
CLASS B - 1 Flammable Hazard. In 
general, functions by rapid 
combustion rather than 
detonation. Included are 
explosive devices such as 
special fireworks, flash 
powders, etc. (49 CFR 
173.88) 
CLASS C - 1 Minimum hazard. Small 
arms ammunition, certain 
types of fireworks and 
various types of 
manufactured articles 
containing restricted 
quantities of Class A and/or 
Class 11 explosives as 
components. Included are 
common fireworks and 
various types of small arms 
ammunition manufactured 
articles which contain 
restricted quantities of Class 
A or Class B explosives. (49 
CFR 173.100) 
EXPLOSIVES 
BLASTING AGENT - 1 Blasting Agent.  A 
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material designed for 
blasting which has been 
tested in accordance with 49 
CFR 173.114(a)(b). It must 
be so insensitive that there is 
very little probability of: (1) 
accidental explosion or (2) 
going from burning to 
detonation. (49 CFR 
173.114a(a)) 
2 - Compressed Gas Any material or mixture 
having in-the-container an 
absolute pressure exceeding 
NON-FLAMMABLE GAS 
40 psi at 70' F, OR a pressure 
exceeding 104 psi at 130'F; 
or any liquid flammable 
material having a vapor 
pressure exceeding 40 psi at 
100'F. (49 CFR 173.300(a)) 
2 - non-liquified 
Compressed Gas 
A gas (other than gas in 
solution) which, under the 
charged pressure, is entirely 
gaseous at a temperature of 
70'F. (49 CFR 173.300(c)) 
2 - Liquefied Compressed 
Gas 
A gas which, under the 
charged pressure, is partially  
liquid at a temperature of 
70-F. (49 CFR 173.300(d)) 
2 - Compressed Gas in 
solution 
A non- liquefied 
compressed gas which is 
dissolved in a solvent. (49 
CFR 173.300(e)) 
2 - Flammable 
Compressed Gas 
Any compressed gas 
meeting criteria as specified 
in 49 CFR 173.300(a) and 
(1)).  This includes: lower 
flammability limit, 
flammability limit range, 
flame projection, or flame 
propagation. 
GASES 
2 - Non-flammable Gas Any compressed gas other 
than a flammable 
compressed gas. 
FLAMMABLE LIQUID 
3 - Flammable liquid Any liquid having a flash 
point below 100'F.  
Authorized methods to 
determine flashpoints are 
listed in 49 CFR 173.115(d). 
For exceptions, see 49 CFR 
173.115(a). 
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3 - Pyrophoric Liquid Any liquid that ignites 
spontaneously in dry or 
moist air at or below 130'F. 
(49 CFR 173.115(c)). 
COMBUSTIBLE 
LIQUID 
3 - Combustible liquid Any liquid that does not 
meet any other hazard class, 
other than ORM-E, having a 
flash point at or above 100'F. 
and below 200'F. For 
exceptions, see 49 CFR 
173.115(b). Authorized 
methods to determine 
flashpoints are listed in 49 
CFR 173.115(d). Exceptions 
are found in 49 CFR 
173.118(a). 
4 - Flammable Solid Any solid material (other 
than an explosive) which 
under normal transportation 
conditions is liable to cause 
fires through friction or 
retained heat from 
manufacturing or processing.  
It can, be ignited readily and 
burns so vigorously and 
persistently, as to create a 
serious transportation hazard. 
Included in this class are 
spontaneously combustible 
and water reactive material. 
(49 CFR 173.150). 
4 - Spontaneously 
Combustible Material (solid) 
A solid substance 
(including sludges and 
pastes) which may undergo 
spontaneous Treating or self-
ignition under normal 
transportation conditions. 
These materials may increase 
in temperature and ignite 
when exposed to air. (49 
CFR 171.8). 
FLAMMABLE SOLID 
4 - Water Reactive 
Material (solid) 
Any solid substance 
(including sludges and 
pastes) which react with 
water by igniting or giving 
off dangerous quantities of 
flammable or toxic gases. 
(49 CFR 171.8). 
ORGANIC PEROXIDE 5 - Organic Peroxide Any organic compound 
containing the bivalent -0-0- 
structure.  It may be 
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considered a derivative of 
hydrogen peroxide where 
one or more of the hydrogen 
atoms have been replaced by 
organic radicals.  It must be 
classed as an organic 
peroxide unless it meets 
certain criteria listed in 49 
CFR 173.151(a). 
OXIDIZER 5 - An Oxidizer A substance such as 
chlorate, permanganate, 
inorganic peroxide, or a 
nitrate, that yields oxygen 
readily to stimulate the 
combustion of organic 
matter. (49 CFR 173.151). 
POISON A 2 - Extremely Dangerous 
Poisons 
Poisonous gases or liquids-
-a very small amount of the 
gas, or vapor of the liquid, 
mixed with air is dangerous 
to life. (49 CFR 173.326). 
POISON B 6 - Less Dangerous 
Poisons 
Substances, liquid or solid 
(including pastes and semi-
solids), other than Class A 
Poisons or Irritating 
Materials--so toxic (or 
presumed to be toxic) to man 
that they are a  hazard to 
health during transportation. 
(49 CFR 173.343(a)). 
IRRITATING 
MATERIAL 
6 - An Irritating Material A liquid or solid substance 
which, upon contact with fire 
or air, gives off dangerous or 
intensely irritating fumes. It 
does not include any 
poisonous material, Class 
A.(49 CFR 173.381). 
ETIOLOGIC AGENT 6 - An Etiologic agent A living micro-organism 
(or its toxin) which causes 
(or may cause) human 
disease, and includes those 
agents listed in 49 CFR 
72.3.(49 CFR 173.386). 
RADIOACTIVE 
MATERIAL 
7 - Radioactive Material Any material, or 
combination of materials, 
that spontaneously gives off 
ionizing radiation. It has a 
specific activity greater than 
0.002 microcuries per gram. 
(49 CFR 173.403)(See 49 
CFR 173.403(a) through (z) 
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for details.) 
CORROSIVE 
MATERIAL 
8 - Corrosive Material A liquid or solid that 
causes visible destruction or 
irreversible damage to 
human skin tissue on contact. 
Also, it may be a liquid that 
has a severe corrosion rate 
on steel. (See 49 CFR 
173.240 (a) and (b) for 
details.) 
9 – Other regulated 
materials 
(1) Any material that may 
pose an unreasonable risk to 
health, safety, and property 
when transported in 
commerce; and (2) does not 
meet any of the definitions of 
the other hazard classes 
specified in this  subchapter, 
or (3) has been re-classed an 
ORM (specifically or 
permissively) according to 
this subchapter. (49 CFR 
173.500(a)). 
9 - ORM-A An ORM-A is material 
which has an anaesthetic, 
irritating, noxious, toxic, or 
other similar property. If the 
material leaks during 
transportation, passengers 
and crew would experience 
extreme annoyance and 
discomfort. (49 CFR 
173.500(b)(1)). 
 
ORM- OTHER 
REGULATED 
MATERIALS 
 
9 - ORM-B An ORM-B is material, 
(including a solid when wet 
with water), the leakage of 
which could cause 
significant damage to the 
vehicle transporting it. 
Materials meeting one or 
both of the following criteria 
are ORM-it materials: (1) 
specifically designated by 
name in 49 CFR 172.101 
and/or (2) a liquid substance 
that has a corrosion rate 
exceeding 0.250 inch per 
year(IPY) on non-clad 
aluminium. An acceptable 
test is described in NACE 
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Standard TM-01-69.(49 CFR 
173.500(b)(2)). 
9 - ORM-C An ORM-C is material 
which has other inherent 
characteristics not described 
as an ORM-A or ORM-B, 
but which make it unsuitable 
for shipment, unless properly 
identified and prepared for 
transportation. Each ORM-C 
material is specifically 
named in 49 CFR 172.101. 
(49 CFR 173.500(b)(3)). 
9 - ORM-D An ORM-D is a material 
such as a consumer 
commodity which presents a 
limited hazard during 
transportation due to its 
form, quantity and 
packaging. It must be a 
material for which 
exceptions are provided in 
172.101. Shipping 
descriptions applicable to 
ORM-D materials are found 
in 49 CFR 172.101. (49 CFR 
173.500(b)(4)). 
 
9 - ORM-E An ORM-E is a material 
that is not included in any 
other hazard class but is 
subject to the requirements 
of this subchapter.  Materials 
in this class include: (1) 
HAZARDOUS WASTE and 
(2) HAZARDOUS 
SUBSTANCES, as defined 
in 49 CFR 171.8. (49 CFR 
173.500(b)(5)). 
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Attachment N.2 – Kerosene Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) 
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Attachment N.3 – GIS and WEB-GIS platform and prototype 
 
 
ArcMap Workspace. Monte Alpi Taranto pipeline as a single polyline of 137.7 km in lenght. In 
support are displayed: the filing of Viggiano, eight tables framing the pipeline in different frames, 
welds, derived from the Tubes Book of the Pipeline and converted into shapefiles. 
 
 
Shapefile attribute table associated with Monte Alpi Taranto pipeline. Each record represents a 
number of factors associated to an accidents caused by activities of third parties. 
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Using a query attribute that displays bars pipeline - hatching in red - that are associated with a 
population density of 144.75 people per sq. km. The attribute table has many records selected as 
there are bars with this feature. 
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Archive data base. 
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01_THIRD PARTIES ACTIVITIES ACCIDENT SCENARIO 
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02_CORROSION ACCIDENT SCENARIO 
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03_MECHANICAL FAILURE ACCIDENT SCENARIO 
 
 
 
 
 221
 
 
 
 
 222
 
 
04_WEB-GIS PROTOTIPE 
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DSS architecture for the pipeline system descrive in this study. 
GIS 
OFF-LINE 
 
ANN 
GIS 
ON-LINE 
VETTORE 
CARATTERISTICHE 
DEL TERRITORIO 
EVENTI 
CARATTERIZZAZIONE 
EVENTI 
CARATTERIZZAZIONE 
TRATTE 
SET CAMPIONE DATI DOT 
INFORMAZIONI REPORT 
GUARDALINEE ED 
ELICOTTERI 
INDICE DI PRIORITA’ DI 
MANUTENZIONE 
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Attachment N.4 – Acciden scenario from TIP to ALOHA 
 
 
 
CLASS OF 
DATA: 
TYPE OF DATA: VALUES: 
SITE DATA Location: 
 
Building  
Air Exchanges Per Hour:    
VIA DEI PETROLI, 
ITALY (VE), ITALY 
0.50 
(enclosed 
office)
 
Time: October 5, 2009  1019 
hours ST (user specified) 
CHEMICAL 
DATA 
Chemical Name: PROPANE 
  Molecular Weight: 44.10 g/mol 
  TEEL-1 5500 ppm 
  TEEL-2 17000 ppm 
  TEEL-3 33000 ppm 
  IDLH 2100 ppm 
  LEL 20000 ppm 
  UEL 95000 
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  Ambient Boiling Point: -42.7° C 
  Vapor Pressure at Ambient 
Temperature: 
greater than 1 atm 
 Ambient Saturation 
Concentration: 
1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% 
ATMOSFERIC 
DATA (Manual 
Input of Data) 
 
Wind: 
meters/second from N at 10 
meters 
  Ground Roughness: urban or 
forest
  Cloud Cover: 7 tenths 
  Ait Temperature: 24° C 
  Stability Class: B 
  Inversion Height: No 
  Relative Humidity: 75% 
SOURCE 
STRENGTH 
Description: 
    
       
    
   
Leak from hole in 
horizontal cylindrical tank  
Flammable chemical 
escaping from tank (not 
burning)                    Tank 
contains liquid                    
Tank is 88% full 
 Tank Diameter: 2.8 meters 
 Tank Length:  8 meters 
 Tank Volume:  49.3 cubic meters 
 Internal Temperature: 30° C 
 Chemical Mass in Tank: 21,067 kilograms 
 Circular Opening Diameter: 10 centimeters 
 Opening is: 0.50 meters from tank 
bottom 
 Release Duration: 5 minutes 
 Max Average Sustained 
Release Rate: 
8,720 kilograms/min 
(averaged over a minute or 
more) 
 Total Amount Released:  20,927 kilograms 
 Note: The chemical escaped as a 
mixture of gas and aerosol 
(two phase flow) 
 
 
THREAT ZONE: 
 Model Run: Gaussian 
 Red : 124 meters --- (33000 ppm = 
TEEL-3) 
 Orange: 171 meters --- (17000 ppm = 
TEEL-2) 
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 Yellow: 290 meters --- (5500 ppm = 
TEEL-1) 
THREAT AT POINT: 
Concentration Estimates at 
the point: 
Downwind - 50 meters Off Centerline - 1.48 meters 
Max Concentration: Outdoor - 205,000 ppm Indoor -  4,000 ppm 
Concentration Estimates at 
the point: 
Downwind - 100 meters Off Centerline - 1.48 meters 
Max Concentration: Outdoor - 50,800 ppm Indoor -  1,050 ppm 
Concentration Estimates at 
the point: 
Downwind - 150 meters Off Centerline - 1.48 meters 
Max Concentration: Outdoor - 22,200 ppm Indoor -  450 ppm 
Concentration Estimates at 
the point: 
Downwind - 200 meters Off Centerline - 1.48 meters 
Max Concentration: Outdoor - 12,300 ppm Indoor -  235 ppm 
Concentration Estimates at 
the point: 
Downwind - 250 meters Off Centerline - 1.48 meters 
Max Concentration: Outdoor - 7,440 ppm Indoor - 151 ppm 
Concentration Estimates at 
the point: 
Downwind - 300 meters Off Centerline - 1.48 meters 
Max Concentration: Outdoor - 5,140 ppm Indoor -  103 ppm 
Concentration Estimates at 
the point: 
Downwind - 350 meters Off Centerline - 1.48 meters 
Max Concentration: Outdoor - 7,440 ppm Indoor -  151 ppm 
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Concentrazione a 50 m: 
 
 
Concentrazione a 100 m: 
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Concentrazione a 150m: 
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Concentrazione a 200 m: 
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Concentrazione a 250m: 
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Concentrazione a 300m: 
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THREAT AT POINT: 
   Concentration Estimates at the point: 
   Downwind: 50 meters                    Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Max Concentration: 
      Outdoor: 192,000 ppm 
      Indoor:  3,740 ppm 
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THREAT AT POINT: 
   Concentration Estimates at the point: 
   Downwind: 100 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Max Concentration: 
      Outdoor: 83,200 ppm 
      Indoor:  1,720 ppm 
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THREAT AT POINT: 
   Concentration Estimates at the point: 
   Downwind: 150 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Max Concentration: 
      Outdoor: 40,300 ppm 
      Indoor:  817 ppm 
 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Concentration Estimates at the point: 
   Downwind: 200 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Max Concentration: 
      Outdoor: 23,100 ppm 
      Indoor:  442 ppm 
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THREAT AT POINT: 
   Concentration Estimates at the point: 
   Downwind: 250 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Max Concentration: 
      Outdoor: 14,300 ppm 
      Indoor:  288 ppm 
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THREAT AT POINT: 
   Concentration Estimates at the point: 
   Downwind: 300 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Max Concentration: 
      Outdoor: 9,930 ppm 
      Indoor:  200 ppm 
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THREAT AT POINT: 
   Concentration Estimates at the point: 
   Downwind: 350 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Max Concentration: 
      Outdoor: 7,240 ppm 
      Indoor:  143 ppm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
246
 
 
 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Concentration Estimates at the point: 
   Downwind: 400 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Max Concentration: 
      Outdoor: 5,380 ppm 
      Indoor:  108 ppm 
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THREAT AT POINT: 
   Concentration Estimates at the point: 
   Downwind: 450 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Max Concentration: 
      Outdoor: 4,170 ppm 
      Indoor:  84.6 ppm 
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THREAT AT POINT: 
   Concentration Estimates at the point: 
   Downwind: 500 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Max Concentration: 
      Outdoor: 3,180 ppm 
      Indoor:  67.4 ppm 
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THREAT AT POINT: 
   Concentration Estimates at the point: 
   Downwind: 550 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Max Concentration: 
      Outdoor: 2,440 ppm 
      Indoor:  55 ppm 
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THREAT AT POINT: 
   Concentration Estimates at the point: 
   Downwind: 600 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Max Concentration: 
      Outdoor: 2,090 ppm 
      Indoor:  45.7 ppm 
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THREAT AT POINT: 
   Concentration Estimates at the point: 
   Downwind: 650 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Max Concentration: 
      Outdoor: 1,660 ppm 
      Indoor:  38.4 ppm 
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THREAT AT POINT: 
   Concentration Estimates at the point: 
   Downwind: 2000 meters                  Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Max Concentration: 
      Outdoor: 53.4 ppm 
      Indoor:  3.1 ppm 
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THREAT AT POINT: 
   Concentration Estimates at the point: 
   Downwind: 3000 meters                  Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Max Concentration: 
      Outdoor: 13.4 ppm 
      Indoor:  1.2 ppm 
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THREAT ZONE: (GAUSSIAN SELECTED) 
   Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion 
   Type of Ignition: ignited by detonation 
   Model Run: Gaussian 
   Red   : 294 meters --- (8.0 psi = destruction of buildings) 
   Orange: 419 meters --- (3.5 psi = serious injury likely) 
   Yellow: 890 meters --- (1.0 psi = shatters glass) 
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THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 50 meters                    Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 285 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 100 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 285 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 150 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 285 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 200 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 43.9 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 250 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
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   Overpressure: 13.2 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 300 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 7.56 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 350 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 5.15 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 400 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 3.85 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 450 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 3.04 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 500 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 2.5 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 550 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 2.12 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 600 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 1.83 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 650 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 1.61 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 700 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 1.43 psi 
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THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 750 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 1.29 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 800 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 1.17 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 850 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 1.07 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 900 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 0.985 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 950 meters                   Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 0.911 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 1000 meters                  Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 0.847 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 1500 meters                  Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 0.488 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 2000 meters                  Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 0.336 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 2500 meters                  Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 0.254 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
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   Downwind: 3000 meters                  Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 0.202 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 3500 meters                  Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 0.168 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 4000 meters                  Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 0.142 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 4500 meters                  Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 0.123 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 5000 meters                  Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   Overpressure: 0.109 psi 
 
THREAT AT POINT: 
   Overpressure Estimate at the point: 
   Downwind: 5500 meters                  Off Centerline: 5 meters 
   There is no significant overpressure at the point selected. 
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Attachment N.5 – Risk adverse decision making code 
 
sets: 
!a(link,path)= 1 se il link fa parte del percorso k; 
!b = -1 se nodo origine ,1 se destinazione - NON SERVE; 
!c= rischio sull'arco; 
!p = probabilità di uso del link; 
!q = probabilità condizionale di di incidente del link; 
!h = probabilità che il percosrso k sia scelto; 
!path= ho già sei percorsi fissi; 
!MI = matrice dei percorsi- (-1) arco uscente-(1)arco entrante - NON 
SERVE; 
 
n/1..9/: b; 
time/1..8/:costo; 
 
link/1..12/:rischio_link_i; 
 
path/1..2/; 
 
OD/1..2/; 
 
rit/1..4/; 
 
!rischioxtempo(link,time):risk,richio_link_t; 
 
matrice(link,path,OD,time): use; 
 
percorso(link,path,OD,time,rit): perc;  
 
prob(path,OD,rit):h; 
 
prova_rischio(link,time,rit):rischio_link; 
prova_rischio_2(link,time):risk,rischio_link_t,rischio_link_1,rischio_l
ink_2,rischio_link_3,rischio_link_4; 
 
 
scrivi_percorso(link,path,time): 
percorso_1_1,percorso_1_2,percorso_1_3, 
percorso_1_4,percorso_2_1,percorso_2_2,percorso_2_3,percorso_2_4; 
 
!decisionale(path,delay):sched; 
 
!rischio_su_arco(link,path,sim_t,camion):temp; 
 
!tratta(link,percorso):a; 
!trattadue(percorso,link):g; 
endsets 
 
data: 
 
perc=@OLE ('bell_prova_rischio_costante.xls', 'perc'); 
risk=@OLE ('bell_prova_rischio_costante.xls', 'risk');!rischio; 
 
@OLE ('bell_prova_rischio_costante.xls', 'h')=h; 
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@OLE ('bell_prova_rischio_costante.xls', 
'rischio_link_t')=rischio_link_t; 
@OLE ('bell_prova_rischio_costante.xls', 
'rischio_link_i')=rischio_link_i; 
 
 
@OLE ('bell_prova_rischio_costante.xls', 
'rischio_link_1')=rischio_link_1; 
@OLE ('bell_prova_rischio_costante.xls', 
'rischio_link_2')=rischio_link_2; 
@OLE ('bell_prova_rischio_costante.xls', 
'rischio_link_3')=rischio_link_3; 
@OLE ('bell_prova_rischio_costante.xls', 
'rischio_link_4')=rischio_link_4; 
 
@OLE ('bell_prova_rischio_costante.xls', 'percorso_1_1')=percorso_1_1; 
@OLE ('bell_prova_rischio_costante.xls', 'percorso_1_2')=percorso_1_2; 
@OLE ('bell_prova_rischio_costante.xls', 'percorso_1_3')=percorso_1_3; 
@OLE ('bell_prova_rischio_costante.xls', 'percorso_1_4')=percorso_1_4; 
 
@OLE ('bell_prova_rischio_costante.xls', 'percorso_2_1')=percorso_2_1; 
@OLE ('bell_prova_rischio_costante.xls', 'percorso_2_2')=percorso_2_2; 
@OLE ('bell_prova_rischio_costante.xls', 'percorso_2_3')=percorso_2_3; 
@OLE ('bell_prova_rischio_costante.xls', 'percorso_2_4')=percorso_2_4; 
enddata 
 
!min= c +10*@sum(time(t):costo(t)); 
 
 
!obiettivo 1; 
min= c; 
 
 
!obiettivo 2; 
!min= @sum(time(t):costo(t)); 
 
 
!@for(link(i): @for(time(t): (@sum(rit(tau):@sum(path(k): 
@sum(OD(v):(risk(i,t)*perc(i,k,v,t,tau)*h(k,v,tau))))))< costo(t))); 
 
 
@for(link(i): @for(time(t): (@sum(rit(tau):@sum(path(k): 
@sum(OD(v):(risk(i,t)*perc(i,k,v,t,tau)*h(k,v,tau))))))< c )); 
 
 
 
!@for(link(i): @for(path(k):@for(veh(v): 
@for(time(t)|t#lt#10:perc(i,k,1,t+1,1)=use(i,k,1,t))))); 
!@for(link(i): @for(path(k):@for(veh(v): 
@for(time(t)|t#lt#9:perc(i,k,1,t+2,2)=use(i,k,1,t))))); 
!@for(link(i): @for(path(k):@for(veh(v): 
@for(time(t)|t#lt#10:perc(i,k,2,t+1,1)=use(i,k,2,t))))); 
!@for(link(i): @for(path(k):@for(veh(v): 
@for(time(t)|t#lt#9:perc(i,k,2,t+2,2)=use(i,k,2,t))))); 
 
@for(OD(v): @sum(path(k): @sum(rit(tau):h(k,v,tau)))=1); 
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!@for(OD(v): @for(path(k): @for(rit(tau):@bin(h(k,v,tau))))); 
 
@for(link(i): @for(time(t):@for(rit(tau): 
rischio_link(i,t,tau)= 
@sum(path(k):@sum(OD(v):(risk(i,t)*perc(i,k,v,t,tau)*h(k,v,tau)))) ))); 
 
@for(link(i):  
rischio_link_i(i)=@sum(time(t):@sum(rit(tau):rischio_link(i,t,tau))) ); 
 
@for(link(i):@for(time(t):  
rischio_link_t(i,t)=@sum(rit(tau):rischio_link(i,t,tau)) )); 
 
!scrivi; 
 
@for(link(i): @for(path(k): @for(time(t): 
percorso_1_1(i,k,t)=perc(i,k,1,t,1)))); 
@for(link(i): @for(path(k): @for(time(t): 
percorso_1_2(i,k,t)=perc(i,k,1,t,2)))); 
@for(link(i): @for(path(k): @for(time(t): 
percorso_1_3(i,k,t)=perc(i,k,1,t,3)))); 
@for(link(i): @for(path(k): @for(time(t): 
percorso_1_4(i,k,t)=perc(i,k,1,t,4)))); 
 
@for(link(i): @for(path(k): @for(time(t): 
percorso_2_1(i,k,t)=perc(i,k,2,t,1)))); 
@for(link(i): @for(path(k): @for(time(t): 
percorso_2_2(i,k,t)=perc(i,k,2,t,2)))); 
@for(link(i): @for(path(k): @for(time(t): 
percorso_2_3(i,k,t)=perc(i,k,2,t,3)))); 
@for(link(i): @for(path(k): @for(time(t): 
percorso_2_4(i,k,t)=perc(i,k,2,t,4)))); 
 
 
@for(link(i): @for(time(t): rischio_link_1(i,t)= rischio_link(i,t,1))); 
@for(link(i): @for(time(t): rischio_link_2(i,t)= rischio_link(i,t,2))); 
@for(link(i): @for(time(t): rischio_link_3(i,t)= rischio_link(i,t,3))); 
@for(link(i): @for(time(t): rischio_link_4(i,t)= rischio_link(i,t,4))); 
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Attachment N.6 – Optimal control in a tunnel - code 
 
SETS: 
Time/1..15/:V,X,I,N1, N2, vel1, vel2, Y,Z, NUMERO1, numero2, HAZ1, 
ETAH1, HAZ2, ETAH2, NUMTOT; 
END SETS 
 
!in metanet suggerisce di fare simulation step 10s, free speed 100-
120 km/h, lunghezze di 300-800 metri; 
 
TSUP=14; 
I(1)=0; 
N1(1)=0; 
N2(1)=0; 
 
 
!Coda; 
@FOR(Time(t)| t#LE#TSUP: I(t+1)=I(t)+V(t)-X(t)); 
 
!Tratto uno; 
@FOR(Time(t)| t#LE#TSUP: N1(t+1)*L1=N1(t)*L1-Y(t)+X(t)); 
 
!Tratto due; 
@FOR(Time(t)| t#LE#TSUP: N2(t+1)=N2(t)+Y(t)/L2-Z(t)/L2); 
 
 
!i flussi; 
@FOR(Time(t): Y(t)=N1(t)*vel1(t)*dt); 
@FOR(Time(t): Z(t)=N2(t)*vel2(t)*dt); 
 
@FOR(Time(t):NUMERO1(t)= N1(t)*L1); 
!@FOR(Time(t):NUMERO1(t)= Y(t)+Z(t)+I(t)); 
 
 
@FOR(Time(t):NUMERO2(t)= N2(t)*L2); 
 
@FOR(Time(t):NUMTOT(t)= Numero1(t)+Numero2(t) ); 
 
!ore; 
!dt=1; 
!secondi; 
dt=10; 
!km; 
!L1=100; 
!L2=100; 
 
!metrilunghezza; 
L1=800; 
L2=800; 
 
 
!vincolo stabilità velocità < L/dt; 
 
!Obiettivo; 
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MIN=@SUM(Time(t): 
lambda*I(t)+alfa*(N1(t)^2)+beta*(N2(t)^2)+gamma*(N1(t)-
N2(t))^2+delta*(Z(t)^2)); 
 
!MIN=@SUM(Time(t): I(t)+alfa*(N1(t)^2)+beta*(N2(t)^2)+gamma*(N1(t)-
N2(t))^2+delta*(@smax(Z(t)-1,0))); 
 
!MIN=@SUM(Time(t): 10*I(t)); 
lambda=1; 
alfa=20000; 
beta=20000; 
gamma=20000; 
delta=200000; 
 
!Vincoli non neg; 
!@FOR(Time(t): X(t)>=0); 
!@FOR(Time(t): N1(t)>=0); 
!@FOR(Time(t): N2(t)>=0); 
!@FOR(Time(t): Y(t)>=0); 
!@FOR(Time(t): Z(t)>=0); 
 
!non-neg; 
@FOR(Time(t): @FREE(X(t))); 
@FOR(Time(t): @FREE(N1(t))); 
@FOR(Time(t): @FREE(N2(t))); 
@FOR(Time(t): @FREE(Y(t))); 
@FOR(Time(t): @FREE(Z(t))); 
 
@FOR(Time(t): @FREE(numtot(t))); 
 
 
@FOR(Time(t): vel1(t)=16.6); 
@FOR(Time(t): vel1(t)=16.6); 
 
!Risk assessment; 
 
@FOR(Time(t): HAZ1(t) = ETAH1(t)*N1(t)*L1 ); 
@FOR(Time(t): HAZ2(t) = ETAH2(t)*(N2(t)*L2+Z(t) )); 
 
 
 HAZTOT= @sum(Time(t): HAZ1(t)+HAZ2(t)); 
 
 
@FOR(Time(t): ETAH1(t) =10 ); 
@FOR(Time(t): ETAH2(t) =10 ); 
 
 
DATA: 
V=10 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0; 
 
!in km/h; 
!vel1 = 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60; 
!vel2 = 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60; 
 
!in m/s; 
!vel1 = 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6  16.6  
16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6; 
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!vel2 = 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6  16.6  
16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6; 
 
 
 
END DATA 
 
